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In many retail settings, demand for a certain product is determined not only by its
own attributes but also by the attributes of other products, creating interactions
among the demands for different products. This thesis focuses on settings where
a retailer offers heterogeneous products that can be designated into a number of
different subgroups such that product evaluations, i.e., the utilities that a cus-
tomer assigns to products within a subgroup, are correlated. We focus on positive
correlation among product evaluations within subgroups, meaning that products
within a subgroup are closer substitutes to each other than products from another
subgroup. We use the Nested Logit (NL) model as a tool to capture correlated
product evaluations. In the Nested Logit model, a customer follows a two-stage
choice process where she first selects a product subgroup, followed by a specific
product within that group.
The first part of the thesis focuses on a pricing problem where a firm offers
a product for sales through several distinct sales channels and the utility derived
from purchasing the product in each channel depends on its price. In each sales
channel, there are also competing products not under our firm’s control which
must be taken into consideration. We provide sequential methods for obtaining
maximizers of the revenue function and provide structural properties pertaining to
the markups on optimal prices.
The second part of the thesis focuses on pricing problems in which the prices
of offered products are subject to bound constraints and the utility derived from
each product depends on its price. We give approximation methods that allow
the user to specify a performance guarantee a priori, where the final solutions are
obtained by solving linear programs whose sizes scale gracefully with the specified
performance guarantee. In addition, we develop a linear program that we can use
to quickly obtain upper bounds on optimal expected revenues.
The final part of the thesis focuses on an assortment offering problem in which
operational costs are incorporated in the form of inventory considerations. We pro-
vide theoretical and numerical results concerning the effect of correlation between
product evaluations within a subgroup on optimal assortment sizes, optimal profits
and optimal stocking levels. We give structural properties of optimal assortments
within each subgroup, and provide efficient dynamic-programming based solution
approaches for finding near-optimal assortments.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis centers on problems in operations management settings involving
customer choice. When a customer walks into a brick-and-mortar store and browses
the products on the shelves, she makes the choice of what to buy. When a search
for a flight is made online, the customer is shown a listing of available options,
and she makes the choice. When booking a reservation at a restaurant with an
online booking system, the customer views the available times, and then makes
a choice. In many retail applications, customers do not finalize their decisions
before entering a store (or a virtual storefront), but rather, their decision depends
heavily on what they see when they arrive: the product offering decisions made
by the retailer. The growing presence of online retailing has given customers an
avenue to view a wide variety of products or services instantaneously. In light
of this, capturing the substitution patterns of customers has become increasingly
important when making product planning decisions.
A customer choice model is described by the following attributes: a customer
arrives and views an available assortment of products S. Upon viewing the as-
sortment, the customer either chooses one of the available products to purchase,
or elects to leave without making a purchase. Associated with each product j in
the set S is a probability that the customer will purchase product j. In practice,
this probability depends on the assortment S as well as the prices p = (pj)j∈S of
all the products in the assortment. As such, the purchase probability of product
j is a function qj(p, S). The managerial decisions studied in this dissertation take
both the prices and the offered assortment into account.
One of the most prominent customer choice models is the Multinomial Logit
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(MNL) model. The MNL model is derived from an underlying probabilistic model
of customer utility, which assumes that a customer associates a random utility with
each offered product, as well as the no-purchase option, and chooses the option
that provides the largest realized utility. The random utilities follow a Gumbel
distribution, and customer utilities are assumed to be independent from product
to product The MNL model’s popularity stems from its clean and attractive ex-
pressions for the customer purchase probabilities. Its major drawback is that it
exhibits the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property: the ratio of
probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of the presence or
attributes of a third alternative. Another way of saying this is that adding a new
alternative to the assortment has an equal effect on the purchase probabilities of
all other alternatives in the set relative to one another. If the assortment contains
alternatives that can be grouped such that alternatives within a group are more
similar than alternatives outside the group, the MNL model becomes unrealistic,
because adding a new alternative should reduce the probability of choosing similar
alternatives more than dissimilar alternatives.
In the MNL model, the IIA property results from the assumption that a cus-
tomer’s random utilities are assumed to be independent from product to product.
The Nested Logit (NL) model circumvents the IIA property by relaxing the as-
sumption of independence among customer evaluations from product to product,
allowing correlation between a customer’s utilities for products within designated
nests (subsets of the offer set). In particular, the set of potential products is
partitioned into m nests (subsets of the assortment), where there is correlation
between the random utilities of the options in each nest. The NL model is much
more appropriate for capturing settings where a retailer offers a heterogeneous
collection of products that can be designated into a number of different product
2
types or subgroups, where the products within a type are closer substitutes to
each other than products from another type. Both the delineation of products into
subgroups and the customer’s perception of how similar products within types are
can impact customer substitution patterns in ways that cannot be adequately cap-
tured by assuming that all products belong to a single category. In the NL model,
the purchase probability qj(p, S) of a product j depends not only on the product
prices and the assortment, but also on the specific degrees of product evaluation
correlation assigned to each of the m nests.
This thesis considers problems in which the product evaluations of customers
are allowed to be correlated, where variants of the NL model are used to capture
customer choice behavior. In these problems, three key decisions for the retailer
are taken into consideration: the assortment of products offered, the prices of the
offered products, and the amount of each offered product stocked.
We first consider a problem where a firm offers a product for sale via multiple
sales channels, where it is assumed that competing products are present in each
channel. We assume that products offered together within a particular sales chan-
nel are viewed as closer substitutes to one another than products in a different
sales channel, motivating use of the NL model to capture customer choice behav-
ior. The firm must choose the optimal price at which to offer its product in each
sales channel. The work on this chapter focuses on sequential methods for find-
ing revenue-maximizing prices and structural properties of optimal prices, which
are shown to differ from properties observed in pricing problems under the MNL
model.
Next, we study a more general pricing problem, where a firm offers a number
of heterogeneous products than can be designated into subgroups based on their
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attributes. The NL model is again used to capture customer choice behavior. Our
goal in this chapter is to set the prices of all the products to maximize revenue,
subject to upper and lower bounds on each price. There are a number of rea-
sons for incorporating price bounds in practice, such as ensuring that prices are
competitive with the market. We also consider a variant of the same problem
in which the firm must choose the assortment of products to offer in addition to
their prices. The work in this chapter is algorithmic in nature, providing efficient
linear-programming based approximation methods for finding near-optimal prices
that allow the user to specify performance guarantees in advance. We also prove
structural properties of optimal assortments for the joint assortment and pricing
problem.
Finally, we consider an assortment offering problem, where we again have a firm
which offers a number of different heterogeneous products that can be designated
in subgroups, and the firm must choose the optimal subset of its products to offer
to customers. In addition, the firm must also choose the amount of inventory of
each offered product to stock. Unlike in the previous chapters, the incorporation
of operational costs in the form of inventory considerations creates tradeoffs in
this model. Offering larger assortments of products will attract more customers
to our firm’s products, but at the cost of a higher level of fragmentation of de-
mand amongst different products, leading to higher safety stocks. Thus, a balance
must be struck between the costs and benefits of product variety. The main fo-
cus of this work is examining relationships between product evaluation correlation
and optimal product assortment variety. We show that fluctuations in the level
of evaluation correlation between products in subgroups can impact optimal as-
sortment variety and optimal inventory levels in ways that mirror trends observed
in practice. In addition, we provide dynamic-programming solution methods for
4
obtaining near-optimal assortments in reasonable computation time.
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CHAPTER 2
PRICING A SINGLE PRODUCT SOLD VIA MULTIPLE SALES
CHANNELS
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we are concerned with the problem of maximizing expected profits
when a firm has a product that can be sold through multiple sales channels and
customers follow a nested choice selection process, where they first select one of the
available sales channels through which they can purchase products and then select
a specific product within that sales channel. Of particular interest are the settings
where a product is sold through sales channels in which there are other competing
products present. Examples of such settings are found in online retailing, where a
customer can utilize a number of different aggregator websites (e.g., expedia.com,
kayak.com) where a product or service (e.g., a flight or hotel room) belonging to a
particular firm is listed alongside competing products or services offered by other
firms.
In our setting, the sales channels can either take the form of either individual
retail stores or outside agencies which offer the products of competing firms to-
gether. We consider an oligopolistic pricing problem viewed from the perspective
of one firm, in which each nest contains exactly one of our firm’s products, but
also contains alternative options that we do not control. These alternative options
are assumed to be fixed before the time that our firm makes its pricing decisions,
i.e., they act as no-purchase options from the perspective of our firm. In reality,
they may represent products from other firms whose values are fixed ahead of time.
One particular interpretation of this scenario is that our firm has m versions of
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a particular product and is utilizing m distinct agencies acting as intermediaries
between the firm and the customer, through which it is selling these versions. The
central motivating questions of this work are whether a procedure exists for finding
the individual prices to set in each sales channel to maximize expected revenue,
whether the markup on optimal prices is consistent across sales channels, and how
optimal prices differ depending on the competing options present in each sales
channel.
We utilize the nested logit (NL) model to capture the customer’s selection pro-
cess. The Nested Logit (NL) model, of which the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model
is a special case, is a random utility maximization model which is among the most
popular models to study purchase behavior of customers who must choose amongst
multiple substitutable products. The MNL model has been widely used as a model
of customer choice, but it suffers from limitations and may behave poorly when
alternatives are correlated. This is illustrated by the independence of irrelevant
alternatives property; see [26]. The NL model relaxes the assumption of indepen-
dence between all the alternatives, designating the products into subgroups and
capturing the level of similarity among alternatives in the same subgroup through
correlation on utility components. In our setting, the NL model allows us to accu-
rately reflect the fact that different sales channels are perceived as different product
subgroups by customers and the resulting implications on customer substitution
behavior. It also allows us to capture the fact that the level of perceived similarity
among the products in a particular sales channel may differ from channel to chan-
nel. This is especially important when one takes into account the fact that firms
have products grouped together with products offered by competing firms.
We formulate our problem as a nonlinear optimization problem, where the
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objective function is our firm’s expected profit and the decision variables are the
prices. The resulting problem is a price optimization problem under the NL model
where the price in each sales channel can be viewed as the price of a distinct
product. Our problem is difficult as the objective function is neither concave nor
quasi-concave in its decision variables, the complexity of the purchase probability
expressions under the NL model creating structural challenges.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows: we study the problem under
the setting where there are two sales channels. We first show that revenue can be
efficiently maximized over one price with respect to its complement price. We show
that doing so can be used to define a “response function” which takes a price as an
input and maximizes over the complement price with respect to the input. Despite
the fact that the objective function of our original problem lacks desirable structure
in its joint decision variables, we show that these response functions are unimodal
and that global maximizers of the response functions can be used to construct
a global maximizer of our original problem. Secondly, we provide a sequential
method for maximizing our objective function using structural properties of the
response functions. We also extend these results to the setting where the number of
sales channels is arbitrary, showing that an analogous sequential procedure exists
to find a local maximizer of our objective function, though we cannot guarantee
in this case that such a maximizer is global. Lastly, we show that optimal prices
have a markup (i.e., price minus cost) that corresponds to the channel in which
they are placed, and that more attractive competing options within a channel lead
to a lower optimal price within that channel. This differs from price optimization
problems under the MNL model, where prices have been shown to have a constant
markup (see [4] and [19]).
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This chapter is related to several papers which explore price optimization prob-
lems under the MNL model. [16] shows that the profit function under the MNL
model is not concave with respect to the prices. [36] and [11] show that the profit
function is concave with respect to the purchase probabilities or market shares of
the individual products and show how the optimal solution can be obtained using
this transformation. [4] and [19] examine price optimization under the MNL model
with identical price sensitivity coefficients, and show that the optimal markup is
constant for all products; [3] shows that the profit function is unimodal and the
optimal solution can be obtained by solving first-order equations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce
the two-channel price optimization problem. In Section 2.3, we examine structural
properties that show how one price can be optimized if the second price is fixed. In
Section 2.4, we develop a sequential approach for obtaining the optimal solution.
Section 2.5 extends the problem to an arbitrary number of sales channels and
adapts the sequential approach for finding a local maximizer of the revenue function
in the general case. Section 2.6 gives structural properties of optimal prices. In
Section 2.7, we conclude.
2.2 The Two-Channel Problem
We have a single product that is being sold through two different sales channels.
We use i ∈ {1, 2} to index a sales channel. Each channel includes one copy of our
firm’s product, but also contains alternative options that our firm does not control.
These alternative options, which represent competing products from other firms
as well as the option to purchase nothing, are assumed to be fixed before the time
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that our firm makes its pricing decisions. Since the customer must act within the
confines of the agency he or she has chosen to utilize, our firm has no control over
these alternative purchase options, only the price of the product assigned to that
particular sales channel. At the top level, the customer either selects one of the
two sales channels or chooses to leave the system and purchase nothing. At the
second level, if the customer has chosen a sales channel, she then selects a purchase
option within that channel.
In our analysis, we will use “price i” to refer to the price of our firm’s product
that is set for sales channel i. Let (p1, p2) denote our firm’s price vector. Let ni be
the number of competing products in each channel i = 1, 2, and let ri = (ri1, . . . , r
i
ni
)
be the vector of competing prices. We use use αi and βi to denote the base utility
and price sensitivity associated with channel i, which result in the deterministic
component of the random utility a customer associates with a product purchased
through channel i at price p as αi − βip. Equivalently, we can say that this is
a customer’s expected utility for a product purchased through channel i at price
p. We assume that there is one no-purchase option at the top level carrying
a normalized expected utility of zero. Each sales channel also has a parameter
γi ∈ (0, 1] characterizing the degree of dissimilarity between the available purchase
options in that channel. Under the Nested Logit (NL) model, as shown in [7], the
probability that a customer makes a purchase from channel i is given by
λi(p1, p2) =
(eαi−βipi +
∑ni
k=1 e
αi−βirik)γi
1 +
∑
l=1,2(e
αl−βipl +
∑nl
k=1 e
αl−βlrlk)γl
for i = 1, 2. Given that the customer chooses channel i, the probability that a
customer purchases our firm’s product within channel i is given by
λ¯i(pi) =
eαi−βipi
eαi−βipi +
∑ni
k=1 e
αi−βixik
.
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Thus, the probability that a customer purchases our firm’s product in sales channel
i is given by
Λi(p1, p2) = λi(p1, p2)λ¯i(pi).
The probability that a customer leaves the system without selecting a sales channel
is 1−∑i=1,2 Λi(p1, p2), while the probability that a customer selects a sales channel
i but chooses not to purchase our firm’s product is given by λi(p1, p2)(1− λ¯i(pi)).
Let δi be the fraction of revenue that is retained from sales through channel i,
i.e., 1 − δi is the fraction of sales that channel i keeps for utilizing its service. If
we offer the prices p, the expected revenue obtained through selling the product
via the two sales channels is given by
Π(p1, p2) =
∑
i=1,2
δipiΛi(p1, p2).
Our firm’s objective is to choose the two prices to maximize the expected revenue.
In other words, we wish to solve the problem
max
p1,p2≥0
Π(p1, p2).
We note that the revenue function is not quasiconcave in the prices (p1, p2), even
under the simpler MNL model as shown in [16]. Under the special case of the
MNL model, [36] and [11] express the revenue function using the individual pur-
chase probabilities as decision variables and show that it is concave under this
transformation, but concavity does not hold for our problem. To circumvent these
challenges, we will work directly with prices as decision variables, and will establish
structural properties that do not require joint concavity in the prices, but never-
theless allow us to find global maximizers of the revenue function. We will start by
showing how revenue can be maximized over a single price decision, and use this
to characterize a response function that computes the maximizer of the revenue
function over one price with respect to its complement price.
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2.3 Optimization Over a Single Price
This section is concerned with maximizing the revenue function over a single price
decision variable. While the revenue function is not quasiconcave in the prices
(p1, p2), we will show that it is possible to maximize the revenue function over one
price while treating the second price as fixed. This is accomplished via a first-
order analysis of the revenue function. Using the subscript −i to denote 1 if i = 2
and 2 if i = 1, we note that the first partial derivatives of the customer selection
probabilities with respect to prices are given by
∂λi
∂pi
(p1, p2) = −βiγiλ¯i(pi)λi(p1, p2)(1− λi(p1, p2)), i = 1, 2 (2.1)
∂λi
∂p−i
(p1, p2) = β−iγ−iλ¯−i(p−i)λ−i(p1, p2)λi(p1, p2), i = 1, 2 (2.2)
dλ¯i
dpi
(pi) = −βiλ¯i(pi)(1− λ¯i(pi)), i = 1, 2. (2.3)
Using the above, it is easily shown that the purchase probability Λi of the option
corresponding to price i is decreasing in its own price pi and increasing in the price
p−i. To express the first partial derivatives of the revenue function Π(·, ·), we note
that
∂Π
∂pi
(p1, p2) = δiΛi(p1, p2) + δipi
∂Λi
∂pi
(p1, p2) + δ−ip−i
∂Λ−i
∂pi
(p1, p2)
= δiΛi(p1, p2) + δipiΛi(p1, p2)βiγi{−λ¯i(pi) + Λi(p1, p2)− 1/γi + (1/γi)λ¯i(pi)}
+ δ−ip−iγiβiΛi(p1, p2)Λ−i(p1, p2).
Letting
Ci(pi) = λ¯i(pi)δipi + (1− λ¯i(pi)) 1
γi
δipi,
we can simplify the terms in the above equation to arrive at the expression
∂Π
∂pi
(p1, p2) = Λi(p1, p2)
(
δi + γiβi(Π(p1, p2)− Ci(pi))
)
, i = 1, 2. (2.4)
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We note that Ci(pi) is a convex combination of δipi and
1
γi
δipi, and since γi ∈ (0, 1],
this implies that that Ci(pi) ≥ δipi for all pi. We also note that C ′i(pi) > 0 for
pi > 0 and C
′
i(0) = 0, where C
′
i(·) denotes the first derivative of Ci(·).
The revenue function is not necessarily quasiconcave in (p1, p2). However, Π is
unimodal in any single price pi when the second price p−i is fixed. Furthermore,
the global maximum of the function Π(·, p−i) can be found by solving its first-order
equation. We prove this in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For i=1,2, the first-order equation ∂Π
∂pi
(pi, p−i) = 0 has exactly one
solution in pi ≥ 0, and this solution is a global maximizer of Π(·, p−i) on R+.
Proof. Consider the first partial derivative of the revenue function with respect to
pi, as a function of pi:
∂Π
∂pi
(pi, p−i) = Λi(pi, p−i)
(
δi + γiβi(Π(pi, p−i)− Ci(pi))
)
.
We note that ∂Π
∂pi
(0, p−i) > 0, since λi(p1, p2) > 0 for all (p1, p2) and Ci(0) = 0. In
addition, since Λi(p1, p2) < 1 for all (p1, p2), we have Π(p1, p2) ≤ max{δ1p1, δ2p2}.
Since Ci(·) is strictly increasing for pi > 0 and Ci(pi) ≥ δipi, we have
lim
pi→∞
{Π(pi, p−i)− Ci(pi)} = −∞,
which implies that the first-order equation in ∂Π
∂pi
(pi, p−i) = 0 has at least one
solution in pi. Now consider the second derivative with respect to pi,
∂2Π
∂p2i
(pi, p−i) =
∂Λi
∂pi
(pi, p−i)
(
δi + γiβi(Π(pi, p−i)− Ci(pi))
)
+ Λi(pi, p−i)γiβi
(
∂Π
∂pi
(pi, p−i)− C ′i(pi)
)
=
∂Λi
∂pi
(pi, p−i)
Λi(pi, p−i)
∂Π
∂pi
(pi, p−i) + Λi(pi, p−i)γiβi
(
∂Π
∂pi
(pi, p−i)− C ′i(pi)
)
,
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which is negative at any pi that satisfies
∂Π
∂pi
((pi, p−i)) = 0. Thus, the function
Π(·, p−i) is strictly quasi-concave. Therefore, the first-order equation has only one
solution pi, and this solution must be a global maximizer of Π(·, p−i).
We define the response function p∗i : R→ R by letting p∗i (p−i) be the solution to
the first order equation ∂Π
∂pi
(pi, p−i) = 0 as a function of p−i. By Lemma 1, p∗i (p−i) =
argmaxpi Π(pi, p−i). In addition, from the first order equation (2.4), we know that,
given p−i, p∗i (p−i) is the unique price satisfying
Ci(p
∗
i (p−i)) = Π(p
∗
i (p−i), p−i) +
δi
γiβi
. (2.5)
Thus, the value of p∗i (p−i) is intrinsically related to the value of the revenue function
at p∗i (p−i). This suggests that we can maximize revenue by maximizing the value of
the function p∗i (·), as opposed to searching for a maximizer of the revenue function
itself. We now show that this is in fact the case, and provide a method for obtaining
the maximizers of these functions in later sections.
Lemma 2. If p¯−i is a global maximizer of p∗i (·), then (p∗i (p¯−i), p¯−i) is a global
maximizer of Π(·, ·).
Proof. Suppose that there exists a price vector (pˆ1, pˆ2) such that Π(pˆ1, pˆ2) >
Π(p∗i (p¯−i), p¯−i). Then by the definition of p
∗
i (·),
Π(p∗i (pˆ−i), pˆ−i) ≥ Π(pˆ1, pˆ2) > Π(p∗i (p¯−i), p¯−i).
We know that ∂Π
∂pi
(p∗i (pˆ−i), pˆ−i) = 0 and
∂Π
∂pi
(p∗i (p¯−i), p¯−i) = 0. Since Λi(·, ·) > 0
for all finite prices, we must have δi + γiβi(Π(p
∗
i (pˆ−i), pˆ−i) − Ci(p∗i (pˆ−i))) = δi +
γiβi(Π(p
∗
i (p¯−i), p¯−i)−Ci(p∗i (p¯−i)) = 0. This implies that Ci(p∗i (pˆ−i))−Ci(p∗i (p¯−i)) =
γiβi(Π(p
∗
i (pˆ−i), pˆ−i) − Π(p∗i (p¯−i), p¯−i)) > 0. But since p¯−i is a global maximizer of
p∗i (·) and Ci(·) is increasing, this is a contradiction.
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Our next objective is to show that the response function p∗i (·) in fact admits a
global maximizer. We will later devise an approach for finding this maximizer and
using it to construct a global maximizer of the expected revenue function.
Using the Implicit Function Theorem and equation (2.5), we verify that the first
derivative of p∗i (·), which we denote ∇p∗i (·), exists and is continuous. Again using
the Implicit Function Theorem, ∇p∗i (·) is determined by the implicit relationship
∇p∗i (p−i) =
∂Π
∂p−i
(p∗i (p−i), p−i)
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
∀p−i, i = 1, 2. (2.6)
We note that ∇p∗i (p−i) = 0 if and only if ∂Π∂p−i (p∗i (p−i), p−i) = 0, since C ′i(·) > 0.
By the definition of the function p∗i (·), ∂Π∂p−i (p∗i (p−i), p−i) = 0 if and only if p−i =
p∗−i(p
∗
i (p−i)), i.e., p−i is the maximizer of the revenue function Π(·, ·) with respect to
the price p∗i (p−i). Thus, if a price p−i satisfies the first-order condition∇p∗i (p−i) = 0
for p∗i (·), expected revenue cannot be improved from the price (p∗i (p−i), p−i) by
maximizing with respect to either price variable, as any such operations will simply
return to the same price vector. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows that
p∗1(·) is maximized at the maximum value of p∗2(·) and vice-versa.
A natural next question is, if such a point exists, whether or not it defines a
global maximizer of Π(·, ·). We answer this by examining the second derivative
of p∗i (·), which we denote ∇2p∗i (·). To implicitly express the second derivative, we
note that
∇p∗i (p−i) =
Λ−i(p∗i (p−i), p−i)
(
δ−i + γ−iβ−i(Π(p∗i (p−i), p−i)− C−i(p−i))
)
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
=
Λ−i(p∗i (p−i), p−i)
(
δ−i + γ−iβ−i(Ci(p∗i (p−i))− δiγiβi − C−i(p−i))
)
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
,
which follows from (2.4) and (2.5). Continuing the differentiation from the above
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Figure 2.1: Example values of p∗1(·) and p∗2(·).
equation, we have
∇2p∗i (p−i)
=
∂Λ−i
∂p−i
(p∗i (p−i), p−i)
δ−i + γ−iβ−i(Ci(p∗i (p−i))− δiγiβi − C−i(p−i))
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
+ Λ−i(p∗i (p−i), p−i) ·
{
γ−iβ−i
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))∇p∗i (p−i)− C ′−i(p−i)
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
− C ′′i (p∗i (p−i))∇p∗i (p−i)
δ−i + γ−iβ−i(Ci(p∗i (p−i))− δiγiβi − C−i(p−i))
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))2
}
.
Using this expression, we can show that the unimodality of the revenue function
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over a single price extends to unimodality of the response function. This is char-
acterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The function p∗i (·) is strictly quasiconcave on R+.
Proof. Suppose that ∇p∗i (p−i) = 0. Then
∇2p∗i (p−i)
=
∂Λ−i
∂p−i
(p∗i (p−i), p−i)
∇p∗i (p−i)
Λ−i(p∗i (p−i), p−i)
− Λ−i(p∗i (p−i), p−i)γ−iβ−i
C ′−i(p−i)
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
= −Λ−i(p∗i (p−i), p−i)γ−iβ−i
C ′−i(p−i)
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
.
We now claim that p−i > 0. To see this, note that since ∇p∗i (p−i) = 0, we must
have p−i = p∗−i(p
∗
i (p−i)). Therefore, p−i satisfies the relationship C−i(p−i) =
Π(p∗i (p−i), p−i) +
δ−i
γ−iβ−i
, so C−i(p−i) must be positive, implying that p−i is pos-
itive. Thus, C ′−i(p−i) > 0 and we have ∇2p∗i (p−i) < 0. Since p−i is an arbitrary
price satisfying ∇p∗i (p−i) = 0, this implies that p∗i (·) is strictly quasiconcave.
Since p∗i (·) is strictly quasiconcave, any price p−i that satisfies the first-order
condition for p∗i (·) must be a global maximizer of p∗i (·). Thus, by Lemma 2, if we can
find a price satisfying the first order equation ∇p∗i (p−i) = 0 for either i = 1, 2, this
price defines a global maximizer (p∗i (p−i), p−i) of Π(·, ·). In the following section,
we will describe a sequential approach to find this global maximizer.
2.4 A Sequential Approach To Maximizing Revenue
In this section, we present a sequential method for maximizing Π(p1, p2). This
method involves successively maximizing Π with respect to p1 and subsequently
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maximizing Π with respect to p2 in sequence. We will use properties of the function
p∗i (·) to prove that maximizing over individual prices successively in this manner
leads to finding a critical point of the function p∗i (·) for i = 1, 2, which defines a
global maximizer of Π(·, ·).
Theorem 1. Let (p01, p
0
2) be an arbitrary price vector. For all k = 1, 2, . . . , let
pk2 = p
∗
2(p
k−1
1 ) and p
k
1 = p
∗
1(p
k
2). Then the sequence {(pk1, pk2)}k=1,2,... converges to a
global maximizer of Π(·, ·).
Proof. We know that the function p∗i (·) is defined for i = 1, 2. Since pk2 =
p∗2(p
k−1
1 ) and p
k+1
2 = p
∗
2(p
k
1), it follows that Π(p
k−1
1 , p
k
2) = C1(p
k
2) − δ2γ2β2 and
Π(pk1, p
k+1
2 ) = C2(p
k+1
2 ) − δ2γ2β2 . Since the operation p∗i (·) improves revenue, we
have Π(pk−11 , p
k
2) ≤ Π(pk1, pk2) ≤ Π(pk1, pk+12 ), so C2(pk2) − δ2γ2β2 ≤ C2(pk+12 ) − δ2γ2β2 .
Since C2(·) is increasing, the sequence {pk2}k≥1 is increasing; we can similarly prove
that {pk1}k≥1 is increasing as well. Let p¯1 = supk≥1{pk1} and p¯2 = supk≥1{pk2}. Since
Π(·, ·) has a global maximizer, the functions p∗1(·) and p∗2(·) are bounded. This fol-
lows from equation (2.5) and the fact that Π(·, ·) is bounded. Therefore, {pk1} and
{pk2} are bounded and we have lim{pk1} = p¯1 < ∞ and lim{pk2} = p¯2 < ∞ by the
monotone convergence theorem. In addition, {Π(pk1, pk2)} is bounded, monotone
and convergent, and we have limk→∞Π(pk1, p
k
2) = Π(p¯1, p¯2). But also,
lim
k→∞
Π(pk1, p
k
2) = lim
k→∞
Π(pk1, p
k+1
2 ) = lim
k→∞
{
C2(p
k+1
2 )−
δ2
γ2β2
}
= C2(p¯2)− δ2
γ2β2
,
where the last equality follows from the fact that C2(·) is increasing. Thus, we
have C2(p¯2) = Π(p¯1, p¯2) +
δ2
γ2β2
, which implies that p¯2 = p
∗
2(p¯1). Similarly, we can
show that p¯1 = p
∗
1(p¯2). Thus, ∇p∗2(p¯1) = 0 and it follows that (p¯1, p¯2) is a global
maximizer of Π(·, ·).
Thus, despite the fact that Π(p1, p2) is not quasi-concave in (p1, p2) in general,
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there exists an iterative method for finding a global maximizer of Π. We note that
this sequential method differs from a taˆtonnement scheme (e.g.,, in [1]), in which
both prices are simultaneously optimized with respect to their complement prices in
the previous iteration, i.e., pk+11 = argmaxp1 Π(p1, p
k
2), p
k+1
2 = argmaxp2 Π(p
k
1, p2).
Defining the sequence as in Theorem 1 is key to maintaining increasing revenue
values and monotonicity of the sequences {pk1} and {pk2}.
In the next section, we extend this iterative procedure to an arbitrary number
of sales channels and show that it can be used to obtain a local maximizer of the
revenue function.
2.5 Pricing with m Channels
Assume now that there are an arbitrary number of sales channels m, and let M =
{1, . . . ,m}. We continue to use i ∈M to index sales channels. Let p = (p1, . . . , pm)
denote our firm’s vector of prices to be determined across all channels. We continue
to use ni to denote the number of competing products in each channel i and x
i
k
to denote the price of competing product k in channel i. Under the NL model,
a customer purchases our firm’s product from channel i ∈ M with probability
Λi(p) = λi(p)λ¯i(pi), where
λi(p) =
(eαi−βipi +
∑ni
k=1 e
αi−βixik)γi
1 +
∑
l∈M(e
αl−βipl +
∑nl
k=1 e
αl−βlxlk)γl
,
and λ¯i(pi) is the same as defined for the two-price problem. Our objective is to
maximize the expected revenue
Π(p) =
∑
i∈M
δipiΛi(p)
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over Rm+ . It is easily verified that the analogue of equation (2.4) is true in general,
i.e.,
∂Π
∂pi
(p) = Λi(p)
(
δi + γiβi(Π(p)− Ci(pi))
)
, i ∈M. (2.7)
Analogous to the two-price setting, it is possible to maximize the function
Π(·) over a single price. Namely, letting p−i denote (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pm), the
first-order equation ∂Π
∂pi
(pi,p−i) = 0 has exactly one solution, which is a global
maximizer of Π(·,p−i). The proof is the same as that of Lemma 1. As such, we
define the response functions p∗i : Rm−1 → R by letting p∗i (p−i) be the solution to
the first order equation ∂Π
∂pi
(pi,p−i) = 0, i.e.,
Ci(p
∗
i (p−i)) = Π(p
∗
i (p−i),p−i) +
δi
γiβi
.
In addition, the proof of Lemma 2 can be adapted to show that if p¯−i is a local
maximizer of p∗i (·), then (p∗i (p¯−i), p¯−i) is a local maximizer of Π(·).
Let ∇p∗i (·) denote the gradient of p∗i (·) and let ∇2p∗i (·) denote its Hessian ma-
trix. The first and second partial derivatives of p∗i (·) are given by
∂p∗i
∂pj
(p−i) = Λj(p
∗
i (p−i),p−i)
δj + γjβj[Ci(p
∗
i (p−i))− δiαi − Cj(pj)]
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
, j 6= i,
and
∂2p∗i
∂pj∂pk
(p−i) =
∂Λj
∂pk
(p∗i (p−i),p−i)
Λj(p∗i (p−i),p−i)
∂p∗i
∂pj
(p−i)
+ Λj(p
∗
i (p−i),p−i) ·
{
γjβj
αjC
′(p∗i (p−i))
∂p∗i
∂pk
(p−i)− C ′j(pj)1(k = j)
C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
− C ′′i (p∗i (p−i))
∂p∗i
∂pk
(p−i)
δj + γjβj(Ci(p
∗
i (p−i))− δiαi − Cj(pj))
(C ′i(p
∗
i (p−i)))2
}
, j, k 6= i,
respectively. We observe that if the gradient ∇p∗i (p−i) is zero, then ∂p
∗
i
∂pj
(p−i) = 0
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for all j 6= i, so the entries of the Hessian at p−i are given by
∂2p∗i
∂pj∂pk
(p−i) =

−Λj(p∗i (p−i),p−i)γjβj
C′j(pj)
C′i(p
∗
i (p−i))
, k = j
0, k 6= j.
Thus, the Hessian at p−i is diagonal with negative entries, and is therefore negative
definite at any vector p−i satisfying ∇p∗i (p−i) = 0. While this is not strong enough
to prove that p∗i (·) is a quasiconcave function as in the two-price setting, it does
imply that any p−i satisfying ∇p∗i (p−i) = 0 is a local maximizer of p∗i (·). We will
use this fact to formulate an analogue of our approach from the two-price setting
to find a local maximizer of Π(·).
Define the families of operators {Ti}i∈M : Rm → Rm and{T¯i}i∈M∪{0} : Rm →
Rm as follows: T¯0(p) = p, Ti(p) = T¯i−1(p∗i (p−i),p−i) and T¯i(p) = limk→∞Tki (p),
where
Tki (p) = Ti(Ti(· · · (Ti︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
(p)))).
Our sequential procedure for the m-channel problem involves evaluating Tm(p
0)
from any initial price vector p. We observe that if m = 2, this corresponds exactly
to the sequential procedure that we formulated for the 2-channel problem. The
following theorem demonstrates that T¯i(p) is defined for all i ∈M and that T¯m(p)
is a local maximizer of the revenue function.
Theorem 2. For all p ∈ Rm+ , {Tki (p)}k≥1 converges for all i ∈ M , and T¯m(p) is
a local maximizer of Π(·).
Proof. The proof is by induction. For notational brevity, let T kij(p) denote the
jth component of Tki (p) and T¯ij(p) denote the jth component of T¯i(p); also let
T¯i,−j(p) denote the vector of all components of T¯i(p) besides the jth component.
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Base case: We note that T1(p) = (p
∗
1(p−1),p−1). Thus, since T¯0 is the identity,
T1(T1(p)) = (p
∗
1(p−1),p−1) as well, and it follows that T¯1(p) = (p
∗
1(p−1),p−1).
We have
T2(p) = T¯1(p
∗
2(p−2),p−2) = (p
∗
1(p
∗
2(p−2)), p
∗
2(p−2), p3, . . . , pm).
From Theorem 1, we know that for any p, limk→∞Tk2(p) = T¯2(p) exists and that
T¯22(p) = p
∗
2(T¯21(p), p3, . . . , pm) and T¯21(p) = p
∗
1(T¯22(p), p3, . . . , pm). We can show
this by considering Π(·, p3, . . . , pm) as a two-price revenue function and following
the sequential approach over the first two prices from Theorem 1, which is exactly
the procedure involved in finding limk→∞Tk2(p).
Inductive step: Now suppose that for some 2 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, T¯i(p) exists and
T¯ij(p) = p
∗
j(T¯i,−j(p)) for all j = 1, . . . , i. Then for all k ≥ 1,
T ki+1,i+1(p) = p
∗
i+1(T
k−1
i+1,1(p), . . . , T
k−1
i+1,i(p), pi+2, . . . , pm)
and
T ki+1,j(p) = T¯ij(T
k−1
i+1,1(p), . . . , T
k−1
i+1,i(p), T
k
i+1,i+1(p), pi+2, . . . , pm)∀j = 1, . . . , i.
Thus, since Π(T k−1i+1,1(p), . . . , T
k−1
i+1,i(p), T
k
i+1,i+1(p), pi+2, . . . , pm) = Ci(T
k
i+1,i+1(p))−
δi
γiβi
and Π(Tki (p)) = Cj(T
k
i+1,j(p))− δjγjβj ∀j = 1, . . . , i−1 are increasing in k, both
{T ki+1,i+1(p)} and {T ki+1,j(p)}, j = 1, . . . , i − 1 are increasing in k, bounded and
convergent. Thus, T¯i+1(p) exists. We have
Π(T¯i+1(p)) = lim
k→∞
Π(Tki+1(p))
= lim
k→∞
Π(T k−1i+1,1(p), . . . , T
k−1
i+1,i(p), T
k
i+1,i+1(p), pi+2, . . . , pm)
= lim
k→∞
{
Ci(T
k
i+1,i+1(p))−
δi
γiβi
}
= Ci(T¯i+1,i+1(p))− δi
γiβi
,
so T¯i+1,i+1(p) = p
∗
i+1(T¯i+1,−(i+1)(p)). We can similarly show that T¯i+1,j(p) =
p∗j(T¯i+1,−j(p)) for all j = 1, . . . , i.
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Thus, by induction, for all i ∈M , {Tki (p)}k≥1 converges and T¯ij(p) = p∗j(T¯i,−j(p))
for all j = 1, . . . , i. So T¯m(p) exists and we have T¯mj(p) = p
∗
j(T¯m,−j(p)) for all j ∈
M. This implies that
∂p∗i
∂pj
(T¯m,−i(p)) =
∂Π
∂pj
(p∗i (T¯m,−i(p)),T¯m,−i(p))
C′i(p
∗
i (T¯m,−i(p)))
=
∂Π
∂pj
(T¯m(p))
C′i(p
∗
i (T¯m,−i(p)))
= 0
for all j ∈ M . Thus, T¯m,−i(p) is a local maximizer of p∗i (·), which implies that
T¯m(p) is a local maximizer of Π(·).
2.6 Properties of Optimal Prices
If a price vector p is globally optimal, then we must have p∗i (p−i) = pi for all
i ∈ M. Thus, we have Ci(pi) = Π(p) + δiγiβi for all i ∈ M. [4] and [19] show that
in price optimization problems under the MNL model, all optimal prices have a
constant markup, i.e., price minus cost. In our case, we express the markup of
price i as δipi, as the percentage δi encompasses the costs incurred from offering
our firm’s product in channel i. If δi = 1, the markup of price i is simply its price,
and in the MNL model when all costs are zero, a constant price among all products
is optimal. In our case, we note that
Ci(pi) =
eαi−βipi
Ai + eαi−βipi
δipi +
Ai
Ai + eαi−βipi
1
γi
δipi,
where Ai =
∑ni
k=1 e
αi−βirik is the aggregate attractiveness of the competitor prices
and the no-purchase option within channel i. Therefore, if Π∗ denotes the optimal
revenue, every optimal price pi must satisfy
δipi =
γi(Ai + e
αi−βipi)
Ai + γieαi−βipi
(
Π∗ +
δi
γiβi
)
. (2.8)
We make two key observations from equation (2.8). The first is that optimal
markups are not constant. We note that even if Ai = 0 (i.e., there are no competing
purchase options within channel i), the optimal channel markup is equal to the
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optimal revenue plus the constant δi
γiβi
, which is unique to the channel i. If Ai > 0,
then the optimal channel markup is a channel-specific function of the optimal
revenue. Second, we note that the right-hand side of equation (2.8) is a decreasing
function in pi, and thus equation (2.8) has a unique solution. But in addition,
the right-hand side of (2.8) is decreasing in Ai for any fixed pi and the optimal
revenue Π∗ is decreasing with Ai, where the latter can be shown by noting that all
of the purchase probabilities Λj(p)j∈M are decreasing in Ai for any fixed p. Thus,
as Ai gets larger, the value of pi where the left and right-hand sides of equation
(2.8) intersects gets smaller. This implies that more attractive competing products
within a channel lead to a lower channel price.
2.7 Conclusions
We formulated a pricing problem where a firm prices a single product through mul-
tiple sales channels and competing products are present in each channel. We used
the nested logit model to capture the customer’s selection process. In the setting
where there are two sales channels, we showed that while the expected revenue
function is not quasi concave in the prices, maximizing prices individually with
respect to one another yields useful structural properties. We used this knowledge
to formulate a sequential procedure that can be used to find a global maximizer of
the expected revenue function by maximizing over individual prices successively.
We extended this result to a setting with an arbitrary number of sales channels
and showed that an analogous procedure can be used to find a local maximum
of the revenue function. In both settings, we show that the markups of optimal
prices are determined by channel-specific parameters and that the optimal price in
a particular channel is decreasing in the aggregate attractiveness of the competing
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products present in that channel.
It still remains to be shown whether a tractable method exists for solving more
general problems under the nested logit model, e.g., by relaxing the assumption
that our firm only controls one product in each sales channel or product subgroup
or by incorporating constraints on the prices of products our firm controls. These
questions are addressed later in the thesis.
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CHAPTER 3
APPROXIMATION METHODS FOR MULTI-PRODUCT PRICING
PROBLEMS WITH PRICE BOUNDS
3.1 Introduction
When faced with product variety, most customers make their purchase decisions
by comparing the offered products through attributes such as price, richness of
features and durability. In this type of a situation, the demand for a certain
product is determined not only by its own attributes but also by the attributes of
other products, creating interactions among the demands for different products.
Discrete choice models are particularly suitable to study such demand interactions,
as they model the demand for a certain product as a function of the attributes
of all products offered to customers. However, optimization models that try to
find the right set of products to offer or the right prices to charge may quickly
become intractable when one works with complex discrete choice models and tries
to incorporate operational constraints.
In this chapter, we consider pricing problems where the interactions between the
demands for the different products are captured through the nested logit model and
there are bounds on the prices that can be charged for the products. We consider
two problem variants. In the first variant, the set of products offered to customers
is fixed and we want to determine the prices for these products. In the second
variant, we jointly determine the products that should be offered to customers
and their corresponding prices. Once the products to be offered and their prices
are determined, customers choose among the offered products according to the
nested logit model. In both variants, the objective is to maximize the expected
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revenue obtained from each customer. We give approximation methods for both
variants of the problem. In particular, for any ρ > 0, our approximation methods
obtain a solution with an expected revenue deviating from the optimal by at most
a factor of 1 + ρ. To obtain this solution, the approximation methods solve linear
programs whose sizes grow linearly with 1/ log(1 + ρ). Noting that 1/ log(1 + ρ)
grows at the same rate as 1/ρ for small values of ρ, the computational work for our
approximation methods grows polynomially with the approximation factor. Our
approximation methods give a performance guarantee over all problem instances,
but we also develop a linear program that we can use to quickly obtain an upper
bound on the optimal expected revenue for an individual problem instance. In our
computational experiments, we compare the expected revenues from the solutions
obtained by our approximation methods with the upper bounds on the optimal
expected revenues and demonstrate that our approximation methods can quickly
obtain solutions whose expected revenues differ from the optimal by less than a
percent. Thus, our approximation methods have favorable theoretical performance
guarantees and they are useful to obtain high quality solutions in practice.
The first problem variant we consider is a pricing problem where customers
choose according to the nested logit model and there are bounds on the prices
of the offered products. For the first variant, assuming that there are m nests
in the nested logit model and each nest includes n products to offer, we show
that for any ρ > 0, we can solve a linear program with O(m) decision variables
and O(mn + mn log(nσ)/ log(1 + ρ)) constraints to obtain a set of prices with
an expected revenue deviating from the optimal expected revenue by at most a
factor of 1 + ρ. In this result, σ depends on the deviation between the upper
and lower price bounds of the products. The second problem variant we consider
is a joint assortment offering and pricing problem, where we need to choose the
27
products to offer and their corresponding prices. For this variant, we establish a
useful property for the optimal subsets of products to offer. In particular, ordering
the products according to their price upper bounds, we show that it is optimal
to offer a certain number of products with the largest price upper bounds. Using
this result, we show that for any ρ > 0, we can solve a linear program with O(m)
decision variables and O(mn2 +mn2 log(nσ)/ log(1 + ρ)) constraints to find a set
of products to offer and their corresponding prices such that the expected revenue
obtained by this solution deviates from the optimal expected revenue by at most
a factor of 1 + ρ. Comparing our results for the two variants, we observe that
the extra computational burden of jointly finding a set of products to offer and
pricing the offered products boils down to increasing the number of constraints in
the linear program by a factor of n.
Pricing under the nested logit model has recently received attention, starting
with the work of [24] and [14]. [24] considers pricing problems without upper or
lower bound constraints on the prices. Assuming that the products in the same
nest share the same price sensitivity parameter and the so called dissimilarity pa-
rameters of the nested logit model are less than one, the authors cleanly show
that the pricing problem can be reduced to the problem of maximizing a scalar
function. This scalar function turns out to be unimodal so that maximizing it is
tractable. [14] also studies pricing problems under the nested logit model without
price bounds, but they allow the products in the same nest to have different price
sensitivities and the dissimilarity parameters of the nested logit model to take
on arbitrary values. Surprisingly, their elegant argument shows that the optimal
prices can still be found by maximizing a scalar function, but this scalar function
is not unimodal in general and evaluating this scalar function at any point requires
solving a separate high-dimensional optimization problem involving implicitly de-
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fined functions. This chapter fills a number of gaps in this area. The earlier work
shows that the problem of finding the optimal prices can be reduced to maximiz-
ing a scalar function, which is the expected revenue as the function of an adjusted
markup parameter. However, this function is not unimodal and maximizing it
can be intractable for two reasons. First, a natural approach to maximizing this
scalar function is to evaluate it at a finite number of grid points and pick the best
solution, but it is not clear how to place these grid points to obtain a performance
guarantee. Second, given that computing the scalar function at any point requires
solving a nontrivial optimization problem, it is computationally prohibitive to sim-
ply follow a brute force approach and use a large number of grid points. Thus,
while the earlier work shows how to reduce the pricing problem to a problem of
maximizing a scalar function, as far as we can see, it does not yet yield a computa-
tionally viable and theoretically sound algorithm to compute near-optimal prices
in general. Our work provides practical algorithms that deliver a desired perfor-
mance guarantee of 1 + ρ for any ρ > 0. To obtain our approximation methods,
we transform the pricing problem into a knapsack problem with a separable and
concave objective function, which ultimately allows us to use different arguments
from [24] and [14].
Beside providing computationally viable algorithms to find prices with a certain
performance guarantee, a unique feature of our work is that it allows imposing
bounds on the prices that can be chosen by the decision maker. Such price bounds
do not appear in the earlier pricing work under the nested logit model and there
are a number of theoretical and practical reasons for studying such bounds. On
the theoretical side, if we impose price bounds, then even in the simplest case when
the price sensitivities of all products are equal to each other, the scalar functions
in the works of [24] and [14] are no longer unimodal. In such cases, we emphasize
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that the lack of unimodality is purely due to the presence of the price bounds,
as the work of [24] shows that the scalar functions that they work are indeed
unimodal when the price sensitivities of the products are equal to each other. Thus,
price bounds can significantly complicate the structural properties of the pricing
problem. Furthermore, naive approaches for satisfying price bound constraints
may yield poor results. For example, a first cut approach for dealing with price
bounds is to use the work of [24] or [14] to find the optimal prices for the products
under the assumption that there are no price bounds. If these unconstrained prices
are outside the price bound constraints, then we can round them up or down to
their corresponding lower or upper bounds. This naive approach does not perform
well and we can come up with problem instances where this naive approach can
result in revenue losses of over 20%, when compared with approaches that explicitly
incorporate price bounds.
There are also practical reasons for studying price bounds. Customers may
have expectations for sensible price ranges and it is useful to incorporate these price
ranges explicitly into the pricing model. Furthermore, lack of data may prevent us
from fitting an accurate choice model to capture customer choices, in which case we
can guide the model by limiting the range of possible prices through price bounds.
When we solve the pricing model without price bounds, we essentially rely on the
choice model to find a set of reasonable prices for the products, but depending on
the parameters of the choice model, the prices may not come out to be practical.
Thus, incorporating price bounds into the pricing problem is a nontrivial task
from a theoretical perspective and it has important practical implications. It is
also worth mentioning that if there are no price bounds, then finding the right set
of products to offer is not an issue as [14] show that it is always optimal to offer
all products at some finite price level. This result does not hold in the presence of
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price bounds and our second variant, which jointly determines the set of products
to offer and their corresponding prices, becomes particularly useful.
Our approximation methods allow us to obtain prices with a certain perfor-
mance guarantee. In addition to these approximation methods, we give a simple
approach to compute an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue. This up-
per bound is obtained by solving a linear program and we can progressively refine
the upper bound by increasing the number of constraints in the linear program. By
comparing the expected revenue from the solution obtained by our approximation
methods with the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue, we can bound
the optimality gap of the solutions obtained by our approximation methods for
each individual problem instance. Admittedly, our approximation methods pro-
vide a performance guarantee of 1 + ρ for a given ρ > 0, but this is the worst case
performance guarantee over all problem instances and it turns out that we can
use the linear program to obtain a tighter performance guarantee for an individual
problem instance. The linear program we use to obtain an upper bound on the
optimal expected revenue can be useful even if we do not work with our approxi-
mation methods to obtain a good solution to the pricing problem. In particular,
we can use an arbitrary heuristic or an approximation method to obtain a set of
prices and check the gap between the expected revenue obtained by charging these
prices and the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue. If the gap turns out
to be small, then there is no need to look for better prices.
There is a long history on building discrete choice models to capture customer
preferences. Some of these models are based on axioms describing a sensible be-
havior of customer choice, as in the basic attraction model of [26]. On the other
hand, some others use a utility maximization principle, where an arriving customer
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associates random utilities with the products and chooses the product providing
the largest utility. Such a utility based approach is followed by [28], resulting in the
celebrated multinomial logit model. The nested logit model, which plays a central
role in this chapter, goes back to the work of [42]. Extensions for the nested logit
model are provided by [29] and [7]. An important feature of the nested logit model
is that it avoids the independence of irrelevant alternatives property suffered by
the multinomial logit model. A discussion of this property can be found in [6].
There is a body of work on assortment optimization problems under various
discrete choice models. In the assortment optimization setting, the prices of the
products are fixed and we choose the set of products to offer given that customers
choose among the offered products according to a particular choice model. [37]
studies assortment problems when customers choose under the multinomial logit
model and show that the optimal assortment includes a certain number of products
with the largest revenues. As a result, the optimal assortment can efficiently be
found by checking the performance of every assortment that includes a certain
number of products with the largest revenues. [34] considers the same problem with
a constraint on the number of products in the offered assortment and show that the
problem can be solved in a tractable fashion. [40] extends this work to more general
versions of the multinomial logit model. In [8], [31] and [35], there are multiple
types of customers, each choosing according to the multinomial logit model with
different parameters. The authors show that the assortment problem becomes
NP-hard in the weak and strong sense, propose approximation methods and study
integer programming formulations. [20] work on how to obtain good assortments
with only limited computations of the expected revenue from different assortments.
The work mentioned so far in this paragraph uses the multinomial logit model,
but there are extensions to the nested logit model. [33] develop an approximation
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scheme for assortment problems when customers choose under the nested logit
model and there is a shelf space constraint for the offered assortment. [10] studies
the same problem without the shelf space constraint and give a tractable method
to obtain the optimal assortment under the nested logit model. [13] show that
it is tractable to obtain the optimal assortment when customers choose according
to the nested logit model and there is a cardinality constraint on the number of
products offered in each nest. They extend their result to the situation where each
product can be offered at a finite number of price levels and one needs to jointly
choose the assortment of products to offer and their corresponding price levels.
Their approach does not work when the set of products to be offered is fixed and
not under the control of the decision maker.
Pricing problems within the context of different discrete choice models is also
an active research area. Under the multinomial logit model, [16] note that the
expected revenue function is not concave in prices. However, [36] and [11] make
progress by formulating the problem in terms of market shares, as this formula-
tion yields a concave expected revenue function. [24] extend the concavity result
to the nested logit model by assuming that the price sensitivities of the products
are constant within each nest and the dissimilarity parameters are less than one.
[14] relax both of the assumptions in [24] and extend the analysis to more gen-
eral forms of the nested logit model. [41] considers a joint assortment and price
optimization problem to choose the offered products and their prices. The author
imposes cardinality constraints on the offered assortment, but the customer choices
are captured by using the multinomial logit model, which is more restrictive than
the nested logit model. Recently, there has been interest in modeling large scale
revenue management problems by incorporating the fact that customers make a
choice depending on the assortment of available itinerary products and their prices.
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The main approach in these models is to formulate deterministic approximations
under the assumption that customer arrivals and choices are deterministic. Such
deterministic approximations have a large number of decision variables and they
are usually solved by using column generation. The assortment and pricing prob-
lems described in this and the paragraph above become instrumental when solving
the column generation subproblems. Deterministic approximations for large-scale
revenue management problems can be found in [12], [25], [23], [43], [44] and [30].
In Section 3.2, we formulate the first variant of the problem, where the set
of products to be offered is fixed and we choose the prices for these products. In
Section 3.3, we show that this problem can be visualized as finding the fixed point
of a scalar function. In Section 3.4, we develop an approximation framework by
using the fixed point representation and computing a scalar function at a finite
number of grid points. In Section 3.5, we show how to construct an appropriate
grid with a performance guarantee and give our approximation method. In Section
3.6, we extend the work in the earlier sections to the second variant of the problem,
where we jointly choose the products to offer and their corresponding prices. In
Section 3.7, we show how to obtain an upper bound on the optimal expected
revenue and give computational experiments to compare the performance of our
approximation methods with the upper bounds on the optimal expected revenues.
In Section 3.8, we conclude.
3.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we describe the nested logit model and formulate the pricing prob-
lem. There are m nests indexed by M = {1, . . . ,m}. Depending on the application
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setting, nests may correspond to different retail stores, different product categories
or different sales channels. In each nest there are n products and we index the prod-
ucts by N = {1, . . . , n}. We use pij to denote the price of product j in nest i. The
price of product j in nest i has to satisfy the price bound constraint pij ∈ [lij, uij],
for the upper and lower bound parameters lij, uij ∈ [0,∞). We use wij to denote the
preference weight of product j in nest i. Under the nested logit model, if we choose
the price of product j in nest i as pij, then the preference weight of this product
is wij = exp(αij − βij pij), where αij ∈ (−∞,∞) and βij ∈ [0,∞) are parameters
capturing the effect of the price on the preference weight. Since there is a one to
one correspondence between the price and preference weight of a product, through-
out the chapter, we assume that we choose the preference weight of a product, in
which case, there is a price corresponding to the chosen preference weight. In par-
ticular, if we choose the preference weight of product j in nest i as wij, then the
corresponding price of this product is pij = (αij− logwij)/βij, which is obtained by
setting wij = exp(αij −βij pij) and solving for pij. For brevity, we let κij = αij/βij
and ηij = 1/βij and write the relationship between price and preference weight as
pij = κij − ηij logwij. Noting the upper and lower bound constraint on prices, the
preference weight of product j in nest i has to satisfy the constraint wij ∈ [Lij, Uij]
with Lij = exp(αij−βij uij) and Uij = exp(αij−βij lij). We usewi = (wi1, . . . , win)
to denote the vector of preference weights of the products in nest i. Under the
nested logit model, if we choose the preference weights of the products in nest i
as wi and a customer decides to make a purchase in this nest, then this customer
purchases product j in nest i with probability wij/
∑
k∈N wik. Thus, if we choose
the preference weights of the products in nest i as wi and a customer decides to
make a purchase in this nest, then we obtain an expected revenue of
Ri(wi) =
∑
j∈N
wij∑
k∈N wik
(κij − ηij logwij) =
∑
j∈N wij (κij − ηij logwij)∑
j∈N wij
,
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where the term wij/
∑
k∈N wik on the left side above is the probability that a cus-
tomer purchases product j in nest i given this customer decides to make a purchase
in this nest, whereas the term κij−ηij logwij captures the revenue associated with
product j in nest i.
Each nest i has a parameter γi ∈ (0, 1], characterizing the degree of dissimilarity
between the products in this nest. In this case, if we choose the preference weights
of the products in all nests as (w1, . . . ,wm), then a customer decides to make a
purchase in nest i with probability
Qi(w1, . . . ,wm) =
(∑
j∈N wij
)γi
1 +
∑
l∈M
(∑
j∈N wlj
)γl .
Depending on the interpretation of a nest as a retail store, a product category or
a sales channel, the expression above computes the probability that a customer
chooses a particular retail store, product category or sales channel as a function of
the preference weights of all products. With probability 1−∑i∈M Qi(w1, . . . ,wm),
a customer leaves without making a purchase. McFadden (1984) demonstrates that
the choice probabilities above can be derived from a utility maximization principle,
where a customer associates a random utility with each product and purchases the
product that provides the largest utility. Thus, if we choose the preference weights
as (w1, . . . ,wm) over all nests, then we obtain an expected revenue of
Π(w1, . . . ,wm) =
∑
i∈M
Qi(w1, . . . ,wm)Ri(wi)
=
∑
i∈M
(∑
j∈N wij
)γi ∑
j∈N wij (κij−ηij logwij)∑
j∈N wij
1 +
∑
i∈M
(∑
j∈N wij
)γi , (3.1)
where the second equality is by the definitions of Ri(wi) and Qi(w1, . . . ,wm). Our
goal is to choose the preference weights to maximize the expected revenue, yielding
the problem
Z∗ = max
{
Π(w1, . . . ,wm) : wi ∈ [Li,Ui] ∀ i ∈M
}
, (3.2)
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where we use Li and Ui to respectively denote the vectors (Li1, . . . , Lin) and
(Ui1, . . . , Uin) and interpret the constraint wi ∈ [Li,Ui] componentwise as wij ∈
[Lij, Uij] for all j ∈ N .
3.3 Fixed Point Representation
In this section, we show that problem (3.2) can alternatively be represented as the
problem of computing the fixed point of an appropriately defined scalar function.
This alternative fixed point representation allows us to work with a single decision
variable for each nest i, rather than n decision variables wi = (wi1, . . . , win) and
it becomes crucial when developing our approximation methods. To that end,
assume that we compute the value of z that satisfies
z =
∑
i∈M
max
wi∈[Li,Ui]
{(∑
j∈N
wij
)γi ∑j∈N wij (κij − ηij logwij)∑
j∈N wij
−
(∑
j∈N
wij
)γi
z
}
.
(3.3)
Viewing the right side of (3.3) as a function of z, finding the value of z satisfying
(3.3) is equivalent to computing the fixed point of this scalar function. There
always exists such a unique value of z since the left side above is strictly increasing
and the right side above is decreasing in z. Letting zˆ be the value of z satisfying
(3.3), we claim that zˆ is the optimal objective value of problem (3.2). To see this
claim, note that if (w∗1, . . . ,w
∗
m) is an optimal solution to problem (3.2), then we
have
zˆ ≥
∑
i∈M
{(∑
j∈N
w∗ij
)γi ∑j∈N w∗ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij)∑
j∈N w
∗
ij
−
(∑
j∈N
w∗ij
)γi
zˆ
}
,
where we use the fact that zˆ is the value of z satisfying (3.3) andw∗i is a feasible but
not necessarily an optimal solution to the maximization problem on the right side of
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(3.3) when we solve this problem with z = zˆ. In the inequality above, if we collect
all terms that involve zˆ on the left side of the inequality, solve for zˆ and use the
definition of Π(w1, . . . ,wm) in (3.1), then it follows that zˆ ≥ Π(w∗1, . . . ,w∗m) = Z∗.
On the other hand, if we let wˆi be an optimal solution to the maximization problem
on the right side of (3.3) when we solve this problem with z = zˆ, then we observe
that (wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) is a feasible solution to problem (3.2). Furthermore, since zˆ is
the value of z that satisfies (3.3), the definition of wˆi implies that
zˆ =
∑
i∈M
{(∑
j∈N
wˆij
)γi ∑j∈N wˆij (κij − ηij log wˆij)∑
j∈N wˆij
−
(∑
j∈N
wˆij
)γi
zˆ
}
. (3.4)
If we solve for zˆ in the equality above and use the definition of Π(w1, . . . ,wm) in
(3.1) once more, then we get zˆ = Π(wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) ≤ Z∗, where the last inequality
uses the fact that (wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) is a feasible but not necessarily an optimal solution
to problem (3.2). So, we obtain zˆ = Z∗, establishing the claim. Thus, we can obtain
the optimal objective value of problem (3.2) by finding the value of z that satisfies
(3.3). Furthermore, if we use zˆ to denote such a value of z and wˆi to denote an
optimal solution to the maximization problem on the right side of (3.3) when this
problem is solved with z = zˆ, then the discussion in this paragraph establishes that
(wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) is an optimal solution to problem (3.2). Since the left and right sides
of (3.3) are respectively increasing and decreasing in z, we can find the value of z
satisfying (3.3) by using bisection search. However, one drawback of using bisection
search is that we need to solve the maximization problem on the right side of (3.3)
for each value of z visited during the course of the search. This maximization
problem involves a high-dimensional objective function. Also, it is not difficult to
generate counterexamples to show that this objective is not necessarily concave.
To get around the necessity of dealing with high-dimensional and nonconcave
objective functions, we give an alternative approach for finding the value of z
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satisfying (3.3). We define gi(yi) as the optimal objective value of the nonlinear
knapsack problem
gi(yi) = max
{∑
j∈N
wij (κij − ηij logwij) :
∑
j∈N
wij ≤ yi, wij ∈ [Lij, Uij] ∀j ∈ N
}
.
(3.5)
We make a number of observations regarding problem (3.5). We can verify that
the objective function of this problem is concave. Also, if we do not have the
first constraint in the problem above, then by using the first order condition for
the objective function of this problem, we can check that the optimal value of the
decision variable wij is given by min{max{exp(κij/ηij−1), Lij}, Uij} for all j ∈ N .
Thus, letting U¯i =
∑
j∈N min{max{exp(κij/ηij − 1), Lij}, Uij}, if we have yi > U¯i,
then the first constraint in problem (3.5) is not tight at the optimal solution. On
the other hand, letting L¯i =
∑
j∈N Lij, if we have yi < L¯i, then problem (3.5) is
infeasible. Finally, if we have yi ∈ [L¯i, U¯i], then it follows that the first constraint
in problem (3.5) is always tight at the optimal solution. Thus, intuitively speaking,
the interesting values for yi take values in the interval [L¯i, U¯i]. In this case, noting
that problem (3.5) finds the maximum value of the numerator of the fraction in
(3.3) while keeping the denominator of this fraction below yi, instead of finding
the value of z satisfying (3.3), we propose finding the value of z that satisfies
z =
∑
i∈M
max
yi∈[L¯i,U¯i]
{
yγii
gi(yi)
yi
− yγii z
}
. (3.6)
The value of z satisfying (3.6) is unique since the left side above is strictly increasing
and the right side above is decreasing in z. The maximization problem on the right
side above involves a scalar decision variable and the computation of gi(yi) requires
solving a convex optimization problem. In the next proposition, we show that (3.6)
can be used to find the value of z satisfying (3.3).
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Proposition 2. The value of z that satisfies (3.3) and (3.6) are the same, corre-
sponding to the optimal objective value of problem (3.2).
Proof. The value of z that satisfies (3.3) or (3.6) has to be positive. Otherwise, the
left sides of these expressions evaluate to a negative number, but the right sides
evaluate to a positive number. In this case, comparing (3.3) and (3.6), if we can
show that
max
wi∈[Li,Ui]
{(∑
j∈N
wij
)γi ∑j∈N wij (κij − ηij logwij)∑
j∈N wij
−
(∑
j∈N
wij
)γi
z
}
= max
yi∈[L¯i,U¯i]
{
yγii
gi(yi)
yi
− yγii z
}
for any z > 0, then the value of z that satisfies (3.3) and (3.6) are the same. The
equality above can be established by showing that we can use the optimal solution
to one of the problems above to construct a feasible solution to the other. We
defer the details to the appendix.
The proposition above provides a tempting approach for solving problem (3.2).
In particular, we can find the value of z that satisfies (3.6) by using bisection search.
We observe that the maximization problem on the right side of (3.6) involves a
scalar decision variable and the computation of gi(·) requires solving a convex
optimization problem. Thus, the optimization problems that we solve during the
course of the bisection search may be tractable. We use zˆ to denote the value
of z that satisfies (3.6) and yˆi to denote an optimal solution to the maximization
problem on the right side of (3.6) when we solve this problem with z = zˆ. In this
case, we can solve problem (3.5) with yi = yˆi to obtain an optimal solution wˆi.
Once we solve problem (3.5) with yi = yˆi for all i ∈M , it follows that (wˆ1, . . . , wˆm)
is an optimal solution to problem (3.2).
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3.4 Approximation Framework
As mentioned at the end of the previous section, the maximization problem on
the right side of (3.6) involves a scalar decision variable and it is tempting to
try to solve problem (3.2) by finding the value of z satisfying (3.6). Unfortu-
nately, it turns out that the objective function of this maximization problem
is not unimodal and it can be intractable to solve the maximization problem
on the right side of (3.6). To give an example where the objective function of
the maximization problem on the right side of (3.6) is not unimodal, consider a
case with a single nest and seven products. The problem parameters are given
by γ1 = 0.4, (α11, . . . , α17) = (2.1, 1.0, 1.7, 1.4, 1.0, 12.0, 13.0), (β11, . . . , β17) =
(0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.07), (l11, . . . , l17) = (30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 251, 330)
and (u11, . . . , u17) = (200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 368, 383). For this problem instance,
Figure 3.1 plots the objective function of the maximization problem on the right
side of (3.6) as a function of y1, fixing z at 24.74 and shows that this objective
function is not necessarily unimodal. We note that the value of z that we use in
this figure is sensible as the optimal objective value of problem (3.2) is close to
24.74 for this problem instance. So, we do not have unimodality even with sensible
values of z. Interestingly, [14] considers the case where there are no lower or upper
bounds on the prices. The authors show that if the dissimilarity parameters of the
nests satisfy γi ≥ 1−minj∈N βij/maxj∈N βij for all i ∈M , then the objective func-
tion of the maximization problem on the right side of (3.6) is always unimodal. In
the example above, we indeed have γi ≥ 1−minj∈N βij/maxj∈N βij for all i ∈M ,
indicating that this example satisfies the condition in [14]. However, due to the
presence of the lower and upper bounds on the prices, we lose the unimodality
property.
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Figure 3.1: The function yγ11 (g1(y1)/y1)− yγ11 z as a function of y1.
The objective function of the maximization problem on the right side of (3.6)
is not necessarily unimodal, but since this objective function is scalar, a possible
strategy is to construct a grid over the interval [L¯i, U¯i] and check the values of the
objective function only at the grid points. To pursue this line of thought, we use
{y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} to denote a collection of grid points such that y˜ti ≤ y˜t+1i for all
t = 1, . . . , Ti − 1. Furthermore, the collection of grid points should satisfy y˜1i = L¯i
and y˜Tii = U¯i to make sure that the grid points cover the interval [L¯i, U¯i]. In this
case, instead of considering all values of yi over the interval [L¯i, U¯i] as we do in
(3.6), we can focus only on the grid points and find the value of z that satisfies
z =
∑
i∈M
max
yi∈{y˜ti : t= 1,...,Ti}
{
yγii
gi(yi)
yi
− yγii z
}
. (3.7)
The important question is that what properties the grid should possess so that the
solution obtained by limiting our attention only to the grid points has a quantifiable
performance guarantee. In the next theorem, we show that if the optimal objective
value gi(yi) of the knapsack problem in (3.5) does not change too much at the
successive grid points, then we can build on the value of z satisfying (3.7) to
construct a solution to problem (3.2) with a certain performance guarantee.
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Theorem 3. For some ρ ≥ 0, assume that the collection of grid points {y˜ti : t =
1, . . . , Ti} satisfy gi(y˜t+1i ) ≤ (1 + ρ) gi(y˜ti) for all t = 1, . . . , Ti − 1, i ∈ M . If
zˆ denotes the value of z that satisfies (3.7) and Z∗ denotes the optimal objective
value of problem (3.2), then we have (1 + ρ) zˆ ≥ Z∗.
Proof. To get a contradiction, assume that (1 + ρ) zˆ < Z∗. For all i ∈ M , we let
y∗i be an optimal solution to the maximization problem on the right side of (3.6)
when this problem is solved with z = Z∗. Furthermore, we let ti ∈ {1, . . . , Ti − 1}
be such that y∗i ∈ [y˜tit , y˜ti+1i ]. We have
1
1 + ρ
Z∗ > zˆ ≥
∑
i∈M
{(
y˜tii
)γi gi(y˜tii )
y˜tii
− (y˜tii )γi zˆ
}
≥
∑
i∈M
{
1
1 + ρ
(
y˜tii
)γi gi(y∗i )
y˜tii
− (y˜tii )γi zˆ
}
,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that zˆ corresponds to the
value of z that satisfies (3.7) and y˜tii is a feasible but not necessarily an opti-
mal solution to the maximization problem on the right side of (3.7) when this
problem is solved with z = zˆ. To see that the third inequality holds, we ob-
serve that gi(·) is increasing, in which case, since y∗i ∈ [y˜tii , y˜ti+1i ], we obtain
gi(y
∗
i ) ≤ gi(y˜ti+1i ) ≤ (1 + ρ) gi(y˜tii ). In this case, noting that γi ≤ 1 and y˜tii ≤ y∗i so
that (y˜tii )
1−γi ≤ (y∗i )1−γi , we continue the chain of inequalities above as
∑
i∈M
{
1
1 + ρ
(
y˜tii
)γi gi(y∗i )
y˜tii
− (y˜tii )γi zˆ
}
≥
∑
i∈M
{
1
1 + ρ
(
y∗i
)γi gi(y∗i )
y∗i
− (y∗i )γi zˆ
}
≥ 1
1 + ρ
∑
i∈M
{(
y∗i
)γi gi(y∗i )
y∗i
− (y∗i )γi Z∗
}
,
where the second inequality uses the assumption that (1 +ρ) zˆ < Z∗. By using the
last two displayed chains of inequalities and noting the definition of y∗i , it follows
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that
Z∗ >
∑
i∈M
{(
y∗i
)γi gi(y∗i )
y∗i
− (y∗i )γi Z∗
}
=
∑
i∈M
max
yi∈[L¯i,U¯i]
{
yγii
gi(yi)
yi
− yγii Z∗
}
.
By Proposition 2, Z∗ corresponds to the value of z that satisfies (3.6), but the
last chain of inequalities above shows that Z∗ does not satisfy (3.6), which is a
contradiction.
When we work with grid points that satisfy the assumption of Theorem 3, this
theorem allows us to obtain a (1 +ρ)-approximate solution to problem (3.2) in the
following fashion. We find the value of z that satisfies (3.7) and use zˆ to denote
this value. We let yˆi be an optimal solution to the maximization problem on the
right side of (3.7) when this problem is solved with z = zˆ. For all i ∈ M , we
solve problem (3.5) with yi = yˆi and use wˆi to denote an optimal solution to this
problem. In this case, it is possible to show that the solution (wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) provides
an expected revenue that deviates from the optimal expected revenue by at most
a factor of 1 + ρ, satisfying (1 + ρ) Π(wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) ≥ Z∗. To see this result, we
note that since zˆ is the value of z that satisfies (3.7) and yˆi is an optimal solution
to the maximization problem on the right side of (3.7) when this problem is solved
with z = zˆ, we have
zˆ =
∑
i∈M
{
yˆγii
gi(yˆi)
yˆi
− yˆγii zˆ
}
. (3.8)
Also, since yˆi ∈ [L¯i, U¯i], the discussion right after the formulation of problem
(3.5) shows that the first constraint in this problem must be tight at the optimal
solution when this problem is solved with yi = yˆi. Therefore, noting that wˆi is
an optimal solution to problem (3.5) when we solve this problem with yi = yˆi,
we obtain yˆi =
∑
j∈N wˆij and gi(yˆi) =
∑
j∈N wˆij (κij − ηij log wˆij) for all i ∈
M . Replacing yˆi and gi(yˆi) in (3.8) by their equivalents given by the last two
equalities, we observe that zˆ and (wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) satisfy the equality in (3.4). So,
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if we collect all terms that involve zˆ on the left side of (3.4), solve for zˆ and use
the definition of Π(w1, . . . ,wm), then we get zˆ = Π(wˆ1, . . . , wˆm). When the grid
points satisfy the assumption of Theorem 3, we also have (1 + ρ) zˆ ≥ Z∗. So, we
obtain (1 + ρ) Π(wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) ≥ Z∗, showing that the expected revenue from the
solution (wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) deviates from the optimal by at most a factor of 1 + ρ.
The preceding discussion, along with Theorem 3, gives a framework for obtain-
ing approximate solutions to problem (3.2) with a performance guarantee. The
crucial point is that the collection of grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} has to satisfy
the assumption of Theorem 3. Also, the number of grid points in this collection
should be reasonably small to be able to solve the maximization problem on the
right side of (3.7) quickly. In the next section, we show that it is indeed possible to
construct a reasonably small collection of grid points that satisfies the assumption
of Theorem 3. Before doing so, however, we make a brief remark on how to find the
value of z that satisfies (3.7). Thus far, we propose bisection search as a possible
method to obtain this value of z. One shortcoming of bisection search is that it
may not terminate in finite time. To get around the fact that bisection search may
not terminate in finite time, we demonstrate that it is possible to obtain the value
of z satisfying (3.7) by solving a linear program.
To formulate the linear program, we note that the left side of the equality
in (3.7) is increasing in z, whereas the right side is decreasing. Therefore, the
value of z that satisfies (3.7) corresponds to the smallest value of z such that the
left side of the equality in (3.7) is still greater than or equal to the right side.
This observation immediately implies that finding the value of z satisfying (3.7) is
equivalent to solving the problem
min
{
z : z ≥
∑
i∈M
max
yi∈{y˜ti : t= 1,...,Ti}
{
yγii
gi(yi)
yi
− yγii z
}}
.
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If we define the additional decision variables (x1, . . . , xm) so that xi represents the
optimal objective value of the maximization problem in the ith term of the sum
on the right side of the constraint above, then the problem above can be written
as
min
{
z : z ≥
∑
i∈M
xi, xi ≥ yγii
gi(yi)
yi
− yγii z ∀ yi ∈ {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti}, i ∈M
}
,
(3.9)
where the decision variables are z and (x1, . . . , xm). The problem above is a linear
program with 1 +m decision variables and 1 +
∑
i∈M Ti constraints. So, as long as
the number of grid points is not too large, we can solve a tractable linear program
to obtain the value of z satisfying (3.7).
3.5 Grid Construction
In this section, our goal is to show how we can construct a reasonably small col-
lection of grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} that satisfies the assumption of Theorem
3. By noting the discussion that follows Theorem 3 in the previous section, such
a collection of grid points allows us to obtain a solution to problem (3.2) with
a given approximation guarantee. To construct the collection of grid points, we
begin by giving a number of fundamental properties of the knapsack problem in
(3.5). After we give these properties, we proceed to showing how we can build on
these properties to construct the collection of grid points.
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3.5.1 Properties of Knapsack Problems
The first property that we have for problem (3.5) is that the optimal values of
the decision variables in this problem are monotonically increasing in yi as long
as yi ∈ [L¯i, U¯i]. To see this property, we associate the Lagrange multiplier λi
with the first constraint in problem (3.5) and write the Lagrangian as Li(wi, λi) =∑
j∈N wij (κij−ηij logwij−λi)+λi yi, which is a concave function ofwi. Maximizing
the Lagrangian Li(wi, λi) subject to the constraints that wij ∈ [Lij, Uij] for all
j ∈ N , the optimal solution to problem (3.5) can be obtained by setting
wij = min
{
max
{
exp
(
κij
ηij
− 1− λi
ηij
)
, Lij
}
, Uij
}
(3.10)
for all j ∈ N . We observe that the expression on the right side above is decreasing
in λi, showing that the optimal value of the decision variable wij is decreasing in
the optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier. On the other hand, since we have
yi ∈ [L¯i, U¯i], by the discussion that follows the formulation of problem (3.5), the
first constraint in this problem must be tight at the optimal solution. Therefore,
noting (3.10), the optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier λi satisfies the equality∑
j∈N min{max{exp(κij/ηij − 1 − λi/ηij), Lij}, Uij} = yi. The expression on the
left side of this equality is decreasing in λi, which implies that the optimal value
of the Lagrange multiplier is decreasing in the right side of the first constraint in
problem (3.5). To sum up, if we use λ∗i (yi) to denote the optimal value of the
Lagrange multiplier for the first constraint in problem (3.5) as a function of the
right side of this constraint, then λ∗i (yi) satisfies
∑
j∈N
min
{
max
{
exp
(
κij
ηij
− 1− λ
∗
i (yi)
ηij
)
, Lij
}
, Uij
}
= yi. (3.11)
Furthermore, λ∗i (yi) is decreasing in yi. Since the optimal value of the decision
variable wij in problem (3.5) is decreasing in the optimal value of the Lagrange
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multiplier and λ∗i (yi) is decreasing in yi, it follows that the optimal value of the
decision variable wij in problem (3.5) is increasing in yi, as desired. Therefore, we
can let ζij and ξij be such that
exp
(
κij
ηij
− 1− λ
∗
i (ζij)
ηij
)
= Lij and exp
(
κij
ηij
− 1− λ
∗
i (ξij)
ηij
)
= Uij, (3.12)
in which case, (3.10) implies that if yi = ζij, then we have wij = Lij in the optimal
solution to problem (3.5), whereas if yi = ξij, then we have wij = Uij. Also, since
the optimal value of the decision variable wij is increasing in yi, the optimal value
of the decision variable wij in problem (3.5) satisfies wij = Lij for all yi ≤ ζij,
whereas wij = Uij for all yi ≥ ξij. In this way, ζij and ξij correspond to the two
threshold values of the right side of the first constraint in problem (3.5) such that
if yi ≤ ζij, then the optimal value of the decision variable wij is always Lij, whereas
if yi ≥ ξij, then the optimal value of the decision variable wij is always Uij.
We note that there may not exist a value of ζij or ξij satisfying (3.12). If this
is the case, then we set ζij = −∞ or ξij = ∞. Building on the discussion above,
we obtain the next lemma.
Lemma 3. For any j ∈ N , there exists an interval [ζij, ξij] such that the optimal
value of the decision variable wij in problem (3.5) satisfies wij = Lij when we have
yi ≤ ζij, whereas wij = Uij when we have yi ≥ ξij. Furthermore, if yi ∈ [ζij, ξij],
then we can drop the constraint wij ∈ [Lij, Uij] in problem (3.5) without changing
the optimal solution to this problem.
Proof. We let ζij and ξij be as defined in (3.12), in which case, the
first part follows from the discussion right before the lemma. To show
the second part, we let w∗i be the optimal solution to problem (3.5)
and λ∗i (yi) be the corresponding Lagrange multiplier for the first con-
straint. Since yi ∈ [ζij, ξij] and λ∗i (yi) is decreasing in yi, (3.12) implies that
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exp(κij/ηij − 1− λ∗i (yi)/ηij) ≥ Lij and exp(κij/ηij − 1− λ∗i (yi)/ηij) ≤ Uij. By
the last two inequalities and (3.10), the optimal value of the decision variable
wij in problem (3.5) is w
∗
ij = min{max{exp(κij/ηij − 1− λ∗i (yi)/ηij), Lij}, Uij} =
exp(κij/ηij − 1− λ∗i (yi)/ηij). Also, the last two inequalities imply that the max
and min operators for product j can be dropped from the sum in (3.11) with-
out disturbing the equality, showing that λ∗i (yi) is still the optimal value of the
Lagrange multiplier for the first constraint in problem (3.5) when we drop the con-
straint wij ∈ [Lij, Uij]. In this case, we let wˆi be the optimal solution to problem
(3.5) when we drop the constraint wij ∈ [Lij, Uij], together with the corresponding
Lagrange multiplier λ∗i (yi) for the first constraint. When we drop the constraint
wij ∈ [Lij, Uij], setting Lij = −∞ and Uij =∞ in (3.10) implies that the optimal
value of the decision variable wij is given by wˆij = exp(κij/ηij−1−λ∗i (yi)/ηij). Thus,
it follows that w∗ij = wˆij, as desired.
The second property that we have for problem (3.5) is that we can partition the
extended real line [−∞,∞] into a number of intervals {[νki , νk+1i ] : k = 1, . . . , Ki}
such that if we solve problem (3.5) for any yi ∈ [νki , νk+1i ], then we can immediately
fix the values of some of the decision variables at their upper or lower bounds and
not impose the upper and lower bound constraints at all on the remaining decision
variables. To see this property, we note that if we plot the 2n points in the set
{ζij : j ∈ N}∪{ξij : j ∈ N} on the extended real line [−∞,∞], then they partition
the extended real line into at most 2n+ 1 intervals. We denote these intervals by
{[νki , νk+1i ] : k = 1, . . . , Ki} with ν1i = −∞ and νKi+1i = ∞. Since the intervals
{[νki , νk+1i ] : k = 1, . . . , Ki} are obtained by partitioning the real line with the
points {ζij : j ∈ N}∪{ξij : j ∈ N}, it follows that for any k = 1, . . . , Ki and j ∈ N ,
we must have [νki , ν
k+1
i ] ⊂ [ζij, ξij], or [νki , νk+1i ] ⊂ [−∞, ζij], or [νki , νk+1i ] ⊂ [ξij,∞].
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In this case, we define the sets of products Lki , Uki and Fki as
Lki = {j ∈ N : [νki , νk+1i ] ⊂ [−∞, ζij]} Uki = {j ∈ N : [νki , νk+1i ] ⊂ [ξij,∞]}
Fki = {j ∈ N : [νki , νk+1i ] ⊂ [ζij, ξij]}.
Consider problem (3.5) with a value of yi satisfying yi ∈ [νki , νk+1i ] for some k =
1, . . . , Ki. If product j is in the set Lki , then we have [νki , νk+1i ] ⊂ [−∞, ζij]. Since
yi ∈ [νki , νk+1i ], we obtain yi ≤ ζij, in which case, Lemma 3 implies that the optimal
value of the decision variable wij in problem (3.5) is Lij. By following the same
reasoning, if product j is in the set Uki , then the optimal value of the decision
variable wij in problem (3.5) is Uij. Finally, if product j is in the set Fki , then
we have [νki , ν
k+1
i ] ⊂ [ζij, ξij], but since yi ∈ [νki , νk+1i ], we obtain yi ∈ [ζij, ξij], in
which case, by Lemma 3, we can drop the constraint wij ∈ [Lij, Uij] in problem
(3.5) without changing the optimal solution. Therefore, whenever we solve problem
(3.5) with a value of yi ∈ [νki , νk+1i ], we can fix the values of the decision variables
in the sets Lki and Uki respectively at their lower and upper bounds and not impose
the upper and lower bound constraints on the decision variables in the set Fki . The
observations in this paragraph yield the next lemma.
Lemma 4. There exist intervals {[νki , νk+1i ] : k = 1, . . . , Ki} partitioning [L¯i, U¯i]
such that for any yi ∈ [νki , νk+1i ], the optimal solution to problem (3.5) can be
obtained by solving
max
{∑
j∈N
wij (κij − ηij logwij) :
∑
j∈N
wij ≤ yi, wij = Lij ∀ j ∈ Lki , wij = Uij ∀ j ∈ Uki
}
(3.13)
for some subsets of products Lki , Uki ⊂ N that depend on the interval k containing
yi but not on the specific value of yi. Furthermore, we have Ki = O(n).
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Proof. Constructing the intervals {[νki , νk+1i ] : k = 1, . . . , Ki} as defined in the
discussion right before the lemma, the first part follows by this discussion, as long
as we take the intersection of each one of these intervals with [L¯i, U¯i]. To see that
the second part holds, since the points {ζij : j ∈ N} ∪ {ξij : j ∈ N} partition the
extended real line into at most 2n + 1 intervals and these intervals correspond to
{[νki , νk+1i ] : k = 1, . . . , Ki}, Ki is at most 2n+ 1 = O(n).
Lemma 4 becomes useful when constructing a collection of grid points that
satisfies the assumption of Theorem 3. We focus on this task in the next section.
3.5.2 Properties of Grid Points
In this section, we turn our attention to constructing a collection of grid points
{y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} that satisfies the assumption of Theorem 3. To that end, we
choose a fixed value of ρ > 0 and consider the grid points that are obtained by
Y˜ kqi =
∑
j∈Lki
Lij +
∑
j∈Uki
Uij + (1 + ρ)
q (3.14)
for k = 1, . . . , Ki and q = . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . .. In the expression above, Lki , Uki and
Ki are such that they satisfy Lemma 4. In problem (3.5), once we fix the decision
variables in Lki at their lower bounds and the decision variables in Uki at their upper
bounds, the sum of the remaining decision variables is at least
∑
j∈N\(Lki ∪Uki ) Lij and
at most
∑
j∈N\(Lki ∪Uki ) Uij. Therefore, we choose the possible values for q in (3.14)
such that the smallest value of (1 + ρ)q does not stay above
∑
j∈N\(Lki ∪Uki ) Lij and
the largest value of (1+ρ)q does not stay below
∑
j∈N\(Lki ∪Uki ) Uij. If L
k
i ∪ Uki = N ,
then using a single value of q = −∞ suffices. Otherwise, using b·c and d·e to
denote the round down and round up functions, we can choose the smallest value
of q as qLi = blog(minj∈N Lij)/ log(1 + ρ)c and the largest value of q as qUi =
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dlog(nmaxj∈N Uij)/ log(1 + ρ)e. In this case, letting σi = maxj∈N Uij/minj∈N Lij,
we have qUi − qLi = O(log(nσi)/ log(1 + ρ)).
To construct a collection of grid points that satisfies the assumption of Theo-
rem 3, we augment the set of points {Y˜ kqi : k = 1, . . . , Ki, q = qLi , . . . , qUi } defined
above with the set of points {νki : k = 1, . . . , Ki + 1}, where the last set of points
are obtained from the set of intervals {[νki , νk+1i ] : k = 1, . . . , Ki} given in Lemma
4. We obtain our set of grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} by ordering the points in
{Y˜ kqi : k = 1, . . . , Ki, q = qLi , . . . , qUi }∪{νki : k = 1, . . . , Ki + 1} in increasing order
and dropping the ones that are not included in the interval [L¯i, U¯i]. Also, we add
the two points L¯i and U¯i into the collection of grid points to ensure that the small-
est and the largest one of the grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} are respectively equal
to L¯i and U¯i. Thus, the collection of grid points constructed in this fashion satisfies
y˜ti ≤ y˜t+1i for all t = 1, . . . , Ti − 1, y˜1i = L¯i and y˜Tii = U¯i. Since |Ki| = O(n) and
qUi − qLi = O(log(nσi)/ log(1 + ρ)), the number of grid points in the collection is
|Ti| = O(n+ n log(nσi)/ log(1 + ρ)).
There are two useful properties for the grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} con-
structed by using the approach above. The first property is that if y˜ti and y˜
t+1
i
are two consecutive grid points, then they satisfy y˜ti , y˜
t+1
i ∈ [νki , νk+1i ] for some
k = 1, . . . , Ki. To see this property, if this property does not hold, then we have
y˜ti ≤ νki ≤ y˜t+1i for some k = 1, . . . , Ki with one of the two inequalities holding
as a strict inequality. If this chain of inequalities holds, then since νki is a grid
point itself, we get a contradiction to the fact that y˜ti and y˜
t+1
i are two consecu-
tive grid points, establishing the first property. The second property is that if y˜ti
and y˜t+1i are two consecutive grid points satisfying y˜
t
i , y˜
t+1
i ∈ [νki , νk+1i ] for some
k = 1, . . . , Ki, then we have Y˜
kq
i ≤ y˜ti ≤ y˜t+1i ≤ Y˜ k,q+1i for some q = qLi , . . . , qUi − 1.
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The idea behind the second property is similar to the one used for the first prop-
erty. In particular, if the second property does not hold, then either we have
y˜ti ≤ Y˜ kqi ≤ y˜t+1i for some q = qLi , . . . , qUi − 1 or we have y˜ti ≤ Y˜ k,q+1i ≤ y˜t+1i for
some q = qLi , . . . , q
U
i − 1 with one of the last four inequalities holding as a strict
inequality. If either one of the last two chains of inequalities holds, then since
Y˜ kqi and Y˜
k,q+1
i are grid points themselves, we get a contradiction to the fact that
y˜ti and y˜
t+1
i are two consecutive grid points, establishing the second property. In
the next theorem, we use these properties along with Lemma 4 to show that the
collection of grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} satisfies the assumption of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Assume that the collection of grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} are
obtained by ordering the points in {Y˜ kqi : k = 1, . . . , Ki, q = qLi , . . . , qUi } ∪ {νki :
k = 1, . . . , Ki+1} in increasing order. In this case, we have gi(y˜t+1i ) ≤ (1+ρ) gi(y˜ti)
for all t = 1, . . . , Ti − 1.
Proof. If y˜ti and y˜
t+1
i are two consecutive grid points, then the first property right
before the statement of the theorem implies that there exists k = 1, . . . , Ki such
that y˜ti , y˜
t+1
i ∈ [νki , νk+1i ], in which case, by the second property, it follows that
there exists q = qLi , . . . , q
U
i − 1 such that Y˜ kqi ≤ y˜ti ≤ y˜t+1i ≤ Y˜ k,q+1i . Subtracting∑
j∈Lki Lij +
∑
j∈Uki Uij from the last chain of inequalities and noting the definition
of Y˜ kqi in (3.14), we obtain
(1 + ρ)q ≤ y˜ti −
∑
j∈Lki
Lij −
∑
j∈Uki
Uij ≤ y˜t+1i −
∑
j∈Lki
Lij −
∑
j∈Uki
Uij ≤ (1 + ρ)q+1.
Using the chain of inequalities above, it follows that y˜t+1i −
∑
j∈Lki Lij−
∑
j∈Uki Uij ≤
(1+ρ)q+1 ≤ (1+ρ) (y˜ti−
∑
j∈Lki Lij−
∑
j∈Uki Uij). Since y˜
t
i , y˜
t+1
i ∈ [νki , νk+1i ], Lemma
4 implies that the optimal solution to problem (3.5) with yi = y˜
t
i or yi = y˜
t+1
i can
be obtained by solving problem (3.13) respectively with yi = y˜
t
i or yi = y˜
t+1
i . We
let w∗i be the optimal solution to problem (3.13) when we solve this problem with
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yi = y˜
t+1
i . Note that w
∗
ij = Lij for all j ∈ Lki and w∗ij = Uij for all j ∈ Uki . We
define the solution wˆi as wˆij = w
∗
ij/(1 + ρ) for all j ∈ N \ (Lki ∪ Uki ), wˆij = Lij for
all j ∈ Lki and wˆij = Uij for all j ∈ Uki . In this case, we have∑
j∈N\(Lki ∪Uki )
wˆij =
1
1 + ρ
∑
j∈N\(Lki ∪Uki )
w∗ij
≤ 1
1 + ρ
{
y˜t+1i −
∑
j∈Lki
Lij −
∑
j∈Uki
Uij
}
≤ y˜ti −
∑
j∈Lki
Lij −
∑
j∈Uki
Uij,
where the first inequality is by the fact that w∗i is a feasible solution to problem
(3.13) when we solve this problem with yi = y˜
t+1
i and the second inequality follows
from the fact that y˜t+1i −
∑
j∈Lki Lij −
∑
j∈Uki Uij ≤ (1 + ρ) (y˜
t
i −
∑
j∈Lki Lij −∑
j∈Uki Uij), which is shown at the beginning of the proof. Therefore, the chain
of equalities above shows that wˆi is a feasible solution to problem (3.13) when we
solve this problem with yi = y˜
t
i , in which case, we obtain
gi(y˜
t
i) ≥
∑
j∈N
wˆij (κij − ηij log wˆij)
=
∑
j∈N\(Lki ∪Uki )
w∗ij
1 + ρ
(κij − ηij logw∗ij + ηij log(1 + ρ))
+
∑
j∈Lki
(κij − ηij logLij)Lij +
∑
j∈Uki
(κij − ηij logUij)Uij
≥ 1
1 + ρ
{ ∑
j∈N\(Lki ∪Uki )
w∗ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij)
+
∑
j∈Lki
(κij − ηij logLij)Lij +
∑
j∈Uki
(κij − ηij logUij)Uij
}
=
1
1 + ρ
gi(y˜
t+1
i ),
where the first inequality uses the fact that wˆi is a feasible solution to problem
(3.13) when solved with yi = y˜
t
i and this problem yields the optimal solution to
problem (3.5) with yi = y˜
t
i and the second equality follows from the fact that w
∗
i
is the optimal solution to problem (3.13) when solved with yi = y˜
t+1
i . The chain
of inequalities above establishes the desired result.
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Therefore, the theorem above shows that the grid that we construct by using
the set of points {Y˜ kqi : k = 1, . . . , Ki, q = qLi , . . . , qUi } ∪ {νki : k = 1, . . . , Ki + 1}
satisfies the assumption of Theorem 3. It is also useful to note that all of the
discussion in this section continues to hold when we use the no purchase preference
weight wi0 to allow a customer to leave nest i without purchasing anything. To
accommodate this extension, all we need to do is to add wi0 to the left side of
(3.11) when defining λ∗i (yi) and add wi0 to the right side of (3.14) when defining
Y˜ kqi .
3.5.3 Approximation Method
In this section, we put together all of our results so far to give the following
algorithm that finds a (1 + ρ)-approximate solution to problem (3.2).
Step 1. For all i ∈M , j ∈ N , we compute ζij and ξij such that exp(κij/ηij − 1−
λ∗i (ζij)/ηij) = Lij and exp(κij/ηij−1−λ∗i (ξij)/ηij) = Uij, where λ∗i (yi) is as defined
in (3.11). For each i ∈ M , the collection of points {ζij : j ∈ N} ∪ {ξij : j ∈ N}
partition the extended real line into O(n) intervals. We denote these intervals by
{[νki , νk+1i ] : k = 1, . . . , Ki}.
Step 2. For all i ∈ M , k = 1, . . . , Ki, we compute the sets Lki = {j ∈ N :
[νki , ν
k+1
i ] ⊂ [−∞, ζij]} and Uki = {j ∈ N : [νki , νk+1i ] ⊂ [ξij,∞]}. We choose a fixed
value of ρ > 0 and compute the points Y˜ kqi =
∑
j∈Lki Lij +
∑
j∈Uki Uij + (1 + ρ)
q for
all i ∈M , k = 1, . . . , Ki, q = qLi , . . . , qUi , where qLi = blog(minj∈N Lij)/ log(1 + ρ)c
and qUi = dlog(nmaxj∈N Uij)/ log(1 + ρ)e.
Step 3. For each i ∈M , we order the points in the set {Y˜ kqi : k = 1, . . . , Ki, q =
qLi , . . . , q
U
i } ∪ {νki : k = 1, . . . , Ki + 1} in increasing order to obtain a collection of
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grid points. We drop the points that are outside the interval [L¯i, U¯i] and add the
points L¯i and U¯i so that the smallest and the largest one of the grid points are
respectively equal to L¯i and U¯i. We use {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} to denote the collection
of grid points obtained in this fashion.
Step 4. By using the grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} for all i ∈ M , we solve the
linear program in (3.9) and use zˆ to denote its optimal objective value. For all
i ∈ M , we solve the maximization problem on the right side of (3.7) with z = zˆ
and use yˆi to denote its optimal solution.
Step 5. For all i ∈M , we solve the knapsack problem in (3.5) with yi = yˆi and use
wˆi to denote its optimal solution. We return (wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) as a (1+ρ)-approximate
solution to problem (3.2).
In Steps 1, 2 and 3, we compute the collection of grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti}.
Noting Theorem 4, it follows that this collection of grid points satisfies the assump-
tion of Theorem 3. In Step 4, the value of zˆ that we compute by solving the linear
program in (3.9) corresponds to the value of z satisfying (3.7). In Step 5, we com-
pute the solution (wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) to problem (3.2). By the discussion that follows the
proof of Theorem 3, the expected revenue provided by the solution (wˆ1, . . . , wˆm)
deviates from the optimal expected revenue by at most a factor of 1 +ρ, satisfying
(1 + ρ) Π(wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) ≥ Z∗. Letting σ = max{maxj∈N Uij/minj∈N Lij : i ∈ M},
we observe that there are O(n + n log(nσ)/ log(1 + ρ)) points in the collection of
grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti}. Therefore, noting the linear program in (3.9), the
main computational effort in obtaining a (1 + ρ)-approximate solution to prob-
lem (3.2) involves solving a linear program with 1 + m decision variables and
O(mn+mn log(nσ)/ log(1 + ρ)) constraints.
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3.6 Joint Assortment Offering and Pricing
Our development so far assumes that the choice of the products offered to cus-
tomers are beyond our control and all n products have to be offered in all m nests.
In this section, we consider a model that jointly decides which set of products to
offer in each nest, along with the prices of the offered products. Similar to our
problem formulation in Section 3.2, we assume that the price of each product has to
satisfy the constraint pij ∈ [lij, uij] with lij, uij ∈ [0,∞). If we set the price of prod-
uct j in nest i as pij, then its preference weight is given by wij = exp(αij −βij pij).
We continue viewing the preference weights as decision variables, so that the pref-
erence weight wij of product j in nest i has to satisfy the constraint wij ∈ [Lij, Uij]
with Lij = exp(αij−βij uij) and Uij = exp(αij−βij lij). In this case, using Si ⊂ N
to denote the set of products that we offer in nest i, if we offer the assortments, or
subsets of products, (S1, . . . , Sm) over all nests and choose the preference weights
over all nests as (w1, . . . ,wm), then we obtain an expected revenue of
Θ(S1, . . . , Sm,w1, . . . ,wm)
=
1
1 +
∑
i∈M
(∑
j∈Si wij
)γi ∑
i∈M
(∑
j∈Si
wij
)γi ∑j∈Si wij (κij − ηij logwij)∑
j∈Si wij
. (3.15)
The definition of the expected revenue function Θ(S1, . . . , Sm,w1, . . . ,wm) is sim-
ilar to the definition of Π(w1, . . . ,wm) in (3.1) and it can be derived by using
an argument similar to the one in Section 3.2, but the expected revenue function
above only uses the preference weights of the products in the offered assortment.
The second fraction above evaluates to 0/0 when Si = ∅ and we treat 0/0 as zero
throughout this section. Our goal is to solve the problem
ζ∗ = max
{
Θ(S1, . . . , Sm,w1, . . . ,wm) :
Si ⊂ N ∀ i ∈M, wi ∈ [Li,Ui] ∀ i ∈M
}
. (3.16)
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The idea that we use to solve the joint assortment offering and pricing problem
above is similar to the one used for solving our earlier pricing problem. We view
the problem above as computing the fixed point of an appropriately defined scalar
function and this visualization allows us to relate our problem to a knapsack prob-
lem. However, one crucial difference is that we need to characterize the structure
of the subsets of products to be offered in the optimal solution to problem (3.16).
3.6.1 Fixed Point Representation
We begin by giving a fixed point representation of problem (3.16). Our discussion
closely follows the one for our earlier pricing problem. So, while we present our
discussion in full, we omit the proofs whenever they resemble the earlier ones.
Assume that we compute the value of z satisfying
z =
∑
i∈M
max
Si⊂N,wi∈[Li,Ui]
{(∑
j∈Si
wij
)γi ∑j∈Si wij (κij − ηij logwij)∑
j∈Si wij
−
(∑
j∈Si
wij
)γi
z
}
.
(3.17)
Following the same argument at the beginning of Section 3.3, one can check that
if the value of z satisfying (3.17) is given by zˆ, then we have zˆ = ζ∗, where ζ∗
is the optimal objective value of problem (3.16). Furthermore, if the value of z
satisfying (3.17) is zˆ and we use (Sˆi, wˆi) to denote an optimal solution to the
maximization problem on the right side of (3.17) when we solve this problem with
z = zˆ, then it follows that (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm, wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) is an optimal solution to
problem (3.16). One crucial difficulty associated with solving the maximization
problem on the right side of (3.17) is that the decision variable Si in this problem
can take 2n possible values, which can be too many to enumerate when we have a
reasonably large number of products. However, it turns out that we can limit the
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number of possible values for Si in the optimal solution to only 1 +n. In this case,
we can enumerate all possible 1 + n values for the decision variable Si.
To limit the possible values for the decision variable Si, we assume that the
products in each nest are indexed in the order of decreasing price upper bounds
so that ui1 ≥ ui2 ≥ . . . ≥ uin. We use Nij to denote the subset of products
that includes the first j products with the largest price upper bounds in nest i.
That is, Nij = {1, . . . , j}. We refer to such a subset as a nested by price bound
assortment. Using the convention that Ni0 = ∅, we let Ni = {Nij : j ∈ N ∪{0}} to
capture all nested by price bound assortments in nest i. In the next theorem, we
show that a nested by price bound assortment solves the maximization problem
on the right side of (3.17).
Theorem 5. For any z > 0, there exists an assortment S∗i ∈ Ni that solves the
maximization problem on the right side of (3.17).
Proof. For brevity, we let Ri(Si,wi) =
∑
j∈Si wij (κij − ηij logwij)/
∑
j∈Si wij and
Wi(Si,wi) =
∑
j∈Si wij, in which case, we can write the objective function of the
maximization problem on the right side of (3.17) as Wi(Si,wi)
γi(Ri(Si,wi) − z).
To get a contradiction, we let (S∗i ,w
∗
i ) be an optimal solution to the maximization
problem on the right side of (3.17) and assume that there exist products k and
l such that k < l, k 6∈ S∗i and l ∈ S∗i . We show that if we add product k
into the assortment S∗i with price uik, then we obtain a better solution for the
maximization problem on the right side of (3.17), establishing the desired result.
In particular, consider the solution (Sˆi, wˆi) obtained by setting Sˆi = S
∗
i ∪ {k},
wˆik = exp(αik − βik uik) and wˆij = w∗ij for all j ∈ N \ {k}, which is equivalent
to setting the price of product k as uik and not changing the prices of the other
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products in the solution w∗i . In this case, we have
Wi(Sˆi, wˆi)
γi(Ri(Sˆi, wˆi)− z) =
∑
j∈Sˆi wˆij (κij − ηij log wˆij − z)
Wi(Sˆi, wˆi)1−γi
=
∑
j∈S∗i w
∗
ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij − z) + wˆik (κik − ηik log wˆik − z)
Wi(Sˆi, wˆi)1−γi
, (3.18)
where the first equality follows by using the definitions of Ri(Si,wi) and Wi(Si,wi)
and rearranging the terms and the second equality uses the fact that Sˆi = S
∗
i ∪{k}
and the products in S∗i have the same preference weights in solutions w
∗
i and wˆi.
We proceed to lower bounding the last fraction above. It is possible to show
that if product l is included in the optimal solution to the maximization problem
on the right side of (3.17), then the preference weight of product l must satisfy
κil−ηil logw∗il ≥ (1−γi)Ri(S∗i ,w∗i )+γi z. We defer the proof of this fact to Lemma
9 in the appendix. Since (S∗i ,w
∗
i ) is feasible to the maximization problem on the
right side of (3.17), we have w∗il ≥ Lil = exp(αil−βil uil). Taking logarithms in this
inequality and noting κij = αij/βij and ηij = 1/βij, we get κil− ηil logw∗il ≤ uil. In
this case, noting k < l so that uik ≥ uil, we obtain κik − ηik log wˆik = κik −
ηik log(exp(αik−βik uik)) = uik ≥ uil ≥ κil−ηil logw∗il ≥ (1−γi)Ri(S∗i ,w∗i )+γi z. To
lower bound to numerator of the last fraction in (3.18), we use the last chain of
inequalities to get κik − ηik log wˆik − z ≥ (1 − γi)(Ri(S∗i ,w∗i ) − z). Thus, we can
lower bound the numerator of the right side of (3.18) by the expression
∑
j∈S∗i
w∗ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij − z) + wˆik (1− γi)(Ri(S∗i ,w∗i )− z)
= (Ri(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )− z) (Wi(S∗i ,w∗i ) + wˆik (1− γi)),
where the equality follows by using the definitions of Ri(Si,wi) and Wi(Si,wi).
To upper bound the denominator of the last fraction in (3.18), we note that u1−γi
is a concave function of u, satisfying the subgradient inequality uˆ1−γi ≤ (u∗)1−γi +
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(1 − γi) (u∗)−γi (uˆ − u∗) for two points uˆ and u∗. Thus, we get Wi(Sˆi, wˆi)1−γi ≤
Wi(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )
1−γi + (1 − γi)Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )−γi (Wi(Sˆi, wˆi) − Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )). Using these
lower and upper bounds in (3.18), it follows that∑
j∈S∗i w
∗
ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij − z) + wˆik (κik − ηik log wˆik − z)
Wi(Sˆi, wˆi)1−γi
≥ (Ri(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )− z) (Wi(S∗i ,w∗i ) + wˆik (1− γi))
Wi(S∗i ,w
∗
i )
1−γi + (1− γi)Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )−γi (Wi(Sˆi, wˆi)−Wi(S∗i ,w∗i ))
. (3.19)
Noting that Wi(Sˆi, wˆi) − Wi(S∗i ,w∗i ) = wˆik and factoring out Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )−γi
in the denominator of the last fraction in (3.19), the last fraction above is
equal to Wi(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )
γi(Ri(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i ) − z). Thus, (3.18) and (3.19) show that
Wi(Sˆi,w
∗
i )
γi(Ri(Sˆi, wˆi)− z) ≥ Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )γi(Ri(S∗i ,w∗i )− z), establishing that the
solution (Sˆi, wˆi) provides an objective value for the maximization problem on the
right side of (3.17) that is at least as large as the one provided by the solution
(S∗i ,w
∗
i ).
The theorem above shows that we can replace the constraint Si ⊂ N on the
right side of (3.17) with Si ∈ Ni. Noting that |Ni| = O(n), we can deal with the
decision variable Si in the maximization problem on the right side of (3.17) simply
by enumerating all of its possible values in a brute force fashion. To deal with the
high-dimensionality of the decision variable wi, we define gi(Si, yi) as the optimal
objective value of the knapsack problem
gi(Si, yi) = max
{∑
j∈Si
wij (κij − ηij logwij) :
∑
j∈Si
wij ≤ yi, wij ∈ [Lij, Uij] ∀j ∈ N
}
, (3.20)
which is the analogue of problem (3.5), but we focus only on the products
in Si. Similar to the discussion that follows problem (3.5), letting U¯i(Si) =∑
j∈Si min{max{exp(κij/ηij − 1), Lij}, Uij}, if we have yi > U¯i(Si), then the first
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constraint in the problem above is not tight at the optimal solution. On the other
hand, letting L¯i(Si) =
∑
j∈Si Lij, if we have yi < L¯i(Si), then the problem above is
infeasible. Finally, if yi ∈ [L¯i(Si), U¯i(Si)], then the first constraint above is tight at
the optimal solution. Therefore, the solution to the problem above can potentially
change only as yi takes values in the interval [L¯i(Si), U¯i(Si)]. So, instead of finding
the value of z satisfying (3.17), we propose finding the value of z satisfying
z =
∑
i∈M
max
Si∈Ni, yi∈[L¯i(Si),U¯i(Si)]
{
yγii
gi(Si, yi)
yi
− yγii z
}
. (3.21)
By following the outline of the proof of Proposition 2, it is possible to show that
the values of z that satisfy (3.17) and (3.21) are identical to each other and this
common value corresponds to the optimal objective value of problem (3.16).
The decision variable Si on the right side of (3.21) does not create a complica-
tion since |Ni| = O(n) and we can simply check each possible value of this decision
variable one by one. However, the decision variable yi on the right side of (3.21)
can be problematic since the objective function of the maximization problem is
not necessarily a unimodal function of yi for a fixed Si. As described in the next
section, we deal with this complication by constructing a grid.
3.6.2 Approximation Framework and Grid Construction
In this section, we construct a grid to deal with the nonunimodal nature of the
objective function of the maximization problem on the right side of (3.21) and
show that we can obtain solutions with a certain performance guarantee by using
this grid. For each Si ∈ Ni, we propose constructing a separate grid {y˜ti(Si) : t =
1, . . . , Ti(Si)}. These grid points are in increasing order such that y˜ti(Si) ≤ y˜t+1i (Si)
for all t = 1, . . . , Ti(Si)− 1. Also, we ensure that the smallest and the largest one
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of the grid points satisfy y˜1i (Si) = L¯i(Si) and y˜
Ti(Si)
i (Si) = U¯i(Si) so that the grid
points cover the interval [L¯i(Si), U¯i(Si)]. In this case, instead of finding the value
of z satisfying (3.21), we propose checking the values of yi only at the grid points
and finding the value of z satisfying
z =
∑
i∈M
max
Si∈Ni, yi∈{y˜ti(Si) : t= 1,...,Ti(Si)}
{
yγii
gi(Si, yi)
yi
− yγii z
}
. (3.22)
There are
∑
Si∈Ni Ti(Si) possible values for the decision variable (Si, yi) in the
maximization problem on the right side above. Thus, solving this maximization
problem is not too difficult when the number of grid points is not large. The next
theorem gives a sufficient condition under which we can use the value of z satisfying
(3.22) to obtain a good solution for problem (3.16).
Theorem 6. For some ρ ≥ 0, assume that the collection of grid points {y˜ti(Si) :
t = 1, . . . , Ti(Si)} satisfy gi(Si, y˜t+1i (Si)) ≤ (1 + ρ) gi(Si, y˜ti(Si)) for all t =
1, . . . , Ti(Si) − 1, Si ∈ Ni. If zˆ denotes the value of z that satisfies (3.22) and ζ∗
denotes the optimal objective value of problem (3.16), then we have (1 + ρ) zˆ ≥ ζ∗.
The theorem above is analogous to Theorem 3 and it can be shown by following
the same reasoning in the proof of Theorem 3. By building on this theorem, we can
construct an approximate solution to problem (3.16) with a certain performance
guarantee. In particular, we find the value of z satisfying (3.22) and denote this
value by zˆ. We let (Sˆi, yˆi) be an optimal solution to the maximization problem on
the right side of (3.22) when this problem is solved with z = zˆ. For all i ∈ M ,
we solve the knapsack problem in (3.20) with (Si, yi) = (Sˆi, yˆi) and let wˆi be an
optimal solution to this knapsack problem. In this case, it is possible to show that
the solution (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm, wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) is a (1 +ρ)-approximate solution to problem
(3.16). To see this result, since zˆ is the value of z satisfying (3.22) and (Sˆi, yˆi) is
an optimal solution to the maximization problem on the right side of (3.22) when
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this problem is solved with z = zˆ, we have
zˆ =
∑
i∈M
{
yˆγii
gi(Sˆi, yˆi)
yˆi
− yˆγii zˆ
}
. (3.23)
Furthermore, since wˆi is an optimal solution to problem (3.20) when this problem
is solved with (Si, yi) = (Sˆi, yˆi), we have gi(Sˆi, yˆi) =
∑
j∈Sˆi wˆij (κij − ηij log wˆij).
Also, by the discussion that follows the formulation of problem (3.20), since
yˆi ∈ [L¯i(Sˆi), U¯i(Sˆi)], the first constraint in problem (3.20) is tight at the opti-
mal solution, yielding
∑
j∈Sˆi wˆij = yˆi. In this case, using the last two equalities in
(3.23), we obtain
zˆ =
∑
i∈M
{(∑
j∈Sˆi
wˆij
)γi ∑j∈Sˆi wˆij (κij − ηij log wˆij)∑
j∈Sˆi wˆij
−
(∑
j∈Sˆi
wˆij
)γi
zˆ
}
.
If we collect all terms that involve zˆ in the equality above on the left side, solve
for zˆ and use the definition of Θ(S1, . . . , Sm,w1, . . . ,wm) in (3.15), then we ob-
tain zˆ = Θ(Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm, wˆ1, . . . , wˆm). As long as the grid points satisfy the as-
sumption of Theorem 6, we also have (1 + ρ) zˆ ≥ ζ∗, in which case, we obtain
(1 + ρ) Θ(Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm, wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) = (1 + ρ) zˆ ≥ ζ∗. Therefore, it follows that if
the collection of grid points satisfies the assumption of Theorem 6, then the ex-
pected revenue provided by the solution (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm, wˆ1, . . . , wˆm) deviates from
the optimal expected revenue ζ∗ by no more than a factor of 1 + ρ, as desired.
The key question is how we can construct a collection of grid points {y˜ti(Si) :
t = 1, . . . , Ti(Si)} that satisfies gi(Si, y˜t+1i (Si)) ≤ (1 + ρ) gi(Si, y˜ti(Si)) for all t =
1, . . . , Ti(Si)−1 so that the assumption of Theorem 6 is satisfied. It turns out that
the answer to this question is already given in Section 3.5. In particular, the only
difference between problems (3.5) and (3.20) is that the former problem focuses
on the full set of products N , whereas the latter problem focuses on the products
that are in Si. Therefore, for a fixed set of products Si, we can repeat the same
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argument in Section 3.5, but restrict our attention only to the products in the set
Si to construct the collection of grid points {y˜ti(Si) : t = 1, . . . , Ti(Si)} that satisfies
gi(Si, y˜
t+1
i (Si)) ≤ (1 + ρ) gi(Si, y˜ti(Si)) for all t = 1, . . . , Ti(Si). In this case, the
number of grid points in this collection is Ti(Si) = O(n + n log(nσi(Si))/ log(1 +
ρ)) = O(n+ n log(nσ)/ log(1 + ρ)), where we let σi(Si) = maxj∈Si Uij/minj∈Si Lij
and σ = max{maxj∈N Uij/minj∈N Lij : i ∈M}.
Finally, we note that we can find the value of z satisfying (3.22) by solving a
linear program similar to the one in (3.9). The only difference is that the second set
of constraints in this linear program has to be replaced with xi ≥ yγii gi(Si, yi)/yi−
yγii z for all Si ∈ Ni, yi ∈ {y˜ti(Si) : t = 1, . . . , Ti(Si)}, i ∈ M . Noting that
|Ni| = O(n) and Ti(Si) = O(n + n log(nσ)/ log(1 + ρ)), this linear program has
1 + m decision variables and O(mn2 + mn2 log(nσ)/ log(1 + ρ)) constraints. The
optimal objective value of the linear program provides the value of z that satisfies
(3.22). Once we have the value of z that satisfies (3.22), we can follow the approach
described right after Theorem 6 to find a (1 + ρ)-approximate solution to problem
(3.16).
3.7 Computational Experiments
In this section, we test the quality of the solutions obtained by the approximation
method that we propose in this chapter. For economy of space, we present compu-
tational results for the first problem variant where the set of products offered to
customers is fixed and we determine the prices for these products. The qualitative
findings from our computational experiments do not change when we consider the
second problem variant, where we jointly determine the products that should be
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offered to customers and their corresponding prices.
3.7.1 Experimental Setup
Throughout this section, we refer to our approximation method as APP. In par-
ticular, APP uses the algorithm in Section 3.5.3 to find a (1 + ρ)-approximate
solution to problem (3.2). In our computational experiments, we set ρ = 0.005
so that APP obtains a solution to problem (3.2) whose expected revenue deviates
from the optimal expected revenue by at most a factor of 1.005, corresponding to a
worst case optimality gap of 0.5%. We emphasize that APP ensures a performance
guarantee of 1 + ρ, but this performance guarantee is in worst case sense and the
solution obtained by APP for a particular problem instance can perform signifi-
cantly better than what is predicted by the worst case performance guarantee of
1 + ρ. So, a natural question is whether we can come up with a more refined ap-
proach to assess the performance of the solution obtained by APP for a particular
problem instance. It turns out that we can solve a linear program to obtain an
upper bound on the optimal expected revenue in problem (3.2). To formulate this
linear program, we let {y¯ti : t = 1, . . . , τi} be any collection of grid points such that
y¯ti ≤ y¯t+1i for all t = 1, . . . , τi − 1. Also, we assume that y¯1i = L¯i and y¯τii = U¯i so
that the grid points cover the interval [L¯i, U¯i]. In this case, it is possible to show
that the optimal objective value of the linear program
min
{
z : z ≥
∑
i∈M
xi, xi ≥
(
y¯ti
)γi gi(y¯t+1i )
y¯ti
− (y¯ti)γi z ∀ t = 1, . . . , τi − 1, i ∈M
}
(3.24)
provides an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue Z∗ in problem (3.2). In
the linear program above, the decision variables are z and (x1, . . . , xm). Theorem 10
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in the appendix shows that the optimal objective value of the linear program above
is indeed an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue Z∗. It is worthwhile to
note that the optimal objective value of problem (3.24) is always an upper bound
on the optimal expected revenue, irrespective of the number and placement of the
grid points. However, if the grid points satisfy gi(y¯
t+1
i ) ≤ (1 + ρ) gi(y¯ti) for all t =
1, . . . , τi−1 and i ∈M , then Theorem 10 also shows that the upper bound provided
the linear program above deviates from the optimal expected revenue Z∗ by at most
a factor of 1 + ρ. Thus, if we choose the grid points in the linear program above
carefully, then this linear program approximates the optimal expected revenue
with a factor of 1 + ρ accuracy. For example, we can plug the grid points given
in Theorem 4 into problem (3.24) to approximate the optimal expected revenue
with a factor of 1 +ρ accuracy. Once we solve problem (3.24) with a particular set
of grid points, we can compare the optimal objective value of this linear program
with the expected revenue from the solution obtained by APP to get a feel for the
optimality gap of the solution obtained by APP.
In our computational experiments, we generate a large number of problem
instances. For each problem instance, we compute the solution obtained by APP.
Also, we solve the linear program in (3.24) to obtain an upper bound on the
optimal expected revenue. By comparing the expected revenue from the solution
obtained by APP with the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue, we
assess the optimality gap of APP. We use the following strategy to generate our
problem instances. In all of our test problems, the number of nests is equal to the
number of products in each nest so that m = n. To come up with the dissimilarity
parameters of the nests, we generate γi from the uniform distribution over [γ
L, γU ]
for all i ∈ M . We use [γL, γU ] = [0.05, 0.35], [γL, γU ] = [0.35, 0.65] or [γL, γU ] =
[0.65, 1]. For all i ∈M , j ∈ N , we generate αij from the uniform distribution over
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[−2, 2] and βij from the uniform distribution over [0.5, 1.5]. To come up with the
bounds on the prices, after generating the parameters γi, αij and βij for all i ∈M ,
j ∈ N , we solve problem (3.2) under the assumption that there are no bounds on
the prices of the products. We use p∗ij to denote the optimal price of product j
in nest i when there are no price bounds. In this case, we generate the bounds
lij and uij on the price of product j in nest i such that we either have p
∗
ij < lij
or p∗ij > uij. In this way, if we solve problem (3.2) without any price bounds,
then the unconstrained price of product j in nest i does not lie in the interval
[lij, uij]. Our hope is that this approach allows us to generate problem instances
where the price bounds are binding at the optimal solution. To be specific, after
computing p∗ij for all i ∈M , j ∈ N , we set either [lij, uij] = [p∗ij +∆, 1.75×p∗ij +∆]
or [lij, uij] = [0.25× p∗ij −∆, p∗ij −∆], each case occurring with equal probability.
If one of the end points of the interval [0.25 × p∗ij − ∆, p∗ij − ∆] turns out to be
negative, then we round it up to zero. When we generate the price bounds in this
fashion, the unconstrained price p∗ij of product j in nest i violates one of the price
bounds lij or uij by about ∆. Furthermore, the width of the interval [lij, uij] is
about 75% of the unconstrained price of product j in nest i. Thus, products that
tend to have larger prices also tend to have wider price bound intervals.
In our computational experiments, we vary the common value of m and n
over {5, 10, 15}, corresponding to three different numbers of nests and numbers of
products in each nest. We can view the common value of m and n as the scale of the
problem instance, measuring the number of decision variables. We vary [γL, γU ]
over {[0.05, 0.35], [0.35, 0.65], [0.65, 1]}, yielding low, medium and high levels of
dissimilarity parameters. Finally, we vary ∆ over {1, 2, 3}, corresponding to three
different levels of violation of the price upper and lower bounds when we solve
problem (3.2) without any price bounds. Varying three parameters over three
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levels, we obtain 27 parameter combinations. For each parameter combination, we
generate 100 individual problem instances by using the approach described in the
paragraph above. For each individual problem instance, we compute the solution
obtained by APP. Also, we solve the linear program in (3.24) to obtain an upper
bound on the optimal expected revenue. The grid points {y¯ti : t = 1, . . . , τi} that
we use in this linear program are identical to the grid points {y˜ti : t = 1, . . . , Ti}
that we use for APP. Thus, by Theorem 4, the grid points {y¯ti : t = 1, . . . , τi} satisfy
gi(y¯
t+1
i ) ≤ (1 + ρ) gi(y¯ti) for all t = 1, . . . , τi− 1, in which case, Theorem 10 implies
that the upper bound provided by the linear program in (3.24) approximates the
optimal expected revenue with a factor of 1 + ρ accuracy. By comparing the
expected revenue from the solution obtained by APP with the upper bound on the
optimal expected revenue, we assess the optimality gap of the solution obtained
by APP.
3.7.2 Computational Results
We give our main computational results in Table 3.1. In this table, the first three
columns show the parameter combination for our test problems by using the tu-
ple (m, [γL, γU ],∆), where the first component gives the common value for the
number of nests and the number of products in each nest, the second component
corresponds to the interval over which we generate the dissimilarity parameters
and the third component characterizes how much the unconstrained prices vio-
late the price bounds. The fourth and fifth columns respectively show the aver-
age lower and upper price bounds when we generate our test problems by using
the approach described in the previous section. The average is computed over
all products in all nests and over all problem instances in a particular param-
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eter combination. We recall that we generate 100 individual problem instances
in each parameter combination. Our goal in these two columns is to give a feel
for the magnitude of the prices and their bounds. The sixth column shows the
percent gap between the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue and the
expected revenue from the solution obtained by APP, averaged over all problem in-
stances in a particular parameter combination. In particular, for problem instance
k, we let UBk be the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue provided
by the optimal objective value of the linear program in (3.24) and RAPPk be
the expected revenue from the solution obtained by APP. In this case, the sixth
column shows 1
100
∑100
k=1 100 × (UBk − RAPPk)/UBk. The seventh column shows
the maximum percent gap between the upper bound on the optimal expected
revenue and the expected revenue from the solution obtained by APP over all
problem instances in a parameter combination. That is, the seventh column shows
max{100× (UBk − RAPPk)/UBk : k = 1, . . . , 100}. The eighth column shows the
average CPU seconds for APP to obtain a solution for one problem instance. Fi-
nally, the ninth column shows the average number of points in the grid used by
APP, where the average is computed over all nests and over all problem instances
in a parameter combination.
Our results indicate that the solutions obtained by APP perform remarkably
well. Over all of our test problems, the average optimality gap of these solutions is
no larger than 0.117%, which is significantly better than the worst case optimality
gap of 0.5% that we ensure by choosing ρ = 0.005. The optimality gaps are par-
ticularly small when [γL, γU ] is close to one so that the dissimilarity parameters of
the nests tend to be close to one. For example, if we focus only on the problem
instances with [γL, γU ] = [0.65, 1], then the average optimality gap comes out to
be 0.085%, whereas the average optimality gap comes out to be 0.206% when we
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Avg. Price % Gap with No. of
Param. Comb. Bounds Upp. Bnd. CPU Grid
m [γL, γU ] ∆ Low. Upp. Avg. Max. Secs. Points
5 [0.05, 0.35] 1 6.83 15.09 0.289% 0.430% 14.79 3,550
5 [0.05, 0.35] 2 7.05 15.08 0.254% 0.402% 14.88 3,550
5 [0.05, 0.35] 3 7.64 16.04 0.232% 0.412% 15.71 3,694
5 [0.35, 0.65] 1 1.92 3.85 0.114% 0.213% 1.67 500
5 [0.35, 0.65] 2 2.32 3.74 0.032% 0.142% 1.44 396
5 [0.35, 0.65] 3 2.92 4.07 0.022% 0.200% 1.39 367
5 [0.65, 1.00] 1 2.03 4.17 0.153% 0.214% 1.94 583
5 [0.65, 1.00] 2 2.50 4.16 0.029% 0.126% 1.59 430
5 [0.65, 1.00] 3 3.01 4.27 0.008% 0.101% 1.57 409
10 [0.05, 0.35] 1 8.38 18.59 0.224% 0.375% 41.17 4,762
10 [0.05, 0.35] 2 8.11 17.66 0.185% 0.367% 40.03 4,668
10 [0.05, 0.35] 3 8.87 18.92 0.173% 0.370% 43.95 5,072
10 [0.35, 0.65] 1 2.22 4.66 0.133% 0.180% 4.74 701
10 [0.35, 0.65] 2 2.71 4.63 0.030% 0.062% 3.83 515
10 [0.35, 0.65] 3 3.21 4.73 0.007% 0.052% 3.51 444
10 [0.65, 1.00] 1 2.60 5.78 0.191% 0.258% 6.80 996
10 [0.65, 1.00] 2 3.15 5.91 0.123% 0.203% 5.89 821
10 [0.65, 1.00] 3 3.61 5.82 0.014% 0.060% 4.72 596
15 [0.05, 0.35] 1 8.77 19.26 0.186% 0.342% 64.73 4,926
15 [0.05, 0.35] 2 8.93 19.40 0.157% 0.335% 67.03 5,116
15 [0.05, 0.35] 3 9.37 19.97 0.150% 0.305% 72.82 5,544
15 [0.35, 0.65] 1 2.48 5.38 0.148% 0.210% 8.88 866
15 [0.35, 0.65] 2 2.97 5.41 0.045% 0.086% 7.45 676
15 [0.35, 0.65] 3 3.48 5.40 0.009% 0.038% 6.29 528
15 [0.65, 1.00] 1 3.21 7.08 0.125% 0.209% 15.43 1,425
15 [0.65, 1.00] 2 3.59 7.11 0.083% 0.183% 14.21 1,293
15 [0.65, 1.00] 3 4.08 7.11 0.041% 0.075% 12.96 1,140
Average 0.117%
Table 3.1: Performance of APP.
focus only on the problem instances with [γL, γU ] = [0.05, 0.35]. If the dissimilarity
parameters are all equal to one, then the objective function of the maximization
problem on the right side of (3.6) is gi(yi)− yi z, in which case, noting that gi(yi)
is a concave function of yi, the objective value of this maximization problem is a
concave function of yi as well. Thus, intuitively speaking, the objective function
of the maximization problem on the right side of (3.6) behaves well when we have
γi = 1, avoiding the pathological cases such as the one shown in Figure 3.1. When
[γL, γU ] = [0.65, 1] so that the dissimilarity parameters of the nests take on values
closer to one, the performance of APP also turns out to be substantially better
71
than what is predicted by the worst case performance guarantee of 0.5%. Never-
theless, even when [γL, γU ] = [0.05, 0.35] so that the dissimilarity parameters can
be far from one, APP can effectively find solutions with the desired performance
guarantee. Over all of our test problems, the maximum optimality gap of the
solutions obtained by APP is 0.43%. Similar to our observations for the average
optimality gaps, the parameter combinations for which we obtain maximum opti-
mality gaps that are close to 0.5% correspond to the parameter combinations with
[γL, γU ] = [0.05, 0.35], yielding dissimilarity parameters further from one.
The CPU seconds for APP are reasonable for practical implementation. In
our largest problem instances with m = 15, noting that n = m, there are a
total of 225 products and we can obtain solutions for these problem instances in
about one minute. Furthermore, the CPU seconds for APP scale in a graceful
fashion. For example, if we double m, then the total number of products increases
by a factor of four and the CPU seconds increase by no more than a factor of four.
In Table 3.2, we show the CPU seconds for APP as a function of the performance
guarantee ρ. The left portion of the table focuses on a problem instance with
m = n = 5, [γL, γU ] = [0.65, 1] and ∆ = 1, whereas the right portion focuses
on a problem instance with m = n = 15, [γL, γU ] = [0.05, 0.35] and ∆ = 3.
The parameter combination for the second problem instance corresponds to the
parameter combination with the largest CPU seconds in Table 3.1. In each portion
of Table 3.2, the first column shows the performance guarantee ρ and the second
column shows the CPU seconds for APP. The results indicate that we can obtain
a solution with a worst case optimality gap of 0.05% in about six minutes, even
for a problem instance with 225 products. If we are content with a worst case
optimality gap of 1%, then we can obtain solutions in about 10 seconds.
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Param. Comb.
(5, [0.65, 1], 1)
CPU
ρ Secs.
0.01 0.93
0.005 2.13
0.001 8.78
0.0005 19.40
Param. Comb.
(15, [0.05, 0.35], 3)
CPU
ρ Secs.
0.01 12.81
0.005 60.76
0.001 124.58
0.0005 398.21
Table 3.2: CPU seconds for APP as a function of the performance guarantee ρ.
It is useful to note that naive approaches for finding solutions to problem (3.2)
can yield poor results. For example, a first cut approach for finding a solution
to problem (3.2) is to solve this problem under the assumption that there are no
bounds on the prices of the products. If the unconstrained prices obtained in this
fashion are outside the price bound constraints, then we can round them up or
down to their corresponding lower or upper bounds. In Table 3.3, we show the
performance of this approach for the test problems in our experimental setup.
The first three columns in this table show the parameter combination for our test
problems. The fourth column shows the average percent gap between the upper
bound on the optimal expected revenue and the expected revenue from the solu-
tion that we obtain by rounding the unconstrained prices up or down to the price
bounds, whereas the fifth column shows the maximum percent gap between the
upper bound on the optimal expected revenue and the expected revenue obtained
by rounding the unconstrained prices. The average and maximum percent gaps are
computed over the same 100 problem instances in Table 3.1. The results in Table
3.3 indicate that rounding the unconstrained prices up or down to the price bounds
can perform poorly. There are parameter combinations where this approach re-
sults in average optimality gaps of about 40%. Over all parameter combinations,
the average optimality gap of this approach is over 4%. The dramatically high
maximum optimality gaps also indicate that we can generate test problems where
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% Gap with
Param. Comb. Upp. Bnd.
m [γL, γU ] ∆ Avg. Max.
5 [0.05, 0.35] 1 0.658% 3.798%
5 [0.05, 0.35] 2 0.645% 4.285%
5 [0.05, 0.35] 3 1.154% 7.765%
5 [0.35, 0.65] 1 0.114% 0.213%
5 [0.35, 0.65] 2 1.930% 14.749%
5 [0.35, 0.65] 3 8.267% 32.248%
5 [0.65, 1.00] 1 0.153% 0.214%
5 [0.65, 1.00] 2 6.928% 37.986%
5 [0.65, 1.00] 3 39.667% 83.798%
Average 6.613%
% Gap with
Param. Comb. Upp. Bnd.
m [γL, γU ] ∆ Avg. Max.
10 [0.05, 0.35] 1 1.373% 7.347%
10 [0.05, 0.35] 2 1.587% 6.777%
10 [0.05, 0.35] 3 2.569% 7.360%
10 [0.35, 0.65] 1 0.133% 0.180%
10 [0.35, 0.65] 2 1.126% 15.492%
10 [0.35, 0.65] 3 17.466% 42.090%
10 [0.65, 1.00] 1 0.213% 0.845%
10 [0.65, 1.00] 2 0.445% 8.797%
10 [0.65, 1.00] 3 10.869% 64.471%
Average 3.978%
% Gap with
Param. Comb. Upp. Bnd.
m [γL, γU ] ∆ Avg. Max.
15 [0.05, 0.35] 1 1.483% 3.613%
15 [0.05, 0.35] 2 2.069% 4.575%
15 [0.05, 0.35] 3 3.439% 9.326%
15 [0.35, 0.65] 1 0.148% 0.210%
15 [0.35, 0.65] 2 0.050% 0.512%
15 [0.35, 0.65] 3 14.519% 34.727%
15 [0.65, 1.00] 1 0.630% 38.811%
15 [0.65, 1.00] 2 0.337% 2.133%
15 [0.65, 1.00] 3 2.402% 20.070%
Average 2.768%
Table 3.3: Performance of the prices obtained by rounding the unconstrained prices up or
down to the price bounds.
the unconstrained prices give essentially no indication of the optimal prices under
price bounds.
3.8 Conclusions
We developed approximation methods for pricing problems where customers choose
under the nested logit model and there are bounds on the prices that can be
charged for the products. We considered two problem variants. In the first variant,
the set of products offered to customers is fixed and we want to determine the
prices for these products. In the second variant, we jointly determine the products
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to be offered and their corresponding prices. For both problem variants, given
any ρ > 0, we showed how to obtain a solution whose expected revenue deviates
from the optimal expected revenue by no more than a factor of 1 + ρ. To obtain
this solution, we solved a linear program and the number of constraints in this
linear program grew at rate 1/ρ. Our computational experiments demonstrated
that our approximation methods can obtain solutions to practical problems within
reasonable computation time.
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CHAPTER 4
A JOINT ASSORTMENT AND STOCKING PROBLEM:
CORRELATION-VARIETY RELATIONSHIPS AND
APPROXIMATION METHODS
4.1 Introduction
Making effective assortment planning decisions in the face of customer choice re-
quires a strong understanding of customer substitution patterns as well as the
benefits and costs of product variety. Of particular interest are settings where a
retailer offers a heterogeneous collection of products that can be designated into a
number of different product types or subgroups, where the products within a type
are closer substitutes to each other than products from another type. Both the de-
lineation of products into subgroups and the customers’ perception of how similar
products within types are can impact customer substation patterns in ways that
cannot be adequately captured by assuming that all products belong to a single
category. An important question is how the level of similarity of products within a
particular type (or multiple types) affects optimal assortment planning and stock-
ing decisions. A retailer offering a single category of highly similar products (in a
high-end specialty store, for example) may see benefit by reducing its product line
to include only the most popular product variant in this category. On the other
hand, massive big-box retailers carrying many different variants of many differ-
ent product types tend to maintain large levels of product variety and stock large
quantities of their offered products. An interesting question is whether observed
retail practices of this nature can be supported by analysis of a joint stocking and
assortment problem under customer choice.
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We study a joint stocking and product offer problem in order to address the
questions outlined above. We have access to a set of products that are designated
into product types, with individual degrees of product similarity within each type,
to satisfy the demand from customers that arrive over a finite selling horizon.
Products within a particular type have the same selling price and unit cost. We
need to decide which sets of products to offer and how many units of each product
to stock. Product demand in our model arises from a stochastic choice process
in which individual purchase decisions are made according to a random utility
maximization model. The objective is to determine a set of products to offer
over the entire selling horizon and how many units of each offered product to
stock so as to maximize the expected profit. Our model is static in the sense
that customers make their choice from the given assortment without knowledge of
product availability and customer do not substitute in the event of a stock-out.
Our chosen random utility maximization model is the nested logit (NL) model.
The NL model allows us to accurately reflect that products are designated into
subgroups and the resulting implications on customer substitution behavior. Un-
der this model, customers follow a hierarchical choice process, choosing first among
subgroups and then a product in the chosen subgroup. A related advantageous
feature of the NL model is that its purchase probability expressions contain param-
eters corresponding to the degree of similarity among products within a particular
subgroup, allowing us to examine how varying these parameters impacts the key
decisions in our problem.
We formulate our problem as a combinatorial optimization problem, where
the objective function is the retailer’s expected profit and the decision variables
correspond to the subset of products within each type to offer and the stocking
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quantity for each product. This optimization problem is difficult to work with for
a number of reasons. First, the number of decision variables is on the order of
the number of subsets of products, which grows exponentially with the number of
products. Second, the objective function is not separable by the products and is
not concave. Lastly, though a previously-used tactic when dealing with assortment
problems under the NL model is to separate the problem by product subgroups,
our problem is not separable in this manner.
The contributions of our study are threefold. First, we circumvent the above
difficulties by exploiting the structure of the NL model and proving a convenient
structural property of optimal assortment offering decisions, using a nonlinear
programming relaxation of the original problem. Using this property along with
additional structural properties of the nonlinear program, we are able to show
that there exist optimal assortments within every product type that correspond
to the most popular products in each type. As a result, in each product type, we
only need to consider a collection of possible assortments whose size grows linearly
with the number of products in each type. To our knowledge, we are the first to
provide such a property for a general problem with an arbitrary number of product
subgroup designations.
Secondly, we make use of these structural properties of optimal assortments and
the nonlinear programming relaxation to examine how the perception of product
similarity levels within product types impacts optimal expected profit, assortment
offering and product stocking decisions. In particular, we use the relaxation to
show that a decrease in product similarity within any one of the offered product
types leads to an increase in optimal expected profit. This is a result that we
achieve solely through use of the relaxation and its proof does not require any
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specific characterization of optimal assortments. In addition, we show that as the
selection of products within a type becomes increasingly similar, it is optimal to
offer very small assortment of that product type. In our numerical experiments,
we investigate whether the reverse is true - that optimal offered product variety
increases as the selection of products within types become increasingly dissimilar.
We also prove that if the assortment of offered products is fixed, a decrease in
similarity among products of a particular type leads to higher inventory levels
of product stocked within that type. Our numerical experiments suggest that
decreasing product similarity also leads to an increase in optimal stocking levels
as well as optimal assortment variety.
Lastly, we devise efficient solution approaches for our problem that generate
well-performing approximate solutions. We show that our problem can be ex-
pressed as a dynamic program with a three-dimensional state variable. We show
that we can obtain approximate solutions to our original problem in a tractable
fashion via a state space discretization technique, and show that solving an approx-
imate dynamic program provides upper and lower bounds on the optimal expected
profit. In addition, we examine a suitably-calibrated deterministic approximation
to our original problem, whose analogous dynamic programming formulation has
only two state variables and provides a constant-factor approximation to our orig-
inal problem. Using a similar discretization technique, we are able to use this
approximate problem to produce high-quality solutions with a further reduction in
computational effort. Our numerical experiments show that solutions generated by
the approximate problem tend to perform significantly better than the worst-case
performance guarantee.
The aims of this chapter are related to issues examined in consumer psychology
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regarding product assortment variety. [17] showed that while higher product vari-
ety within categories can entice customers to buy from those categories, increasing
product variety within a category can provide diminishing returns for the retailer,
as many customers who were initially lured in by the product variety would nev-
ertheless decide not to make a purchase, especially when dealing with product
categories in which the products were perceived as being very similar or unfamil-
iar to the customers. [32] show that in unfamiliar product categories, congruency
between a customer’s shopping goals and the retailer’s assortment can lead to
lower perceptions of product variety but increased satisfaction with the retailer’s
assortment, suggesting that customers who choose to buy from a specialty product
category with which they are not very familiar may view the products as being
highly similar but, should they decide to make a purchase, will gravitate toward a
high-utility product within that category.
The NL model, as described by [29] and [7], is a generalization of the multino-
mial logit (MNL) choice model, providing closed-form expressions for a customer’s
purchase probability of any offered product, and has been widely used to model
customer choice behavior (see [5], [9]). Our work is most strongly related to two
other papers on assortment planning and stocking decisions under customer choice.
In the first, [39] studies a static assortment and stocking problem where all prod-
ucts belong to a single homogeneous product category, using the MNL model to
capture customer substitution behavior. They obtain the optimal solution, show-
ing that it consists of the most popular products from the set of products that can
potentially be offered. In order to obtain this result, the authors assume that all
of the products have the same unit price to cost ratios. We are able to extend the
work of [39] in two crucial areas: the first being that we are allowed to consider
the case where we have heterogeneous products that can be designated into an
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arbitrary number of subgroups with varying levels of subgroup similarity, and the
second being that we allow each subgroup to have its own associated price to cost
ratio.
In the second, [22] examine a joint assortment planning and pricing problem
utilizing a generalized cost function. The authors allow heterogenous products,
using the NL model to capture customer choice behavior. The authors consider
two arrangements of the customer choice hierarchy. Under the first, a customer
selects one of two products brands and then selects a particular product within
that brand. Under the second, a customer first chooses a product type and then
chooses one of the two brands’ variants of that product type. Under the brand-
primary choice model, the authors show that it is optimal to offer some subset
of the most popular products offered by each brand, and show that this is not
necessarily the case under the type-primary choice model. Under the two choice
structures, the optimal assortment can be found in O(n2) and O(2n) operations
respectively, where n is the number of product types. Our work studies a similar
assortment optimization problem and incorporates costs in the form of product
stocking considerations, but uses exogenous prices. We extend the choice structure
to include an arbitrary number of subgroups and products within those subgroups,
i.e., as opposed to requiring that there be only two product brands to choose from,
there can be an arbitrary number of different brands offered. We show that we can
obtain an analogous structural property under this more general framework despite
the fact that prices are exogenous and devise efficient approaches for generating
well-performing assortments even when the number of product types or the number
of subgroup designations is large.
There are a number of other related papers that study product offering
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and stocking decisions under customer substitution behavior. [19] apply the
MNL model to study the joint assortment planning and pricing problem under
assortment-based substitution. They show that the optimal assortment for a risk-
averse retailer is composed of the variants with the highest quality markups, with
price markups being equal to quality markups. [4] apply the MNL model to study
a static joint assortment planning and pricing problem in a single product cat-
egory. They find that the optimal solution is such that all products have equal
price to cost ratios. [3] optimize inventory levels and prices for multiple products
in a given assortment. [27] develop heuristics for joint assortment, inventory, and
price optimization, while [15], [18], and [2] utilize locational choice models to study
assortment planning and stocking decisions. [38] studies a joint assortment plan-
ning and stocking problem under the MNL model where different assortments may
be offered over the course of the selling horizon and gives tractable methods to
obtain near-optimal policies. Other papers that consider assortment optimization
problems utilizing the NL model with exogenous prices include [10], who stud-
ies an unconstrained revenue maximization problem where a single assortment is
shown to customers, and [13], which considers a variant of the same problem with
capacity constraints on the offered assortment. Both of these papers make use of a
structural property that allows the problem to be separated by product subgroups,
which is not possible in our problem.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formulates our joint
stocking and assortment planning model. Section 4.3 uses a nonlinear program-
ming relaxation of the original problem to show a structural property of optimal
assortments. Section 4.4 gives properties of the optimal solution and examines
effects of varying product similarity within particular product types on optimal
product variety, stocking decisions and expected profit. Section 4.5 gives a dynamic
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programming approach for generating approximate solutions and upper and lower
bounds on the optimal expected profit. Section 4.6 presents an alternative problem
which allows approximate solutions to our original problem to be obtained with
reduced computational effort. Section 4.7 presents computational experiments.
4.2 Problem Formulation
Customers arrive at a rate of λ per unit time. For brevity, we normalize the length
of the selling horizon to one. The firm’s products are designated into m product
types, indexed by M = {1, . . . ,m}. There are n variants of each product type,
indexed by N = {1, . . . , n}. Each variant of a product type i ∈ M is assumed to
have an identical purchasing cost ci and revenue pi, with pi ≥ ci, to reflect the
fact that products within a type are assumed to be similar to some degree. In the
category/brand setting, for instance, we would assume that versions of the same
type of product being offered by different brands should be relatively similar in
price and cost.
We let xij be the number of units of variant j of type i that we stock at the
beginning of the selling horizon. The demand for individual variants is influenced
by choosing the set of products that we offer over the selling horizon. If we offer
the assortment of products S = (S1, . . . , Sm), where Si ⊆ N is the assortment of
variants of type i offered, then the probability that the customer chooses variant
j of type i is denoted by qij(S).
In order to accurately reflect the fact that our firm offers similar products
that are grouped together based on type, we assume that qij(S) is determined
according to the nested logit (NL) model. Under the NL, each customer considers
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the assortment S of products offered by the store. The customer may choose to
purchase a product amongst the set S, or leave without making a purchase. Each
customer assigns a random utility Uij = µij + ij to each variant j ∈ Si, where µij
is a deterministic utility component assigned to each variant j ∈ N and ijt has
a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution ∀i ∈ M, j ∈ N. Similarly, each
customer assigns a random utility U0 = µ0 +0 to the option of purchasing nothing.
The utilities of variants of the same type i are assumed to be correlated. We assume
that all variants of a particular product type have distinct deterministic utilities.
(While it is possible to show that all of the following results also hold under the
case where some variants of the same product type have the same deterministic
utilities, we will concentrate on the case where utilities are distinct to simplify our
analysis.) Without loss of generality, we assume that the variants of each product
type are ordered such that µi1 > µi2 > . . . > µin for all i ∈ M. Each product
type has a parameter γi ∈ (0, 1] associated with it that characterizes the degree
of dissimilarity of products within the type. Equivalently, 1 − γi measures the
correlation between the random utilities (Uij)j∈N of products within type i.
Let Vi(Si) = (
∑
k∈Si e
µik/γi)γi . Under the NL model, as shown in [7], each
customer makes a purchase within product type i with probability Qi(S) =
Vi(Si)
v0+
∑
l∈M Vl(Sl)
, where v0 = e
µ0 . Given that the customer chooses product type i,
he chooses variant j with probability
qj|i(Si) =

eµij/γi
Vi(Si)1/γi
, j ∈ Si
0, otherwise.
Putting these expressions together, we have
qij(S) = Qi(S)qj|i(Si).
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We note that
∑
j∈N qij(S) = Qi(S)∀i ∈M. With probability
Q0(S) = 1−
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
qij(S) = v0
v0 +
∑
l∈M Vl(Sl)
,
each customer leaves without purchasing anything. Our assumption that there are
the same number of variants of each product type is without loss of generality,
because if some type i contains fewer than n variants, then we can include addi-
tional variants j in this nest with µij = −∞ and these products would never be
purchased.
We choose a single assortment of products S to offer over the entire selling
horizon. Our static policy assumes that if a customer chooses a product in the
set S for which we do not have any stock, the customer leaves the system without
purchasing anything. One interpretation of this assumption is that a customer’s
initial decision is a store-visit decision. Customers makes the decision to visit our
store based on knowledge of the set S, i.e., the products that they know are being
offered, but customers do not know the inventory status of particular products
until they arrive at the store. If a customer shows up to the store and his most
preferred product is not in stock, the customer will choose to go elsewhere and
look for this product rather than making a different choice from among our store.
As such, we can interpret the no-purchase option as encompassing all possible
purchasing decisions that are outside the control of our firm.
We assume that each customer assigns utilities to the products in the subset
S based on independent samples of the nested logit model described above, that
is, realizations of the random variables ij, j ∈ N, i ∈ M are independent from
customer to customer. Since customers are heterogeneous and independent, the
observation of one customer’s choice reveals no additional information about the
choice of subsequent customers. This results in the following model of aggregate
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demand: the number of customers that request variant j of type i over the sell-
ing horizon has a normal distribution with mean λqij(S) and standard deviation
αλrqij(S)r, where α > 0 and r ∈ [0, 1). This distribution is chosen to ensure that
our problem framework satisfies economies of scale, in the sense that operational
efficiency increases as the customer volume λ gets larger. Particularly, for a fixed
assortment S, we note that the coefficient of variation of the demand for variant
j of type i is α
λ1−rqij(S)1−r , which is decreasing in the customer volume λ, implying
that inventory costs associated with safety stock should decrease as λ gets larger.
A special case of this model is when the total number of customers that arrive over
the selling horizon is Poisson with mean λ. In this case, the number of customers
that request product j in nest i is also Poisson with mean λqij(S), and the normal
approximation to the Poisson distribution yields α = 1 and r = 1/2.
Using N (µ, σ) to denote a normal random variable with mean µ and standard
deviation σ, we can maximize the expected profit by solving the problem
max
S,x
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
piE
[
min
{N (λqij(S), αλrqij(S)r), xij}]−∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
cixij (4.1)
s.t. S = (S1, . . . , Sm), Si ⊆ N ∀i ∈M (4.2)
xij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N, ∀i ∈M, (4.3)
where the first term in the objective is the expected revenue obtained from pur-
chases by customers and the second term is the cost of stocking the products.
We note that given a fixed assortment S of products, the demand distribution is
exogenous and it is well-known that the optimal stocking decisions for problem
(4.1)-(4.3) are given by
x∗ij(S) = λqij(S) + αλrqij(S)rΦ−1(1− ci/pi), (4.4)
where Φ−1(·) is the inverse of the standard normal distribution function. We can
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collapse these expressions back into the objective function, resulting in
piE
[
min
{N (λqij(S), αλrqij(S)r), x∗ij(S)}]− cix∗ij(S)
= (pi − ci)λqij(S)− piαλrφ(Φ−1(1− ci/pi))qij(S)r ∀i ∈M, j ∈ N,
where φ(·) denotes the standard normal density and we use the fact that
E[min{Z,Φ−1(1 − ci/pi)}] = Φ−1(1 − ci/pi)ci/pi − φ(Φ−1(1 − ci/pi)) for a stan-
dard normal random variable Z; see [21]. For notational brevity, let θi =
piαλ
rφ(Φ−1(1− ci/pi)). Then problem (4.1)-(4.3) is equivalent to
max
S
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
(pi − ci)λqij(S)−
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
θiqij(S)r (4.5)
s.t. S = (S1, . . . , Sm), Si ⊆ N ∀i ∈M. (4.6)
We note that the problem of choosing optimal stocking levels is now embedded into
the objective function, so that the only decision of note is choosing the optimal
assortment of products to offer; the corresponding optimal stock levels can then
be computed using (4.4). However, problem (4.5)-(4.6) is difficult for a number
of reasons. The number of possible choices for each subset Si is 2
n, meaning
that there are 2nm possible choices for the assortment S. In addition, interactions
between the assortment decisions Si for different product types i in the terms
qij(S) and qij(S)r prevent the problem from being separable by the product types
i ∈M , which prevents separation-based approaches for assortment problems such
as those studied in [10] and [13].
In the next section, we give a structural property of optimal assortments for
problem (4.5)-(4.6) using a nonlinear programming relaxation of this problem.
This nonlinear programming relaxation will be influential in allowing us to gain
insights on how optimal solutions to our original problem behave with changes in
the utility correlation parameters in later sections.
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4.3 Optimal Assortments
Recall that within each product type, variants are ordered by their deterministic
utility components µij, such that variant 1 has the highest deterministic utility and
variant n has the lowest. If we suppose that the entire set of variants N is offered
within a nest i, then our expressions for the purchase probabilities qij(S) imply
that we will have qi1(S) > qi2(S) . . . > qin(S). Thus, if all variants of type i are
shown to customers, variant 1 will have the highest mean demand and variant n
the lowest mean demand. We can simplify this concept by simply saying that the
variants in each nest are ordered by their expected popularity. Define the popular
set
P = {∅, {1}, {1, 2}, . . . , {1, . . . , n}}
to be the collection of all assortments containing the k most popular variants for
k = 0, . . . , n. We assume that all variants of a particular product type have distinct
deterministic utilities, i.e., µi1 > . . . > µin ∀i ∈ M. We will show that optimal
assortments have the property that assortments of individual product types must
fall in the popular set P . (While it is also possible to show that there exist
optimal assortments in the popular set when some product variants can have the
same deterministic utility, we will focus on the case where utilities are distinct to
simplify our analysis.)
To achieve this result, we will examine a relaxation of problem (4.5)-(4.6).
In the relaxation, we let Yi represent the probability that a customer chooses
a product from type i, yij the probability that a customer chooses variant
j of product type i and Y0 the probability that the customer buys nothing.
These decision variables must satisfy the constraints
∑
j∈N yij = Yi ∀i ∈ M
and Y0 +
∑
i∈M Yi = 1. We note that the probability that a customer pur-
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chases variant j of product type i is qij(S) = Vi(Si)Q0(S)v0 e
µij/γi
Vi(Si)1/γi
whenever j ∈ Si
and zero otherwise. Thus, when j ∈ Si, qij(S)γie−µij = Vi(Si)γiQ0(S)γivγi0
1
Vi(Si)
, so
that v0Vi(Si)
1−γi(Q0(S)
v0
)1−γiqij(S)γie−µij = Q0(S) when j ∈ Si and zero other-
wise. Therefore, noting that Vi(Si)
1−γi(Q0(S)
v0
)1−γi = Qi(S)1−γi , we always have
v0Qi(S)1−γiqij(S)γie−µij ≤ Q0(S) for all S, j ∈ Si, i ∈ M and it is reasonable
to impose the constraint v0Y
1−γi
i y
γi
ij e
−µij ≤ Y0 for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N. We propose
maximizing our expected profit by solving the problem
max
(y,Y,Y0)∈F
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
(pi − ci)λyij −
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
θiy
r
ij, (4.7)
where F is the feasible region defined by the constraints
Y0 +
∑
i∈M
Yi = 1
∑
j∈N
yij = Yi ∀i ∈M
v0Y
1−γi
i y
γi
ij e
−µij ≤ Y0 ∀j ∈ N, i ∈M
yij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N, i ∈M.
We emphasize that this is a non-convex optimization problem. While the con-
straints become linear if γi = 1 for all i and are consistent with the linear repre-
sentation of the MNL model studied in [38], this problem lacks desirable structure
for general values of γi. Despite the fact that we cannot easily solve this problem,
we can use it to derive structural properties of optimal assortments.
It is clear that problem (4.7) is a relaxation of problem (4.5)-(4.6), since any
assortment S defines a solution that satisfies all the constraints, as shown above.
However, it is possible to construct feasible solutions to this problem that do not
correspond to actual purchase probabilities under the nested logit model; corre-
spondence can only happen if the last constraint is satisfied with equality for all
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j such that yij is positive and its left side is zero otherwise, for all i ∈ M. We
can equivalently state that the following condition is necessary for a solution to
correspond to purchase probabilities:
Condition 1. v0Y
1−γi
i y
γi
ij e
−µij = Y01(yij > 0)∀i ∈M, j ∈ N.
Remarkably, it turns out that optimal solutions to the relaxation (4.7) actually
satisfy this necessary condition. To show this, we will make use of a linearization
technique. Let (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) be an optimal solution to problem (4.7) and let S
∗
i =
{j ∈ N : y∗ij > 0}. Since (·)γi is a concave function, we have
Y 1−γii y
γi
ij = Yi(yij/Yi)
γi ≤ Yi
{
(y∗ij/Y
∗
i )
γi + γi(y
∗
ij/Y
∗
i )
γi−1(yij/Yi − y∗ij/Y ∗i )
}
= (1− γi)(y∗ij/Y ∗i )γiYi + γi(y∗ij/Y ∗i )γi−1yij,
where in the inequality, we have replaced (yij/Yi)
γi with the linear approximation
given by the derivative of (·)γi at the point y∗ij/Y ∗i (an application of the subgradient
inequality). Letting H(y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) be the region defined by the linear constraints
Y0 +
∑
i∈M
Yi = 1
∑
j∈N
yij = Yi ∀i ∈M
v0e
−µijγi(y∗ij/Y
∗
i )
γi−1yij + v0(1− γi)e−µij(y∗ij/Y ∗i )γiYi ≤ Y0 ∀j ∈ S∗i , ∀i ∈M
yij = 0 ∀j ∈ N \ S∗i , ∀i ∈M
yij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N, i ∈M.
it follows that H(y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) ⊆ F . It also follows that (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) ∈
H(y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ), since the first constraint is satisfied with equality when y = y∗.
Thus, (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) must be optimal for the problem
max
(y,Y,Y0)∈H(y∗,Y∗,Y ∗0 )
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
(pi − ci)λyij −
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
θiy
r
ij, (4.8)
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This problem is useful because it involves maximizing a strictly convex objective
function over a set of linear constraints. As such, optimal solutions to this problem
must be extreme points of the feasible region. The following lemma makes use of
this fact to obtain the desired result.
Lemma 5. Any optimal solution (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) to problem (4.7) must satisfy Con-
dition 1.
Proof. Note that H(y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) is a polyhedron. Since the objective function of
problem 4.8 is strictly convex in y, (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) must be an extreme point of
H(y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ). Consider the optimization problem in (4.8). Letting S∗i = {j ∈
N : y∗ij > 0}, we can disregard the variables yij for j /∈ S∗i , as they have no effect
on the objective function value. Introducing slack variables sij, the constraints of
H(y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) can now be expressed as
v0
{
e−µijγi(y∗ij/Y
∗
i )
γi−1yij + (1− γi)e−µij(y∗ij/Y ∗i )γiYi
}
− Y0 + sij = 0∑
j∈S∗i
yij − Yi = 0
∑
i∈M
Yi + Y0 = 1
yij, sij ≥ 0
for all j ∈ S∗i , i ∈M. The variables Yi and Y0 are superfluous, so we can eliminate
them and disregard the second and third constraints, provided we simply re-express
Yi and Y0 in the first constraint in terms of the variables y. Among the y variables,
we have
∑
i∈M |S∗i | variables and
∑
i∈M |S∗i | constraints. We know that (y∗, s∗)
must be an extreme point of this polyhedron, where s∗ is the vector of slack
variables corresponding to y∗, taking only the indices j ∈ S∗i into consideration.
We recall that y∗ij > 0 ∀j ∈ S∗i . Thus, the solution (y∗, s∗) must contain at least
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∑
i∈M |S∗i | positive variables. But this implies that none of the slack variables
s∗ can be positive, because there are only
∑
i∈M |S∗i | constraints in the region
above. Thus, we must have v0(1−γi)e−µij(y∗ij/Y ∗i )γiY ∗i +v0e−µijγi(y∗ij/Y ∗i )γi−1y∗ij−
Y ∗0 = 0 for all j ∈ S∗i , ∀i ∈ M. Since the left side of this equality is equal to
v0(Y
∗
i )
1−γi(y∗ij)
γie−µij − Y ∗0 , we conclude that (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) must satisfy Condition
1.
We can now show that optimal solutions to the relaxation (4.7) correspond to
assortments in the popular set. To see this, suppose that we have an optimal solu-
tion (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) to problem (4.7). Note that since (y
∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) satisfies Condition
1, we must have
v0(Y
∗
i )
1−γi(y∗ij)
γie−µij = Y ∗0 ∀j ∈ S∗i
and y∗ij = 0 ∀j ∈ N \ S∗i . Now suppose that S∗i = {j ∈ N : y∗ij > 0} /∈ P for some
i ∈ M . Then ∃ s, t ∈ N, s < t such that µis > µit, s /∈ S∗i and t ∈ S∗i . Thus,
y∗is = 0 and
v0(Y
∗
i )
1−γi(y∗it)
γie−µit = Y ∗0 .
Now suppose that we construct a new solution yˆ by swapping the variables corre-
sponding to variants s and t, i.e., letting yˆis = y
∗
it, yˆit = 0 and yˆij = y
∗
ij ∀j 6= s, t.
This results in Y ∗0 = 1 −
∑
l∈M
∑
k∈N y
∗
lk = 1 −
∑
l∈M
∑
k∈N yˆlk and Y
∗
i =∑
k∈N y
∗
ik =
∑
k∈N yˆik ∀i ∈ M, so (yˆ,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) is feasible for problem (4.7) and has
the same objective value as (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) (implying that it is optimal for problem
(4.7).) However,
v0(Y
∗
i )
1−γi(yˆis)γie−µis = Y ∗0 e
µit−µis < Y ∗0 ,
implying that (yˆ,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) fails to satisfy Condition 1. This contradicts Lemma 5.
Thus, S∗i = {j ∈ N : y∗ij > 0} must lie in P for all i ∈ M . Since we have only
shown thus far that optimal solutions to problem (4.7) meet a necessary condition
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for correspondence to purchase probabilities, it still remains to be shown that
we can construct an optimal solution to our original assortment problem using
an optimal solution to the relaxation. This is done in the proof of the following
theorem, which characterizes the main result of this section.
Theorem 7. There exists an optimal assortment S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗m) to problem
(4.5)-(4.6) such that S∗i ∈ P for all i ∈M.
Proof. By the preceding analysis, we know that there exists an optimal solution
(y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) to problem (4.7) such that S
∗
i = {j ∈ N : y∗ij > 0} ∈ P for all i ∈ M .
Let S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗m). Since (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) must satisfy Condition 1, we have
Vi(S
∗
i ) =
( ∑
j:y∗ij>0
eµij/γi
)γi
=
( ∑
j:y∗ij>0
y∗ij
v
1/γi
0 (Y
∗
i )
1/γi−1
(Y ∗0 )1/γi
)γi
=
v0Y
∗
i
Y ∗0
,
giving
qij(S∗) = e
µij/γi
(v0 +
∑
l∈M Vl(S
∗
l ))Vi(S
∗
i )
1/γi−1 =
eµij/γi
(v0 +
∑
l∈M
v0Y ∗l
Y ∗0
)(
v0Y ∗i
Y ∗0
)1/γi−1
= eµij/γi
(
Y ∗0
v0
)1/γi
(Y ∗i )
1−1/γi = y∗ij,
where the second-to-last equality follows from the fact that 1 +
∑
l∈M
Y ∗l
Y ∗0
= 1
Y ∗0
and the last equality follows from the fact that (y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) satisfies Condition
1. Thus, the assortment S∗ provides the same objective value as the solution
(y∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ). Since (y
∗,Y∗, Y ∗0 ) is optimal for the relaxation (4.7), S∗ must be
optimal for problem (4.5)-(4.6).
Theorem 7 implies that there is always an optimal assortment of each product
type i ∈ M which is in the popular set P . A similar structure was shown to be
optimal for a single product category (type) under the MNL model by van [39];
[22] established the optimality of this structure for a problem under the NL model
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with two nests (product types in our case). Our result generalizes this structure
to an arbitrary number of product types.
When trying to construct an assortment S that is optimal for problem (4.5)-
(4.6), we need only consider assortments of each product type that are in the
popular set P . We note that there are only n+ 1 assortments in P , as opposed to
2n possible assortments in total, which greatly reduces the number of candidate
assortments that need to be considered by the firm when n is large. This property
allows us to solve our original problem via a dynamic program, as we will show
in Section 4.5, as well as obtain upper and lower bounds on the optimal expected
profit.
4.4 Properties of the Optimal Solution
In this section, we examine the effects of utility correlation among variants of a
product type, captured in the form of the parameters γi, on the stocking and
assortment offering decisions made by our firm. Throughout this section, in order
to emphasize the dependency of the relevant expressions in our problem on the
parameters γ = (γ1, . . . , γm), we will use Vi(Si, γi) to denote Vi(Si) and x
∗
ij(S,γ)
to denote x∗ij(S); Qi(S,γ) and qj|i(Si, γi) are defined similarly.
To examine the effects of utility correlation on our expected profit, we revisit
our nonlinear programming relaxation in problem (4.7). We know from theorem
1 that the optimal objective values of problem (4.7) and problem (4.5)-(4.6) are
equivalent. Consider the feasible region of problem (4.7). Emphasizing its depen-
dency on the correlation parameters, let F(γ) denote the feasible region of (4.7).
94
We can express the constraints of F(γ) as
Y0 +
∑
i∈M
Yi = 1
∑
j∈N
yij = Yi ∀i ∈M
fij(y,Y, γi) ≤ Y0 ∀j ∈ N, i ∈M
yij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N, i ∈M.
where fij(y,Y, γi) = v0Y
1−γi
i y
γi
ij e
−µij ∀i ∈M, j ∈ N. We observe that for any fixed
feasible (y,Y), the derivative of fij with respect to γi is given by
∂fij
∂γi
(y,Y, γi) = v0Y
1−γi
i y
γi
ij e
−µij(log yij − log Yi) ≤ 0.
This implies that, for fixed values of (y,Y), increasing the value of γi decreases
the value of the left side of the constraint. Thus, if (y,Y, Y0) ∈ F(γ−i, γ′i) and
γ¯i > γ
′
i, then fij(y,Y, γ¯i) ≤ fij(y,Y, γ′i) ≤ Y0 ∀j ∈ N, implying that (y,Y, Y0) ∈
F(γ−i, γ¯i). Therefore F(γ−i, γ′i) ⊆ F(γ−i, γ¯i), and any solution that is feasible to
problem (4.7) with parameters (γ−i, γ′i) must be feasible for problem (4.7) with
parameters (γ−i, γ¯i). As a result, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 8. Let Π∗(γ) denote the optimal objective value of problem (4.5)-(4.6)
with correlation parameters γ. For all i ∈ M , if γ¯i > γ′i, then Π∗(γ−i, γ¯i) ≥
Π∗(γ−i, γ′i) for all γ−i ∈ (0, 1]m−1.
Proof. Follows from equivalence of the optimal objective values of problem (4.5)-
(4.6) and problem (4.7).
Thus, as the utilities of products within types become less correlated, our firm’s
expected profits increase. We emphasize that, to our knowledge, we are the first
to demonstrate this property for an assortment optimization problem under the
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NL model. We also emphasize that the use of the nonlinear programming rep-
resentation in (4.7) of the original problem is instrumental in achieving this re-
sult. In addition, since our proof relies only on properties of the feasible region of
the nonlinear program, we could replace the objective function in (4.7) with any
other objective function that can be expressed in terms of the decision variables
(y,Y, Y0) (i.e., the purchase probabilities under the NL model) and show that de-
creased correlation among the utilities of products in any particular type leads to
an improvement in optimal performance.
The following proposition characterizes how customers evaluate products within
a particular type i as the degree of correlation between utilities of variants of that
product type becomes very high. This will allow us to obtain some insights on how
optimal stocking levels change with utility correlation under a fixed assortment, as
well as prove an asymptotic property of optimal assortments. The proof is deferred
to the appendix.
Proposition 3. For any fixed assortment Si ⊆ N , limγi→0 Vi(Si, γi) = emaxk∈Si µik
and
limγi→0 qj|i(Si, γi) = 1(j = argmaxk∈Si µik).
Consider the case when the assortment of products S is fixed. We have shown
in Proposition 3 that as products within a type become increasingly correlated,
customers who choose product type i will gravitate toward the highest-utility vari-
ant of that type (and will select product type i based solely on the attractiveness of
the highest-utility variant, ignoring other variants of the type.) If products within
a type become less correlated, we would expect the opposite behavior : customers
would start to take the utilities of additional variants of product type i into ac-
count. We might expect that this wold increase the probability that a customer
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buys a product from type i. In fact, this can be shown mathematically by noting
that
∂
∂γi
Vi(Si, γi) = Vi(Si, γi)
[
log(
∑
k∈Si
eµik/γi)−
∑
k∈Si µike
µik/γi
γi
∑
k∈Si e
µik/γi
]
≥ 0
since
log(
∑
k∈Si
eµik/γi) ≥ maxk∈Si µik
γi
≥
∑
k∈Si µike
µik/γi
γi
∑
k∈Si e
µik/γi
.
This implies that ∂
∂γi
Qi(S,γ) ≥ 0. Raising γi increases the aggregate attractiveness
of product i, but also increases the chance that a customer will choose a variant
of product type i that is not the highest-utility variant. Naturally, we would
expect that this necessitates carrying more total inventory of products in type
i. Meanwhile, the fact that customers find more potential value in lower-utility
variants of product type i will lure some customers who would otherwise choose
other product types to consider type i. This naturally should necessitate carrying
less inventory of products in other types. The following result formalizes these
notions: as products within a type i become less correlated, the optimal total
stock of type i increases while the optimal total stock of all other types l 6= i
decreases. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 6. For all i ∈ M , if γ¯i > γ′i, then
∑
j∈N x
∗
ij(S, γ¯i,γ−i) ≥∑
j∈N x
∗
ij(S, γ′i,γ−i) and
∑
j∈N x
∗
lj(S, γ¯i,γ−i) ≤
∑
j∈N x
∗
lj(S, γ′i,γ−i)∀l 6= i, for all
γ−i ∈ (0, 1]m−1.
Lastly, the following asymptotic result characterizes optimal assortments of a
product type i as γi tends to zero (i.e.,, as the utilities of variants of product
type i become increasingly correlated.) The proofs of Proposition 3, Lemma 6 and
Lemma 7 are deferred to the appendix.
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Lemma 7. As γi approaches zero, there exists an optimal assortment S
∗
i ∈ {∅, {1}}
of product type i for problem (4.5)-(4.6).
Lemma 7 implies that, as the utilities of variants of a type i become increasingly
correlated, it becomes optimal to either offer no products of type i, or only the most
popular product of type i. This lines up with our observations that as customers
will gravitate toward the highest-utility variant of product type i as γi becomes very
small, and the presence or absence of this highest-utility variant will become the
only factor which influences a customer’s decision to buy from that product type.
As such, when choosing amongst a number of extremely similar product variants
of one type that can potentially be offered, our decision boils down to whether or
not the most popular variant should offered, and all other variants of the product
type can be disregarded. One might expect the opposite to be true, i.e., that
as γi increases, assortment variety in product type i will become a larger factor.
We anticipate that Lemma 7 indicates a general trend in optimal assortments with
changes in γi values, namely that as γi increases, it usually becomes optimal to offer
larger assortments of products of type i. We leave further investigation of effects
of utility correlation on optimal assortment sizes to our numerical experiments.
4.5 Dynamic Program
We can exploit the fact that optimal assortments are popularity-ordered in each
product type to devise a solution approach for problem (4.5)-(4.6). Plugging in
the exact expressions for qij(S), the objective function in (4.5) is equal to
λ
∑
i∈M(pi − ci)Vi(Si)
v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(Si)
−
∑
i∈M θi(
∑
j∈Si e
rµij/γi)Vi(Si)
r(1−1/γi)
(v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(Si))
r
, (4.9)
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where we use the convention 0/0 := 0. Let Θi(Si) = θi(
∑
j∈Si e
rµij/γi)Vi(Si)
r(1−1/γi).
We can maximize this function over assortments S via a dynamic program with
three state variables, where the decision epochs are the product types i ∈ M
and the action variable in each decision epoch is the assortment Si ∈ P ; we only
need to consider assortments in the popular set for each product type. The profit
(4.9) is computed after the final decision epoch m, with the first, second and
third state variables representing the sums
∑
i∈M(pi − ci)Vi(Si),
∑
i∈M Vi(Si) and∑
i∈M Θi(Si), respectively, corresponding to the assortment decisions made in each
of the previous epochs. The optimality equation is given by
Ji(z1, z2, z3) = max
Si∈P
Ji+1
(
z1 + (pi − ci)Vi(Si), z2 + Vi(Si), z3 + Θi(Si)
)
(4.10)
for all i ∈M ,where the boundary condition is
Jm+1(z1, z2, z3) = λ
z1
v0 + z2
− z3
(v0 + z2)r
.
We can evaluate J1(0, 0, 0) to obtain the optimal objective value of problem (4.5)-
(4.6). We note that the size of the state space grows exponentially with m, which
creates computational challenges as the number of product types increases. To mit-
igate this difficulty, we will consider a modified version of the state space by setting
a fixed integer T ≥ 1 and dividing each dimension of the state space into T inter-
vals of equal length. Let T = {0, . . . , T}. Noting that the maximum values that z1,
z2 and z3 can take are
∑
i∈M(pi− ci)Vi(N),
∑
i∈M Vi(N) and
∑
i∈M Θi(N), respec-
tively, let ∆1 =
1
T
∑
i∈M(pi− ci)Vi(N), ∆2 = 1T
∑
i∈M Vi(N), ∆3 =
1
T
∑
i∈M Θi(N).
The modified state space that we consider is
Z =
{
(t1∆1, t2∆2, t3∆3) : (t1, t2, t3) ∈ T 3
}
,
which contains (T + 1)3 elements.
We can show that there exists a solution lying in Z that provides an upper
bound on the optimal objective value of problem (4.5)-(4.6). To see this claim,
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suppose that we have an optimal solution S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗m) to problem (4.5)-(4.6).
Let
t∗1 =
⌈∑
i∈M (pi − ci)Vi(S∗i )
∆1
⌉
, t∗2 =
⌊∑
i∈M Vi(S
∗
i )
∆2
⌋
, t∗3 =
⌊∑
i∈M Θi(S
∗
i )
∆3
⌋
.
Then (t∗1∆1, t∗2∆2, t∗3∆3) ∈ Z and
λ
t∗1∆1
v0 + t∗2∆2
− t
∗
3∆3
(v0 + t∗2∆2)r
=
λt∗1∆1 − (v0 + t∗2∆2)1−rt∗3∆3
v0 + t∗2∆2
≥ λ
∑
i∈M (pi − ci)Vi(S∗i )− (v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(S
∗
i ))
1−r∑
i∈M Θi(S
∗
i )
v0 +
∑
i∈M Vi(S
∗
i )
=
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
(pi − ci)λqij(S∗)−
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
θiqij(S∗)r.
Using this idea, we can define an approximation to our original dynamic program
that provides an upper bound on the optimal objective value of problem (4.5)-(4.6). Let
J˜i(z1, z2, z3) =
max
Si∈P
J˜i+1
(⌈
z1 + (pi − ci)Vi(Si)
∆1
⌉
∆1,
⌊
z2 + Vi(Si)
∆2
⌋
∆2,
⌊
z3 + Θi(Si)
∆3
⌋
∆3
)
(4.11)
for all (z1, z2, z3) ∈ Z, i ∈ M , with J˜m+1(z1, z2, z3) = Jm+1(z1, z2, z3). Then
J˜1(0, 0, 0) ≥ J1(0, 0, 0). We can compute J˜1(0, 0, 0) by evaluating the value func-
tions J˜i(z1, z2, z3) for all i = 1, . . . ,m + 1 and (z1, z2, z3) ∈ Z, which requires
O(mnT 3) operations. We can construct an assortment (S1, . . . , Sm) that provides
a lower bound on the optimal objective value of problem (4.5)-(4.6) by emplying
the greedy policy with respect to the value functions J˜i(z1, z2, z3), i.e., choosing
the assortment Si that achieves the maximum in (4.11) for all i ∈M starting from
J˜1(0, 0, 0).
4.6 An Approximate Model
High-quality solutions to problem (4.5)-(4.6) can also be computed with less com-
putational effort through use of an approximate problem, where we assume that
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for any assortment S, with probability qij(S) all λ customers will by product j
in type i, for all j ∈ N, i ∈ M . In other words, we assume that either exactly
one of the products that we offer will be chosen by the entire arriving customer
population, or that all customers will choose to buy nothing. The optimal stocking
strategy under such a situation is to stock λ units of every product whose purchase
probability qij(S) is at least as large as its cost-to-price ratio. The approximate
problem that we formulate corresponds precisely to the assortment optimization
problem resulting from this scenario, but with price and cost parameters that are
adjusted from their original values in order to provide a good approximation to
problem (4.5)-(4.6). The primary advantage of this approximate problem is that
its analogous dynamic programming formulation has a smaller state space than
that of the dynamic program studied in the previous section.
To formulate the approximate problem, we let hi(q) = (pi − ci)λq − θiqr, so
that the objective function of problem (4.5)-(4.6) is
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N hi(qij(S)). The
function hi(·) is convex and satisfies hi(q) = 0 at q = 0 and at q = ηi, where
ηi = (θi/((pi − ci)λ)) 11−r . For q ∈ [0, ηi], we have hi(q) ≤ 0. We observe that if
S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗m) is an optimal solution for problem (4.5)-(4.6), then hi(qij(S∗)) ≥
0 ∀i ∈ M, j ∈ N. To see this, suppose that hi(qij(S∗)) < 0 for some j ∈ S∗i .
Then we could remove this product from the assortment. This would increase the
purchase probabilities qlk of all products such that fl(qlk(S∗)) ≥ 0, which would in
turn cause hl(qlk) to increase, by the convexity of hl(·). Meanwhile, since hi(0) = 0
but hi(qij(S∗)) < 0, the new solution would provide a strictly better objective value
than S∗, contradicting the optimality of S∗. Since an optimal solution to problem
(4.5)-(4.6) will never have hi(qij(S∗)) < 0, problem (4.5)-(4.6) is equivalent to
maximizing
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N [hi(qij(S))]+, where [·]+ denotes the positive-part function.
We also note that the derivative of hi(·) at ηi is (1 − r)(pi − ci)λ. Since hi(·) is
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convex and hi(ηi) = 0, we can lower bound [hi(q)]
+ by (1 − r)(pi − ci)λ[q − ηi]+
(See Figure 4.1.) This suggests maximizing the function
max
S
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
(1− r)(pi − ci)λ[qij(S)− ηi]+
as an approximation to problem (4.5)-(4.6). This problem corresponds exactly to
the assortment optimization problem under the scenario described at the beginning
of this section, where the adjusted price and cost parameters are (1 − r)(pi − ci)
and (1 − r)(pi − ci)ηi, respectively, meaning that ηi represents the margin in this
approximation.
Note that if S¯ = (S¯1, . . . , S¯m) maximizes the objective function above and
qij(S¯) < ηi for some j ∈ S¯i, then we could remove this product from the assort-
ment and strictly increase our objective value (using a similar argument as in the
paragraph above), implying that qij(S¯) ≥ ηi for any optimal assortment S¯. Thus,
we can disregard the positive-part operator when solving this problem. Since the
constants (1−r) and λ are also superfluous, we arrive at the approximate problem
max
S
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
(pi − ci)qij(S)−
∑
i∈M
(pi − ci)ηi|Si| (4.12)
s.t. S = (S1, . . . , Sm), Si ⊆ N ∀i ∈M. (4.13)
If there is some i ∈ M such that ηi > 1, then since qr ≥ q for all q ∈ [0, 1],
hi(qij(S)) will be non-positive for all j ∈ N , and it will be optimal to offer no
products in nest i. As such, we will assume without loss of generality that ηi ≤ 1
for all i ∈M.
Problem (4.12)-(4.13) retains important structural properties of problem (4.5)-
(4.6), namely that optimal assortments belong to the popular set P . Therefore, as
in the original problem, we need only consider n+ 1 different assortments of each
product type in order to construct an optimal solution.
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Figure 4.1: The functions hi(·) and (1− r)(pi − ci)λ[· − ηi]+.
Theorem 9. There exists an optimal assortment S¯ = (S¯1, . . . , S¯m) for problem
(4.12)-(4.13) such that S¯i ∈ P for all i ∈M.
Proof. Suppose that Sˆ = (Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆm) is optimal for problem (4.12)-(4.13). Let
ki = |Sˆi| for all i ∈ M. Then we have
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N(pi − ci)qij(Sˆ) −
∑
i∈M ηi|Sˆi| =∑
i∈M (pi−ci)Vi(Sˆi)
v0+
∑
l∈M Vl(Sˆl)
−∑i∈M ηiki. Now let S¯i = {1, . . . , ki} for all i ∈ M. We know
that Vi(S¯i) ≥ Vi(Sˆi) for all i ∈ M , since µi1 > . . . > µin and Sˆi contains ki
elements. Since the function
∑
i∈M (pi−ci)yi
v0+
∑
i∈M yi
is increasing in yi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ M ,
it follows that
∑
i∈M (pi−ci)Vi(S¯i)
v0+
∑
l∈M Vl(S¯l)
−∑i∈M ηiki ≥ ∑i∈M (pi−ci)Vi(Sˆi)v0+∑l∈M Vl(Sˆl) −∑i∈M ηiki. Thus,
S¯ = (S¯1, . . . , S¯m) must be optimal for problem (4.12)-(4.13).
Noting that the objective function of problem (4.12)-(4.13) is
∑
i∈M (pi−ci)Vi(Si)
v0+
∑
i∈M Vi(Si)
−∑
i∈M(pi − ci)ηi|Si| and using Lemma 9, we can solve problem (4.12)-(4.13) using
a dynamic program with optimality equation
Gi(z1, z2) = max
Si∈P
{
− (pi − ci)ηi|Si|+Gi+1
(
z1 + (pi − ci)Vi(Si), z2 + Vi(Si)
)}
,
(4.14)
where the boundary condition is Gm+1(z1, z2) =
z1
v0+z2
. We can evaluate G1(0, 0) to
obtain the optimal objective value of problem (4.12)-(4.13). This dynamic program
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has two states, which is one less than the dynamic program used to obtain the
optimal objective value of our original problem. As such, we can use this dynamic
program to obtain approximate solutions with reduced computational effort. We
can make use of a similar state space modification technique as the one described in
the previous subsection to come up with an upper bound on the optimal objective
value of problem (4.12)-(4.13) and obtain assortments that provide lower bounds
on the optimal objective value of problem (4.5)-(4.6). In particular, if we specify
a number T of grid points in each dimension of the modified state space and carry
over the notation used in the previous section, we accomplish this by evaluating
the value functions
G˜i(z1, z2)
= max
Si∈P
{
−(pi−ci)ηi|Si|+G˜i+1
(⌈
z1 + (pi − ci)Vi(Si)
∆1
⌉
∆1,
⌊
z2 + Vi(Si)
∆2
⌋
∆2
)}
,
for all (z1, z2) ∈ {(t1∆1, t2∆2) : (t1, t2) ∈ T 2}, i ∈ M , with G˜m+1(z1, z2) =
Gm+1(z1, z2). The work required using this approach is O(mnT
2).
Problem (4.12)-(4.13) can obtain quite accurate solutions to problem (4.5)-
(4.6), depending on the value of the distribution parameter r. The accuracy of
solutions is formalized in the following lemma, which shows that if we solve problem
(4.12)-(4.13) and use this solution as a solution to problem (4.5)-(4.6), the loss in
expected profit is at most (r ·100)%. We emphasize that this is an upper bound on
the profit loss, and that our numerical experiments indicate that the loss in profit
tends to be significantly less than this worst-case guarantee.
Lemma 8. Let S∗ be an optimal solution to problem (4.5)-(4.6) and S¯ an
optimal solution to problem (4.12)-(4.13). Then 1
1−r
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N hi(qij(S¯)) ≥∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N hi(qij(S∗)).
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Proof. The derivative is hi(·) is given by h′i(q) = (pi − ci)λ − rθiq1−r ≤ (pi − ci)λ −
rθi ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that ((pi − ci)λ − rθi)[q − ηi]+ ≥ [hi(q)]+ ∀q ∈ [0, 1],
since hi(q) ≤ 0 for q ∈ [0, ηi]. Thus, we have
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
hi(qij(S∗)) = maxS
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
hi(qij(S)) = maxS
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
[hi(qij(S))]+
≤ max
S
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
((pi − ci)λ− rθi)[qij(S)− ηi]+
= max
S
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
1− rη1−ri
1− r (pi − ci)λ(1− r)[qij(S)− ηi]
+
≤ 1
1− r maxS
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
(pi − ci)λ(1− r)[qij(S)− ηi]+
=
1
1− r
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
(pi − ci)λ(1− r)[qij(S¯)− ηi]+ ≤ 1
1− r
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
[hi(qij(S¯))]+
=
1
1− r
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
hi(qij(S¯)),
where the second inequality follows from ηi ≤ 1 and the last equality follows from
the fact that qij(S¯) ≥ ηi ∀j ∈ S¯i, ∀i ∈M.
4.7 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we test the performance of the assortment and stocking decisions
obtained by solving approximations to problem (4.5)-(4.6) and examine how these
assortment and stocking decisions behave with changes in the utility correlation
parameters γi. We make use of the three-state dynamic program from Section 4.5
to obtain upper and lower bounds on the optimal objective value of problem (4.5)-
(4.6) and assortments and stocking decisions corresponding to lower bounds. In or-
der to address our central questions, we examine how the assortment and inventory
decisions obtained by the policy corresponding to the three state dynamic program
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change with the values of the parameters γi when all other problem parameters
are fixed. In addition, we use the two-state dynamic program from Section 4.6 to
obtain lower bounds on the optimal objective value and assortments and stocking
decisions corresponding to lower bounds, and compare the performance of these
assortments to the upper bound obtained by the three-state dynamic program.
4.7.1 Experimental Setup
In our test problems, we generate a number of problem instances. For each prob-
lem instance, we compute the value functions J˜i(·, ·, ·) for all i ∈M and record the
upper bound J˜1(0, 0, 0) on the optimal objective value of problem (4.5)-(4.6). We
also compute the assortment S3 = (S31 , . . . , S3m) corresponding to the greedy policy
with respect to the value functions J˜i(·, ·, ·) and compute
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N hi(qij(S3))
to obtain a lower bound on the optimal objective value of problem (4.5)-(4.6) cor-
responding to the three-state policy (3-SP). In addition, we compute the value
functions G˜i(·, ·) for all i ∈ M and the assortment S2 = (S21 , . . . , S2m) corre-
sponding to the greedy policy with respect to these value functions. We compute∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N hi(qij(S2)) to obtain a lower bound on the optimal objective value of
problem (4.5)-(4.6) corresponding to the two-state policy (2-SP).
In each problem instance, we have m = 15 product types and n = 4 variants
of each product type, from which we need to come up with assortments to offer to
customers. Letting Wij be a sample from the uniform distribution over [0, 1], we
set the deterministic utility component of variant j of type i as µij = log(1+9Wij),
so that eµij is uniformly distributed over the interval [1, 10]. To generate the no-
purchase preference, we set v0 =
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N e
µij/9, so that the probability of
non-purchase is 0.1 when all products are offered (Si = N) and γi = 1 for all i.
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To come up with the prices and costs of the product types, we sample the price
pi from the uniform distribution over [200, 500], the margin δi from the uniform
distribution over [0.3, 0.7] and set ci = δipi. We use r = 0.5 and α = 1 in all of our
experiments. We vary the customer volume λ over the values 1000, 2000 and 4000.
For each value of λ, we generate 60 individual problem instances.
For each problem instance, we generate a set of correlation parameters
(γ1, . . . , γm) from the uniform distribution over [γ
L, γH ] for [γL, γH ] =
[0.05, 0.15], [0.15, 0.25], . . . , [0.75, 0.85], [0.85, 1]. For each generated (γ1, . . . , γm)
vector for each problem instance, we compute the approximate value functions
J˜i(·, ·, ·) and G˜i(·, ·) using a fixed size of T = 200 intervals and record the assort-
ments and stocking decisions obtained by 3-SP. For each [γL, γH ] range, we test the
average performance of 3-SP and 2-SP against the upper bound obtained by 3-SP
over all problem instances and compute the average assortment sizes and average
inventory levels given by 3-SP over all problem instances.
4.7.2 Computational Results
Table 1 compares the expected profit bounds obtained by the dynamic program-
ming approximations with λ = 1000.. The first two columns in this table show the
range of values [γL, γH ] from which the parameters γi were generated. The third
column shows the average lower bound on the optimal expected profit obtained by
3-SP, where the average is taken over all 60 problem instances that we generate.
That is, using S3k = (S31k, . . . , S3nk) to denote the assortment generated by 3-SP
for problem instance k, the third column gives 1
60
∑60
k=1
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈M hi(qij(S3k)) for
each [γL, γH ] range. The fourth column gives the average lower bound on the
optimal expected profit obtained by 2-SP in a similar manner. The fifth column
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gives the average upper bound obtained by 3-SP, i.e., 1
60
∑60
k=1 J˜1k, where J˜1k is the
value of J˜1(0, 0, 0) obtained in problem instance k. The sixth and seventh columns
show 1
60
∑60
k=1 100
J˜1k−
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N hi(qij(S3k))
J˜1k
and 1
60
∑60
k=1 100
J˜1k−
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N hi(qij(S2k))
J˜1k
,
respectively, which are the average percentage gaps between the upper bound and
the lower bounds obtained by 3-SP and 2-SP. Tables 2 and 3 follow the same format
as Table 1 for λ = 2000 and λ = 4000 respectively. The columns of Table 4 from
column three onward show 1
60
∑60
k=1 |S3ik|, the average number of products of type i
offered by 3-SP, for each [γL, γH ] range, for all i = 1, . . . , 15. Similarly, the columns
of Table 5 from three onward show 1
60
∑60
k=1
∑
j∈N x
∗
ij(S3k), the average inventory
stocked of product type i by 3-SP, for each [γL, γH ] range, for all i = 1, . . . , 15.
The results in Tables 1,2, and 3 show that 3-SP can achieve lower-to-upper
bound gaps of under 2 percent, suggesting that assortments computed by 3-SP
perform very well relative to true optimal assortments on average for sufficiently
high values of T . We note that the upper and lower bounds on the optimal expected
profit obtained by 3-SP are both increasing as γL and γH increase, as one would
expect given that Theorem 8 indicates that the optimal objective value of problem
(4.5)-(4.6) is nondecreasing in γi. We also note that 2-SP generally performs better
for smaller values of γi.
Table 4 also indicates that the averages size of assortments offered by 3-SP are
increasing as γL and γH increase. While between zero and one product is offered
on average when γi values lie in the interval [0.05, 0.15], upwards of three out of a
potential four products are offered on average when γi values are generated from
[0.85, 1]. The results are consistent not only with Lemma 7, which indicates that
either ∅ or {1} is an optimal assortment for product type i as γi becomes small,
but also our hypothesis in Section 4.4 that optimal assortment sizes increase with
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γi. These properties are also illustrated in Figure 2, which shows a plot of the
average total number of products offered by 3-SP as a function of γH .
Table 5 indicates that the average inventory levels of products stocked in each
product type by 3-SP also tend to become larger as γL and γH increase. While we
know from Lemma 6 that total inventory stocked in a product type i increases as γi
increases for a fixed assortment S, it was not clear whether this result also applied
to optimal assortments, i.e., accounting for the fact that the optimal assortment
is not fixed and is also changing with the values of γi. The results in Table 3 show
that, while this may not be true, there is a general upward trend observable in the
sizes of assortments offered by 3-SP as the utilities of products in all types become
increasingly less correlated with one another. This is also illustrated in Figure 2,
which shows a plot of the average total number of products stocked by 3-SP as a
function of γH .
Our results also indicate that 2-SP generates assortments that can perform well
relative to upper bounds on optimal expected profits. In particular, the assort-
ments generated by 2-SP perform significantly better than the worst-case guarantee
of a 50% profit loss from solving problem (4.12)-(4.13) on average, attaining a worst
observed average percentage gap of 12.63% in our experiments. Examining Tables
2 and 3, we note that while the performance of 3-SP appears relatively insensitive
to changes in λ, the performance of 2-SP is much more sensitive, attaining a worst
observed average percentage gap of only 4.19% when λ = 4000. This suggests
that the number of grid points T in each dimension is the most significant driver
of performance in 3-SP, and that 2-SP may be more useful for problems with a
large customer volume due to its reduced computational effort and relatively good
performance.
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γL γH
Avg. Expected Profit Bounds (×105) Avg. Gap with Upper Bound
Lower (3-SP) Lower (2-SP) Upper 3-SP 2-SP
0.05 0.15 1.272 1.241 1.287 1.17 % 3.56 %
0.15 0.25 1.277 1.243 1.301 1.83 % 4.40 %
0.25 0.35 1.291 1.244 1.316 1.99 % 5.46 %
0.35 0.45 1.310 1.242 1.335 1.92 % 6.87 %
0.45 0.55 1.332 1.243 1.357 1.87 % 8.30 %
0.55 0.65 1.355 1.245 1.379 1.76 % 9.64 %
0.65 0.75 1.379 1.247 1.401 1.64 % 10.89 %
0.75 0.85 1.402 1.251 1.423 1.55 % 11.93 %
0.85 1.00 1.429 1.263 1.449 1.41 % 12.63 %
Table 4.1: Performance of 3-SP and 2-SP (λ = 1000)
γL γH
Avg. Expected Profit Bounds (×105) Avg. Gap with Upper Bound
Lower (3-SP) Lower (2-SP) Upper 3-SP 2-SP
0.05 0.15 2.867 2.854 2.895 1.01 % 1.41 %
0.15 0.25 2.881 2.869 2.929 1.65 % 2.03 %
0.25 0.35 2.917 2.869 2.971 1.82 % 3.43 %
0.35 0.45 2.967 2.876 3.018 1.70 % 4.60 %
0.45 0.55 3.021 2.888 3.073 1.69 % 5.80 %
0.55 0.65 3.077 2.916 3.125 1.55 % 6.48 %
0.65 0.75 3.134 2.945 3.179 1.41 % 7.14 %
0.75 0.85 3.187 2.987 3.228 1.30 % 7.27 %
0.85 1.00 3.249 3.033 3.286 1.16 % 7.48 %
Table 4.2: Performance of 3-SP and 2-SP (λ = 2000)
4.8 Conclusions
We formulated a joint assortment offering and stocking problem where a firm offers
a number of heterogeneous products that can be designated into subgroups, where
customers’ product evaluations are correlated. Through analysis of our problem,
we demonstrated relationships between product evaluation correlation and optimal
product variety, optimal inventory levels and optimal profits. The relationships
demonstrated align with trends observed in practice. In addition, we provided
structural properties of optimal assortments and developed dynamic-programming
based solution methods to obtain upper bounds on the optimal expected profit and
near-optimal solutions. Our numerical experiments demonstrated that our approx-
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γL γH
Avg. Expected Profit Bounds (×105) Avg. Gap with Upper Bound
Lower (3-SP) Lower (2-SP) Upper 3-SP 2-SP
0.05 0.15 5.171 5.170 5.217 0.92 % 0.93 %
0.15 0.25 5.196 5.182 5.283 1.65 % 1.90 %
0.25 0.35 5.270 5.202 5.360 1.68 % 2.89 %
0.35 0.45 5.359 5.248 5.450 1.68 % 3.65 %
0.45 0.55 5.462 5.323 5.548 1.56 % 4.03 %
0.55 0.65 5.567 5.403 5.646 1.42 % 4.19 %
0.65 0.75 5.673 5.507 5.746 1.29 % 4.10 %
0.75 0.85 5.763 5.591 5.833 1.21 % 4.06 %
0.85 1.00 5.875 5.703 5.936 1.05 % 3.84 %
Table 4.3: Performance of 3-SP and 2-SP (λ = 4000)
imation methods can obtain well-performing solutions in reasonable computation
time.
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Figure 4.2: Average total products offered (top) and total inventory (bottom)
stocked by 3-SP as a function of γH (λ = 1000)
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Table 4.4: Average assortment sizes offered by 3-SP by product type (λ =
1000)
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we considered three problems arising from scenarios in which
customers choose among a number of substitutable products that can be designated
into subgroups, such that products within a subgroup are more similar to one
another than to products within a different subgroup. In each problem, we used
the Nested Logit (NL) model to capture the customer’s choice process, in which
product evaluations for different products are allowed to be correlated. The central
decisions for the retailer considered in this thesis were the prices of the offered
products and the subset of products to offer, with some consideration also given
to the amount of each offered product to stock in the fourth chapter.
In Chapter 2, we studied a pricing problem that arose from a scenario in which
a firm offers a product through multiple sales channels where it is grouped together
with competing products, and must choose the price to offer in each channel. We
provided structural properties of the objective function and developed a sequential
procedure for obtaining optimal prices. We also showed that the structure of opti-
mal prices differs from that which is obtained when using the simpler Multinomial
Logit (MNL) model, a special case of the NL model, highlighting the impact of
taking product evaluation correlation into account when making pricing decisions.
In Chapter 3, we considered a more general pricing problem under the NL model,
where a firm controls multiple products categories with multiple products in each
category, with the added constraint that each product’s price must satisfy a lower
and upper bound. We also considered an extension of this problem where the
optimal assortment to offer must be chosen in addition to the prices of the offered
products. We provided efficient approximation methods that allow the user to
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specific performance guarantees in advance, where the final solutions are obtained
via solving linear programs. Through computational experiments, we show that
our methods can vastly outperform naive heuristics for solving constrained pricing
problems under the NL model. In Chapter 4, we studied a joint assortment offer-
ing and stocking problem, motivated by a desire to explain relationships between
product evaluation correlation and offered product variety that tend to appear in
practice. We provided structural properties of optimal assortments for our prob-
lem, and used these properties to establish results concerning relationships between
evaluation correlation and optimal product variety, inventory levels and profit that
aligned with trends observed in practice. In addition, while our original problem
is difficult, we developed multiple strategies for efficiently obtaining near-optimal
solutions and upper bounds on optimal expected profits.
There are several extensions of the work in this thesis that may be pursued in
future research. In the pricing setting of Chapters 2 and 3, it would be interesting
to consider more general constraints on prices, such as polyhedral constraints. An
example of this is price laddering. Generally, high-end products should be priced
above lower-end products in order to stay consistent with quality expectations,
but low-end products with low customer price sensitivities may be priced higher as
a result of optimizing prices without constraints. Price ladder constraints ensure
that lower-end products must be priced below their high-end counterparts.
Considering extensions to Chapter 4, while optimal product variety within a
product type does not always increase with independence among product evalua-
tions within that type, our numerical experiments suggest that this tends to be true
in practice, and it may be possible to identify certain conditions under which this
is the case. The question of whether a constant-factor approximation algorithm
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for our original problem exists remains open. While we developed an approximate
problem that provides a 2-approximation to the original problem, we still needed
to use a dynamic programming-based method to solve this approximate problem.
In addition, it may be interesting to consider instances of our problem where there
are constraints on the offered assortment, e.g., cardinality or capacity constraints.
Another extension in both pricing and assortment problems is to remove the as-
sumption that a customer can purchase only one item, allowing multiple purchases
by one customer. This inherently changes the way that utilities are assigned to
items. For instance, a customer may come into a grocery store looking for a specific
combination of ingredients in order to make a recipe, but may elect to leave with-
out buying anything if one of those ingredients is missing from the store’s offered
assortment. With some modifications, there may be room within the framework
of the MNL and NL models to capture these behaviors.
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APPENDIX A
OMITTED RESULTS
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
In this section, we complete the proof of Proposition 2. As mentioned in the proof
of Proposition 2 in the main text, the result follows if we can show that
max
wi∈[Li,Ui]
{(∑
j∈N
wij
)γi ∑j∈N wij (κij − ηij logwij)∑
j∈N wij
−
(∑
j∈N
wij
)γi
z
}
= max
yi∈[L¯i,U¯i]
{
yγii
gi(yi)
yi
− yγii z
}
.
We let ζ∗L and ζ
∗
R respectively be the optimal objective values of the problems
on the left and right side above. First, we show that ζ∗L ≤ ζ∗R. We let w∗i be an
optimal solution to the problem on the left side above. Since w∗i ∈ [Li,Ui], we have∑
j∈N w
∗
ij ≥
∑
j∈N Lij = L¯i. We proceed under the assumption that we also have∑
j∈N w
∗
ij ≤ U¯i and we carefully address this assumption later on. The solution w∗i
is feasible to problem (3.5) when this problem is solved with yi =
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij. Thus,
letting yˆi =
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij, we have gi(yˆi) ≥
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij). Furthermore,
since
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij ∈ [L¯i, U¯i], the solution yˆi is feasible to the problem on the right side
above. In this case, noting the last inequality and the fact that yˆi =
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij, the
solution yˆi is feasible to the problem on the right side above providing an objective
value for this problem that is larger than the one provided by the solution w∗i for
the problem on the left side. So, we get ζ∗R ≥ ζ∗L. To address the assumption
that
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij ≤ U¯i, assume on the contrary that
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij > U¯i. In this case,
if we solve problem (3.5) with yi =
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij > U¯i and use wˆi to denote an
optimal solution, then the discussion right after problem (3.5) implies that the first
constraint in this problem is not tight at the optimal solution, yielding
∑
j∈N wˆij <
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yi =
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij. Furthermore, if we solve problem (3.5) with yi =
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij, then
w∗i is a feasible solution to this problem, indicating that we have
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij (κij −
ηij logw
∗
ij) ≤
∑
j∈N wˆij (κij − ηij log wˆij). Therefore, we obtain(∑
j∈N
w∗ij
)γi ∑j∈N w∗ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij)∑
j∈N w
∗
ij
−
(∑
j∈N
w∗ij
)γi
z
<
(∑
j∈N
wˆij
)γi ∑j∈N wˆij (κij − ηij log wˆij)∑
j∈N wˆij
−
(∑
j∈N
wˆij
)γi
z,
where we use the fact that
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij (κij−ηij logw∗ij) ≤
∑
j∈N wˆij (κij−ηij log wˆij),
γi ≤ 1,
∑
j∈N wˆij <
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij and z > 0. The inequality above contradicts the
fact that w∗i is an optimal solution to the problem on the left side above. So, we
must have
∑
j∈N w
∗
ij ≤ U¯i.
Second, we show that ζ∗L ≥ ζ∗R. Using y∗i to denote an optimal solution to the
problem on the right side above, we let wˆi be an optimal solution to problem (3.5)
when this problem is solved with yi = y
∗
i , in which case, gi(y
∗
i ) =
∑
j∈N wˆij (κij −
ηij log wˆij). Furthermore, since y
∗
i ∈ [L¯i, U¯i], the discussion right after problem
(3.5) indicates that the first constraint in problem (3.5) has to be satisfied as
equality, yielding
∑
j∈N wˆij = y
∗
i . Thus, the last two equalities imply that wˆi is a
feasible solution to the problem on the left side above yielding the same objective
value provided by the solution y∗i for the problem on the right side. So, we get
ζ∗L ≥ ζ∗R.
A.2 Lemma 9
Lemma 9. Letting (S∗i ,w
∗
i ) be an optimal solution to the maximization problem on
the right side of (3.17), if l ∈ S∗i , then we have κil−ηil logw∗il ≥ (1−γi)Ri(S∗i ,w∗i )+
γi z.
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Proof. To get a contradiction, assume that κil−ηil logw∗il < (1−γi)Ri(S∗i ,w∗i )+γi z.
We let Sˆi be the assortment obtained by taking product l out of S
∗
i . In this case,
we get
Wi(Sˆi,w
∗
i )
γi(Ri(Sˆi,w
∗
i )− z) =
∑
j∈Sˆi w
∗
ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij − z)
Wi(Sˆi,w∗i )1−γi
=
∑
j∈S∗i w
∗
ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij − z)− w∗il (κil − ηil logw∗il − z)
Wi(Sˆi,w∗i )1−γi
, (A.1)
where the first equality uses the definitions of Ri(Si,wi) and Wi(Si,wi) and the
second equality uses the fact that S∗i = Sˆi ∪ {l}. To lower bound to numerator of
the last fraction in (A.1), we note that κil−ηil logw∗il−z < (1−γi)(Ri(S∗i ,w∗i )−z).
In this case, we can lower bound the numerator of the last fraction in (A.1) by
∑
j∈S∗i
w∗ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij − z)− (1− γi)w∗il (Ri(S∗i ,w∗i )− z)
= (Ri(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )− z) (Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )− (1− γi)w∗il) ≥ 0,
where the equality follows by using the definitions of Ri(Si,wi) and Wi(Si,wi)
and rearranging the terms. To see that the inequality above holds, we observe
that we must have Ri(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )−z ≥ 0, otherwise the optimal objective value of the
maximization problem on the right side of (3.17) is negative and we can set S∗i = ∅
to get a better objective value of zero. Furthermore, Wi(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i ) ≥ w∗il and γi ≤ 1 so
that Wi(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )−(1−γi)w∗il ≥ 0, in which case, the inequality above indeed holds.
We can upper bound the denominator of the last fraction in (A.1) by observing the
fact that Wi(Sˆi,w
∗
i )
1−γi ≤ Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )1−γi + (1 − γi)Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )−γi (Wi(Sˆi,w∗i ) −
Wi(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )), which follows by recalling u
1−γi is a concave function of u and using
the subgradient inequality. Therefore, we can lower bound the last fraction in
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(A.1) as∑
j∈S∗i w
∗
ij (κij − ηij logw∗ij − z)− w∗il (κil − ηil logw∗il − z)
Wi(Sˆi,w∗i )1−γi
>
(Ri(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )− z) (Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )− (1− γi)w∗il)
Wi(S∗i ,w
∗
i )
1−γi + (1− γi)Wi(S∗i ,w∗i )−γi (Wi(Sˆi,w∗i )−Wi(S∗i ,w∗i ))
. (A.2)
Noting that Wi(Sˆi,w
∗
i )−Wi(S∗i ,w∗i ) = −w∗il and rearranging the terms in the last
fraction, we observe that the last fraction is equal to Wi(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )
γi(Ri(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i ) −
z). Thus, (A.1) and (A.2) show that Wi(Sˆi,w
∗
i )
γi(Ri(Sˆi,w
∗
i ) − z) >
Wi(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i )
γi(Ri(S
∗
i ,w
∗
i ) − z), contradicting the fact that (S∗i ,w∗i ) is an optimal
solution to the maximization problem on the right side of (3.17). So, our claim
holds and we must have κil − ηil logw∗il ≥ (1− γi)Ri(S∗i ,w∗i ) + γi z.
A.3 Theorem 10
Theorem 10. Letting Z∗ and zˆ respectively be the optimal objective values of
problems (3.2) and (3.24), we have zˆ ≥ Z∗. Furthermore, for some ρ ≥ 0, if the
grid points in problem (3.24) satisfy gi(y¯
t+1
i ) ≤ (1+ρ) gi(y¯ti) for all t = 1, . . . , τi−1,
i ∈M , then we have (1 + ρ)Z∗ ≥ zˆ.
Proof. First, we show that zˆ ≥ Z∗. To get a contradiction, assume that zˆ < Z∗.
Noting that zˆ is the optimal objective value of problem (3.24), we use zˆ and
(xˆ1, . . . , xˆm) to denote an optimal solution to this problem. By Proposition 2, Z
∗
corresponds to the value of z that satisfies (3.6), in which case, if we let x∗i be
the optimal objective value of the maximization problem on the right side of (3.6)
when this problem is solved with z = Z∗, then we get Z∗ =
∑
i∈M x
∗
i . For all
i ∈M , we let y∗i be an optimal solution to the maximization problem on the right
side of (3.6) when this problem is solved with z = Z∗. We let ti ∈ {1, . . . , τi − 1}
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be such that y∗i ∈ [y¯tit , y¯ti+1i ], where the points {y¯ti : t = 1, . . . , τi} are the collection
of grid points in problem (3.24). Since gi(·) is increasing and y∗i ≤ y¯ti+1i , we have
gi(y
∗
i ) ≤ gi(y¯ti+1i ). Also, since γi ≤ 1 and y∗i ≥ y¯tii , we have (y∗i )1−γi ≥ (y¯tii )1−γi . In
this case, using the last two observations, we obtain
xˆi ≥ (y¯tii )γi
gi(y¯
ti+1
i )
y¯tii
− (y¯tii )γi zˆ ≥ (y∗i )γi
gi(y
∗
i )
y∗i
− (y∗i )γi zˆ
≥ (y∗i )γi
gi(y
∗
i )
y∗i
− (y∗i )γi Z∗ = x∗i ,
where the first inequality is by the fact that zˆ and (xˆ1, . . . , xˆm) form a feasible
solution to problem (3.24), the third inequality follows from the fact that zˆ < Z∗
and the equality follows from the definitions of x∗i and y
∗
i . Since zˆ and (xˆ1, . . . , xˆm)
form a feasible solution to problem (3.24), we have zˆ ≥ ∑i∈M xˆi, whereas we
have Z∗ =
∑
i∈M x
∗
i by the discussion at the beginning of the proof. In this case,
adding the chain of inequalities above over all i ∈ M , we obtain zˆ ≥ ∑i∈M xˆi ≥∑
i∈M x
∗
i = Z
∗, which contradicts the fact that zˆ < Z∗. Therefore, we must have
zˆ ≥ Z∗.
Second, we show that (1+ρ)Z∗ ≥ zˆ. If we let x∗i be as defined in the paragraph
above, then we can follow the same line of reasoning that we follow above to see
that Z∗ =
∑
i∈M x
∗
i . For any t = 1, . . . , τi − 1, we note that y¯ti is a feasible
but not necessarily an optimal solution to the maximization problem on the right
side of (3.6) when this problem is solved with z = Z∗. Therefore, it follows that
x∗i ≥ (y¯ti)γi gi(y¯ti)/y¯ti − (y¯ti)γi Z∗ for all t = 1, . . . , τi − 1. If we multiply the last
inequality by 1 + ρ, then we obtain
(1 + ρ)x∗i ≥ (y¯ti)γi
(1 + ρ) gi(y¯
t
i)
y¯ti
− (y¯ti)γi (1 + ρ)Z∗
≥ (y¯ti)γi
gi(y¯
t+1
i )
y¯ti
− (y¯ti)γi (1 + ρ)Z∗,
where the second inequality follows by noting the fact that gi(y¯
t+1
i ) ≤ (1+ρ) gi(y¯ti)
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for all t = 1, . . . , τi − 1. Focusing on the first and last expressions in the chain
of inequalities above and noting that Z∗ =
∑
i∈M x
∗
i , the solution (1 + ρ)Z
∗ and
((1 + ρ)x∗1, . . . , (1 + ρ)x
∗
m) is feasible to problem (3.24). Thus, the objective value
provided by this solution for problem (3.24) is at least as large as the optimal
objective value. Since the solution (1+ρ)Z∗ and ((1+ρ)x∗1, . . . , (1+ρ)x
∗
m) provides
an objective value of (1 + ρ)Z∗ for problem (3.24), we get (1 + ρ)Z∗ ≥ zˆ.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We first note that limγi→0 e
(µik−µij)/γi is equal to 1 if µik = µij, 0 if µik < µij and
∞ if µik > µij. To show the first part, note that Vi(Si, γi) = eγi log(
∑
j∈Si e
µij/γi ).
Using L’Hospital’s rule, we note that
lim
γi→0
γi log(
∑
j∈Si
eµij/γi) = lim
γi→0
log(
∑
j∈Si e
µij/γi)
1/γi
= lim
γi→0
∑
j∈Si
{
µij∑
k∈Si e
(µik−µij)/γi
}
= argmax
k∈Si
µik
and the result follows. To show the second part, we have
lim
γi→0
eµij/γi
Vi(Si, γi)1/γi
= lim
γi→0
1∑
k∈N e
(µik−µij)/γi ,
which is equal to 1 if µij = maxk∈Si µik and 0 otherwise.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 6
We have∑
j∈N
x∗ij(S,γ) = λQi(S,γ) + αλrΦ−1(1− ci/pi)Qi(S,γ)r
∑
j∈Si
qj|i(Si, γi)r
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and
∂
∂γi
[∑
j∈Si
qj|i(Si, γi)r
]
=
∑
j∈Si
r
(
eµij/γi
Vi(Si, γi)1/γi
)r−1
1
γ2i
(
− µij +
∑
k∈Si µike
µik/γi∑
k∈Si e
µik/γi
)
eµij/γi∑
k∈Si e
µik/γi
=
r
γ2i
{
−
∑
j∈Si µije
rµij/γi
(
∑
k∈Si e
µik/γi)r
+
∑
k∈Si µike
µik/γi∑
k∈Si e
µik/γi
∑
j∈Si e
rµij/γi
(
∑
k∈Si e
µik/γi)r
}
=
r
γ2i
∑
j∈Si e
rµij/γi
(
∑
j∈Si e
µij/γi)r
{
−
∑
j∈Si µije
rµij/γi∑
j∈Si e
rµij/γi
+
∑
j∈Si µije
µij/γi∑
j∈Si e
µij/γi
}
.
The derivative of
∑
j∈Si µije
rµij/γi∑
j∈Si e
rµij/γi
with respect to r is
1
γi
[∑
j∈Si µ
2
ije
rµij/γi∑
j∈Si e
rµij/γi
−
(∑
j∈Si µije
rµij/γi∑
j∈Si e
rµij/γi
)2]
,
and the bracketed term is nonnegative by Jensen’s Inequality. Thus,
∑
j∈Si µije
rµij/γi∑
j∈Si µije
rµij/γi
is increasing in r and is equal to
∑
j∈Si µije
µij/γi∑
j∈Si e
µij/γi
when r = 1, so
∑
j∈Si µije
rµij/γi∑
j∈Si e
rµij/γi
≤
∑
j∈Si µije
µij/γi∑
j∈Si e
µij/γi
∀r ∈ [0, 1).
Thus, ∂
∂γi
[∑
j∈Si qj|i(Si, γi)
r
] ≥ 0. Since ∂
∂γi
Qi(S,γ) ≥ 0 also, we have
∂
∂γi
∑
j∈N x
∗
ij(S,γ) ≥ 0. To show that ∂∂γi
∑
j∈N x
∗
lj(S,γ) ≤ 0 for all l 6= i, note
that
∑
j∈N
x∗lj(S,γ) = λQl(S,γ) + αλrΦ−1(1− cl/pl)Ql(S,γ)r
∑
j∈Si
qj|l(Sl, γl)r
and qj|l(Sl, γl)r does not depend on γi, and we have ∂∂γiQl(S,γ) ≤ 0 since
∂
∂γi
Vi(Si, γi) ≥ 0, so the result follows.
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 7
By Proposition 3, the limit of the expected profit as γi → 0 for a given assortment
S = (S1, . . . , Sm) and parameters γ−i ∈ (0, 1]m−1 is
λ
(pi − ci)emaxk∈Si µik +
∑
l 6=i(pl − cl)Vl(Sl, γl)
v0 + e
maxk∈Si µik +
∑
t6=i Vl(Sl, γl)
− θi
(
emaxk∈Si µik
v0 + e
maxk∈Si µik +
∑
l 6=i Vl(Sl, γl)
)r∑
j∈N
1
(
j = argmax
k∈Si
µik
)r
−
∑
l 6=i
θl
(
Vl(Sl, γl)
v0 + e
maxk∈Si µik +
∑
t6=i Vt(St, γt)
)r∑
j∈Sl
(
eµlj/γl
Vl(Sl, γl)1/γl
)r
.
Suppose that Si ∈ P and Si is nonempty, so that 1 ∈ Si. Then maxk∈S∗i µik = µi1.
In addition, since we are assuming that the deterministic utilities of products within
each type are distinct, the sum
∑
j∈N 1(j = argmaxk∈Si µik)
r is simply equal to 1
and does not depend on the choice of Si. Thus, as γi approaches zero, either ∅ or
{1} must be an optimal assortment for product type i.
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